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The purpose of this Dissertation is to analyze the current ills of the international tax system with 
a special focus on developing countries, and to structure and present a Unitary Taxation System 
(“UT”) as a solution to the legitimate and multifaceted complaints about current international 
taxation of multinational companies (“MNEs”). The research aims at presenting a UT that would 
restore credibility in the international tax arena by providing fiscal predictability and certainty to 
MNEs, and ensuring appropriate taxation by all countries (specifically developing nations) of all 
“real” economic activity within their borders. Although this issue has been previously explored, 
there is currently a vacuum to be filled concerning a coherent and complete UT as an alternative 
to the current taxation of MNEs from a developing countries’ perspective. Specifically, there is a 
need for a major research and elaboration of a specific UT that would satisfy the legitimate 
concerns of developing countries while not alienating the developed world and MNEs. That is 
the goal of this Dissertation. 
The international tax regime was created in an effort to avoid situations where the same income 
was subject to double taxation due to the exclusive fact that it had a cross border character. 
However, sovereign tax laws and tax regimes have grown so different, and international 
economic activity has grown so large that the debate ought to shift from the exclusive legitimate 
need to avoid double taxation to the urgent imperative to prevent double non-taxation and other 
undue tax arbitrage schemes1 that are threatening the very existence and credibility of the 
international tax regime. The current debate2 in the international tax world about the 
                                                          
1 David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax System, 53 Tax L. Rev. 137 (1999). 
2Avi-Yonah, Kimberly Clausing, and Michael Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt 
a Formulary Profit Split. Michigan Law School: Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers (2008). 
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inappropriateness of arm’s length standards and its disservice to tax authorities across the globe 
is opening a tremendous opportunity to reflect and design an international tax system that is fair 
to MNEs by providing them with fiscal certainty, and fair to all countries, particularly 
developing countries, by allowing them adequate taxation of economic activity through 
independent and sovereign tax policies.  
This research is a response to the current global outcry about the misfortunes of the international 
tax treatment of MNEs, largely based on the separate accounting arm’s length standard (“ALS”). 
Currently MNEs that operate in different countries have very complex and burdensome tax rules 
applicable to them. The economic realities of MNEs’ operations have shown completely 
irrelevant in the design of the applicable tax rules. MNEs have therefore proven extreme 
creativity in using tax rules to their advantage since these rules are not inspired and usually have 
no real impact on the economics of their transactions. The need to conduct a business in a foreign 
country in the form of a Permanent Establishment (“PE”) for example is very comparable, on a 
strict economic standpoint, to the regime of conducting the same business in the form of a 
Controlled Foreign Corporation (“CFC”). However, in the view of tax law, the not so 
economically relevant fact of choosing a PE or a CFC has tremendous fiscal consequences. The 
debate over “check the box” regime in the U.S. and its use abroad by U.S. MNEs is a telling 
example.3  
The main focus of this research is twofold: on the one hand I intend to analyze the current ills of 
taxation of MNEs, their negative impact on tax authorities in developing countries specifically, 
                                                          
3 Steven Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check the Box Election, and the Future of Tax 
Simplification, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 405 (2005). 
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and the urgent need for a different approach. On the other hand, I intend to design and structure a 
proposal for a better way of taxing MNEs. Through this structure, I intend to align international 
tax rules to economic realities. The UT proposed in this research would provide for equitable 
taxation of MNEs in every jurisdiction they operate in, specifically, in the developing world. The 
research therefore aims at providing an in-depth study and explanation of the current 
unsustainable international tax regime, its weaknesses and unfairness in taxing MNEs; then the 
construction of a new and better structure to approaching and taxing MNEs: the UT. First, the 
discussion of the ills of the current system, focusing specifically on the developing countries, 
would require empirical research of current specific international tax policies in selected sample 
countries. Also, the design of a new structure would require answering several questions 
including: what is a UT (an agreement on definitions of Unitary Business, Combined Reporting 
and Formulary Apportionment)? What can be learned from previous experiences of application 
of various forms of UT (a look at UT within U.S. States, as well as the European experience with 
the Common Consolidated Tax Base “CCTB”)?  How does UT compare with the present system, 
in terms of ease of operation and outcomes, for MNEs and for tax authorities?  What would be 
the administrative implications for tax assessments?  What changes (ideally the least disruptive) 
to the legal framework would be necessary for a transition to UT? What would be the 
administrative cost of such transition, specifically for developing countries? 
The answers to the questions raised in this research are utterly important and relevant because 
they will fill the vacuum by providing a concrete proposal on how to tax MNEs in a way that is 
fair to developing countries and would address the current shouts and cries of MNEs and 
governmental authorities about the global fiscal uncertainty.  
 




The International tax regime is at a crossroads and the path to be chosen is yet to be determined. 
Many solutions have been attempted none of which has totally satisfied the needs of the different 
actors in the international arena. The current system, largely based on a solid network of bilateral 
tax treaties and other Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”), has been designed in order to 
assure that the same income earned should not be subject to multiple instances of taxation due to 
the simple fact that it has a cross border character. In fact, early tax treaties were denominated 
“convention for prevention of double taxation”.4 The international community and the 
international tax regime have more successfully than not achieved this goal. In fact, the burden 
of preventing double taxation has been taken on by national tax authorities directly and 
unilaterally to the point where some have argued that bilateral tax treaties are no longer 
necessary to avoid double taxation.5 This sentiment is echoed in the current environment of tax 
treaty negotiation and drafting to the point where most modern tax treaties do not enunciate the 
need to avoid double taxation in their titles.6 The need to avoid double taxation was made 
necessary as economic activity grew beyond single nations. Today, economic activity has grown 
so large and the world has become so interconnected that if concerns about double taxation seem 
diminished, the emerging trend is the legitimate concerns about tax arbitrage and double non 
taxation.7 The internationalization of economic activity is demonstrated by a large and very 
powerful conglomerate of MNEs.8 The biggest and most impactful companies today operate in 
                                                          
4 See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes 
on Income between the U.S. and Japan, Mar. 8, 1971. 
5 Tsilly Dagan, Tax Treaties Myth, The, 32 NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 939 (1999). 
6 See for example, U.S. Canada tax treaty of 1980, as revised in 2007. 
7 See Jane Gravelle, Tax havens: International tax avoidance and evasion, National Tax Journal 727 (2009). 
8 See for example, Richard Barnet and Ronald Muller, Global Reach: the Power of the Multinational Corporations, 
26 Catholic University Law Review 2 (1977); See also, Brian Roach, Corporate Power in a Global Economy, Tufts 
University (2007). 
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several sovereign countries and their taxation has animated many debates. Today, even though 
these MNEs are very connected and coordinate their global activities very closely, international 
tax laws, accentuated by the tax treaties network, have chosen to ignore the economic reality and 
rather to treat those companies as separate entities dealing independently with each other.9 This 
has created an opportunity for MNEs to basically choose where to pay taxes, if at all. There is a 
growing perception that governments lose substantial corporate tax revenue because of corporate 
designs solely aimed at shifting profits in ways that erode the taxable base from alleged high tax 
jurisdictions to the so called tax havens10 notwithstanding the fact that economic activity is 
located in the former jurisdictions.11 There currently is a growing realization by some that taxes 
are only paid by the naïve.12 Tax revenues are particularly critical in developing countries and 
such countries have been feeling the full weight of tax evasion by MNEs.13 There is 
overwhelming admission today that the system of taxation of MNEs is broken.14 However, 
nothing is as far from a consensus on how to solve it. The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) in an attempt to solve the problem in the mid-2000s 
regrettably doubled down and made matters worse by bringing more transactions under the failed 
ALS of transfer pricing.15 The OECD is back at it again by issuing a report calling for major 
research on how to solve the problems related to taxation of MNEs and specifically base erosion 
                                                          
9 See Article 9 of the U.S., OECD, and U.N. Model Tax Conventions, providing for the separate accounting and arm’s 
length standard. 
10 A tax haven generally refers to a country or an independent territory where taxes are levied at a low to zero 
rates. Traditional examples include Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Luxembourg or Switzerland. 
11 See, for example, Bloomberg: “the great corporate tax dodge”; the New York Times: “but nobody pays that”; the 
Times: “secrets of tax avoiders”; the Guardian: “tax gaps” 
12 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting , January 2013, available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-
reports.htm (last retrieved 12/13/2015). 
13 See Clemens Fuest and Nadine Riedel, Tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax expenditures in developing countries: 
A review of the literature, Report prepared for the UK Department for International Development (DFID) (2009). 
14 See Shome Parthasarathi, A primer on tax evasion, IMF Working Paper No. 93/21 (1993). 
15 See Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, OECD Report, July 17, 2008. 
   10 
  
 
and profit shifting (“BEPS”).16 This begs the central question of this research: can we design a 
better way of taxing MNEs? Is there a better way of meeting MNEs’ needs for fiscal certainty 
and the need for countries all across the globe to legitimately exercise their sovereign power to 
tax economic activities within their borders? And if such a system exists (and I argue it exist and 
intend to craft it), what is it all about? How is it different from the current system? How is it 
advantageous for both MNEs and tax authorities globally (specifically in developing countries)? 
And what would be necessary to implement that new and arguably better system, departing from 
the current rules?  
Although there have been writings on this issue, there is currently a vacuum to be filled 
concerning a coherent and complete alternative to the current taxation of MNEs based on a UT. 
Specifically, there is a need for a major research and elaboration of a specific UT that would 
satisfy the legitimate concerns of developing countries while not alienating the developed world 
and MNEs. That is the task that this research purports to take on. To achieve this goal, this 
research is divided into two main parts, comprised of four chapters each. The first part of this 
paper is a diagnostic on how, and an explanation of why the international tax system is currently 
broken. In this part, we start with a voyage in the history of taxation in general and international 
tax specifically because the knowledge of such history is quintessential to understanding the 
current system. Then we discuss major trends driving international tax rulemaking in the 
developing world, looking at specific countries as case studies in three different continents.  
Finally in this part of the research, we present an analysis of the current shortcomings of the 
systems, specifically for developing counties. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the 
advocacy of the UT as a viable alternative to the current failed system. In this part, we start by 
                                                          
16 See Supra, Note 12. 
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presenting a UT through its common tenets. Then we elaborate the reasons why UT would be the 
panacea for the current international tax ills. Finally, we design and structure an international tax 
reform proposal based on the UT, and present the current international tax treaty network as a 
potential accelerator of a transition to UT, with which it is compatible. 


























































































































Taxation for every country is more than just an expression of a country’s sovereignty; it is a 
condition of each country’s existence and ability to meet its most basic responsibilities to its 
people.17 To take up a serious discussion around taxation, it is necessary to review its historical 
perspective. It is important to not fall into the tempting and rather common habit of a generation 
to easily forget the experiences of its predecessors. The history of taxation, even though with 
parallels globally, is different between the north and the south. This part of the assay analyses, on 
the one hand, the history of taxation in general (A) through discussion of taxation in Colonial 
America (1), in Medieval Europe (2), and in colonial and post-colonial Africa (3); and on the 






                                                          
17 Ring, Diane, What's at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate: International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 Va. J. Int'l 
L. 155 (2008). 
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A. The History of Taxation in General 
Dating as far back as the biblical tithing18 and even before that, a form of taxation has always 
existed throughout times and has shown to be necessary.19 The struggles and evolutions, mainly 
from property to personal taxation have marked the history of taxation in America, Europe and 
Africa. 
1. Taxation and Colonial America 
Marks of taxation and contributions to the activities of the collectivity existed throughout 
colonial America.20 However, the first general tax law in the American colonies was enacted in 
Massachusetts Bay in 1634.21 The early tax laws relied heavily on property taxation, taxation of 
things. In fact, the Massachusetts Bay tax law of 1634 was interpreted to mean that the taxes 
where to be levied only on the property (specifically land) notwithstanding the curious notion of 
“abilityes” used in the law.22  
In the colony of New Plymouth, a revision to the Massachusetts Bay tax law of 1634 was passed 
in 1643 to define the notion of “ability”. The New Plymouth tax law indicated that assessment 
for each person would be “according to their estate and faculties, that is, according to the goods, 
lands, improved faculties and small abilities”.23 This New Plymouth tax law is the first in the 
history of colonial America to use the term “Faculty”. Tax systems and tax laws throughout 
colonial America relied on property and tangible things for assessment of taxation. The 
                                                          
18 Chodorow Adam, Agricultural Tithing and (Flat Tax) Complexity. University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 68 
(2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014967 
19 Brauner, Yariv, International Tax Regime in Crystallization, An, 56 Tax L. Rev. 259 (2002). 
20 See Delos Kinsman, The Income Tax In the Commonwealth of the United States, Publications of the American 
Economic Association, 3rd Series, IV, 4 (1903). See also Ripley, Financial History of Virginia, Columbia University 
Studies in History, Economics and Public Law Vol. iv, No 1, Pp 17-24. 
21 See Colonial Research of Massachusetts Bay, shurtleff’s Ed., No1 Pp 120 (1853). 
22 The 1634 tax law stated that each man was to be assessed “according to his estate and with consideration all 
other his abilityes whatsoever”. 
23  See Records of the Colony of New Plymouth: Laws 1623-1682, Pulsifer’s Ed., No XI, Pp 42. 
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innovative tax law of the colony of New Plymouth did not, however, detail the notion of faculty, 
nor outline methods through which assessment of taxation of a person’s faculties, would be 
accomplished. Nevertheless, the idea of a tax detached from the tangible property was introduced 
and the embryo of “faculty taxation” was planted.24 The notion of faculty tax will thereafter 
make its way in the Massachusetts Bay later tax legislations and enjoy a wide expansion to other 
American colonies.  
The colony of New Heaven relied on land taxation until 1640 at which time it expanded the tax 
base to include estates by introducing a tax on estates. In 1648, in an effort to increase their 
revenues, the colony of New Heaven appointed a committee to inquire as to whether the 
Massachusetts Bay style of taxation would be admissible in New Heaven. As a result of the 
Committee’s work and recommendations, the colony of New Heaven introduced, in 1649, a law 
that imposed tax on the profits of laborers, tradespeople and others.25  
In Connecticut, the tax law closely followed the Massachusetts Bay model. The Connecticut tax 
law of 1650 stated that “every inhabitant who doth not voluntarily contribute proportionably to 
his ability … shall be compelled thereunto by assessment and distress”.26 The law provided for 
an assessment based on the situs of the land and the dwelling of the person.27 In Connecticut, 
non-compliance with tax laws was strongly sanctioned. 
Rhode Island introduced the ‘faculty tax’ a little later, in the tax law passed by the Assembly in 
1673. The particularity in Rhode Island however was the fact that the colony entrusted 
enforcement of the faculty tax to its peoples. In fact, each inhabitant was task to assess its 
                                                          
24 See Edwin Seligman, The Income Tax: a Study of the History, Theory and Practice of Income Taxation at Home 
and Abroad, Political Science Quarterly, Vol X, No 2 (1895). 
25 See Records of the colony and Plantation of New Heaven, Pp40. 
26 See Colonial Records of Connecticut, Pp548. 
27 Id. 
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neighbor, and recommend the tax that the neighbor should be liable for based on the person’s 
assessment of the properties of its neighbor. The final decision on assessment was however 
reserved to a committee of three locally chosen honest and able men.28 
In New Jersey, the tax law of 1684 ended the system of taxation solely on property, and 
stipulated that tax would be assessed on profits. In fact, the 1684 law in New Jersey brought into 
the tax net, in addition to property owners, “all other persons … who are freemen and are 
artificers or follow any trade or merchandizing, and also all inholders, ordinary keepers and other 
persons in places of profits”.29  The law granted the assessor wide discretion in administering the 
new tax provisions. 
In Pennsylvania, the faculty tax was not introduced until after the revolution had started. The law 
of 1782 imposed a poll tax on all freemen.30 Under this law and similar to the Massachusetts Bay 
model, taxes were assessed on profits, not only property. The law afforded the assessor ample 
discretion in the assessment of such taxes. In 1785, a revision to the 1782 law was adopted. The 
revised version of the law diminished the power and discretion of the tax assessor by providing 
for floors and ceilings in the tax assessments and payments. Unlike Massachusetts Bay, the 
Pennsylvania tax was a poll tax because it assigned the taxes to be paid based on categories of 
persons and classes of professions.31 
The Delaware tax law of 1752 which indicated that all persons should be assessed on their 
estates, clarified that the estate was not merely the visible and tangible property, but it rather also 
                                                          
28 See Supra at 24 (Seligman). 
29 See Laws of New Jersey, 1664-1701, leaming and Spicer Pp494. 
30 See the Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dallas ii, Pp 8. 
31 For example, freemen of no profession might be assessed fifty cents to ten dollars, mechanics thirty cents to ten 
dollars, retailers fifty cents to five dollars, lawyers and physicians one to ten dollars etc. 
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included “no visible estate”,32 adopting thereby, the faculty tax model that existed in other 
colonies and had gained continuous popularity. 
The southern state of Maryland had a very primitive tax system. Taxes were levied evenly and 
equally, without regard to notions of ability to pay, or property worth.33 In 1777 the primitive tax 
system and its poll tax were abolished and the state instituted a property tax along with a faculty 
tax.34 Maryland raised its taxes in 1779, very soon after their introduction in 1777.35 Shortly 
thereafter, in 1780, the whole system was abolished. 
The state of South Carolina introduced the faculty tax earlier. The faculty tax model was existent 
there from the outset and South Carolina did not abolish such system but rather thrived to 
improve it over time. The tax law of 1701 clearly imposed tax on citizens according to their 
“estate… and abilities”. The later tax law, after the state constitution was adopted, indicated that 
tax should be assessed on “the profits of all faculties and professions…”36 
As seen above, in the colonial America, the question has seldom been whether to tax; the debate 
and evolution instead has always been about how to tax. The distinction between real and 
personal property marked the evolution of taxation in the colonial America. Most colonies 
started their tax systems with exclusive taxation of real property. Due to the palpable nature of 
real property, it made more sense to assess taxes on the tangible objects and any taxation 
detached from the tangible was hard to imagine. Authors have usually referred to the property 
taxation, predominant during that period, as the ‘real tax’.37 In a quest to expand their tax base 
                                                          
32 See the Laws of the Government of New-Castle, Kent and Sussex upon Delaware, Philadelphia, 1752 Pp234. 
33 See Sketch of tax Legislation in Maryland, Report of the Maryland Tax Commission, Appendix Pp cxxix, Baltimore 
(1888). 
34 See Maryland Laws of 1777, c. 22 Sections 5, 6. 
35 See Maryland Laws of 1779, c. 35 Section 48 (which raised the tax to two and a half percent). 
36 See Cooper, Statutes at Large of South Carolina, Pp36, 183. 
37 The Notion of real tax to describe taxation of real property remains in some fiscal systems to date. In France and 
Cameroon for example, the term “Fiscalite reelle” (translated as real tax) is still used today to describe taxation of 
real property as to distinguish it with the taxation of personal property. See also, supra at 24. 
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and increase their revenues, many colonies adopted the tax on faculties and abilities to capture 
that portion of the population with income not necessarily in the form of tangible property. The 
then known as “faculty tax” imposed a tax on the revenue without being a pure income tax of the 
modern era. The distinctive trait of this tax, compare to the current income tax is that the faculty 
tax was not levied on an individual’s total income excluding his expenses or liabilities. The tax 
was assessed on presumed income on certain classes and categories of people. The system 
resembled a sort of class tax in which different classes within each employment were rated at 
fixed amounts and assessed accordingly. 
After the constitution of the United States and the formation of the Federation, acts of war and 
threats of totalitarian powers raised the importance yet again, of taxation.38 The founding fathers 
clearly understood the importance of taxation in order to achieve important goals such as shaping 
the national economy, bringing other nations to fair commercial terms, regulating morals or 
abolishing slavery.39 The founding document empowered Congress to “lay and collect taxes, 
duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general 
welfare of the United States”.40 The US Constitution however, provided many limitations to such 
otherwise broad taxing powers of Congress. The Constitution clearly indicated that “No… direct 
tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census…”41 Any direct tax therefore was prohibited 
unless apportioned to the states populations. Many attempts to impose an income tax or other 
direct taxes during that period failed on constitutional grounds. In addition, any tax legislation 
was subject Alexander Hamilton’s “necessary and proper” requirements for its validity.42 The 
                                                          
38 See Sidney Ratner, American Taxation: Its History as a Social Force in Democracy, the Vail-Ballou Press (1942). 
39 See Walton H. Hamilton and Douglas Adair, The Power to Govern, New York 121-44 (1937). 
40 See U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 1. 
41  See U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 9, Cl. 4. 
42 See Federalist Papers, essay by Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No 33. 
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corporate tax was sometimes upheld as an excise tax imposed on the privilege of doing business 
in corporate form. The first attempt at imposing an income tax was in 1815. In fact in 1815, 
Secretary Dallas after proposing a tax on inheritance, a tax on wheat and flour, and a tax on bank 
dividends, suggested that an income tax would be easier in order to raise revenues necessary to 
pay for the Civil War.43 However, the conclusion of peace made the tax unnecessary and the 
whole system of internal revenue was abolished. Many attempts to impose an income tax 
thereafter fail through as arguments continued to be raised as to the constitutionality of the 
income tax. In fact, the Supreme Court, in 1895, held that a non-apportioned income tax on 
interest, dividends, and rents was unconstitutional as a direct tax.44 The necessity of a 
constitutional amendment was established in order to sustain an income tax and an Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”). In response, the US Treasury proposed the Sixteenth Amendment to 
do away with the apportionment requirement of direct taxes, and specifically of income taxes.45 
Notwithstanding many attempts to block the Sixteenth Amendment on the grounds that it was a 
dangerous setback in the development of the Union, and many campaigns after its ratification 
questioning the legitimacy of the ratification process, the Amendment was passed by Congress 
and ratified by the requisite number of States in 1913.46 Tax laws and statutes passed after 
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment are often referred to as modern tax statutes, and there 
have been several tax statutes since that period; most commonly in the form of the Internal 
Revenue Code (“IRC”) and amendments thereon. Similar, the IRS was created and has been the 
                                                          
43 See Special Report on the State of the Finances, American State Papers, Vol VI, Pp885-887 (1832). 
44 See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) 
45 See U.S. Const. Amend. XVI stating in part: “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, 
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or 
enumeration.” 
46 See generally Boris Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power of the Federal Government, 41 The Tax 
Lawyer 1 Pp3 (1987). 
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institution in charge of the administration and interpretation of tax laws. The courts have also 
consistently upheld Congress’ broad power to tax.47 
2. Taxation and Medieval Europe 
In Medieval Europe, states and empires survived if they possessed sufficient and continuous 
command over the financial mean necessary to defend their territory and citizens against external 
aggressions, and to meet internal challenges to their authority.48 The regularity of wars and 
aggressions of this period required ever-increasing amounts of revenues. A successful state was 
distinguished by its capacity to mobilize the resources required to maintain its success.49 England 
is often presented as the prime example, in early Europe, of strong, centralized state with a 
powerful monarchy, a sophisticated system of government, and a single representative institution 
claiming to act on behalf of the people.50 The process started with the Kings of Wessex who, in 
late ninth century, started the process of centralization by establishing themselves as rulers of the 
whole of England and creating local administrations to institutionalize their authority.51 Under 
King Edward I,52 the costs of war increased enormously and much of the crown’s expenditures 
needed financing. Public taxation was the response. In England however, there was a long 
standing principle that any extraordinary taxes, say to pay for wars, had to be authorized. From 
1920s therefore, it became normal practice for the Crown to request approval from the 
                                                          
47 See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Co., 384 U.S. 426 (1955) where the court upheld the IRS’s decision to tax punitive 
damages awards received by the taxpayer. See also, Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21 
(1978) where the court confirmed that wages, along with other gains are taxable income. See also, Murphy v. IRS 
as well as Penn Mutual Indemnification Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16 (1960) where the court agreed that the 
IRS could properly impose the federal income tax on receipts of money regardless of what the receipt of money is 
called. 
48 Richard Bonney, The rise of the fiscal state in Europe c. 1200-1815, Oxford University Press (1999). 
49 Id. 
50 Lynn Thorndike, The history of medieval Europe, Houghton Mifflin (1917). 
51 For example, King Alfred the Great who died in 899AD. 
52 King Edward I reigned from 1272 to 1307. 
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Parliament for any new taxes. Parliament was entrusted with the power to authorize extra 
ordinary taxes, granting the Parliament powers and strengthened bargaining position in its 
dealings with the Crown. War taxation gave influence to the Parliament and profoundly altered 
the basis of English politics thereby planting the early seeds of the balance of powers system. 
The change and empowerment of the parliament in England distinguished it from its neighbor 
and greatest rival of the time, France. In the French society at the time, there was no 
authorization needed from the Parliament to collect taxes, even extraordinary taxes. In 1470s, 
John Fortescue drew the distinction of fiscal powers calling the French system the “dominium 
regale” while referring to the English system as the “dominium politicum et regale”. The 
distinction pointed the fact that in France, the Monarchy was free to impose tax anytime of their 
choosing while in England, Parliamentary consent was needed.53 The English system relied on 
land taxation in its early days. The highly sophisticated and remarkably productive land tax 
known then as the “danegeld”54 provided great resources to the Crown.55 However, this tax 
showed ineffective because the Crown, not a taxable subject, was the largest landholder by far in 
the territory by 1086. Even attempts at largess to its most remarkable citizens by granting them 
land and thereby reducing the percentage ownership of land by the Crown, did not solve the 
problem. Another way of raising revenues in late twelfth century was through arbitrary 
‘tallages’56 on royal estates and towns and on the Jews.57 For example, King John imposed a very 
successful ‘tallage’ for the expansion to Ireland in 1219. In the thirteenth century however, the 
                                                          
53 See Supra, at 48, Pp 20. See also, McKenna, The Myth of Parliamentary Sovereignty in Late Medieval England, 94 
English Historical Review 481 (1979). 
54 The Danegeld was a national land tax paid by all landholders in England to combat threats of invasion by the 
Danes. The tax was assessed in different ways in different parts of the country. 
55 See Lipson, The Economic History of England, the Middle Ages, 12th Ed., London (1959). 
56 A Tallage was an intermittent tax paid either in money or in kind by the direct feudal subjects or rulers, and was 
spent at the discretion of the ruler. 
57 See Stacey R., Royal Taxation and the Social Structure of Medieval Anglo-Jewry: The Tallages of 1239-1242, 56 
Hebrew Union College Annual 175 (1985). 
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British Empire instituted a tax on the profits, from land and other activities. The main forms of 
raising revenues in England were land taxes, custom duties, and later taxes on personal property 
and income. The English Empire adhered to a procedure for imposing new taxes, unlike the 
French empire of the time.  
In France, there were many attempts to attack localities compared to the attempted attacks to the 
country as a whole. Taxation in Medieval France, like in England, was driven by the need to 
protect the territory against attacks and to provide minimum social services. Defense needs in 
France were mostly local and France relied heavily on local taxation. France, unlike England, did 
not adopt the “tallage” and instead, various local communities instituted local taxes to respond to 
the various local attacks. For example, Charles VI allowed a 5% tax in 1383 in Perigueux in 
order to build and repair town defenses.58 In general however, the most important tax in France, 
before 1380 (year of its termination) was the hearth tax.59 This tax was relatively consensual as it 
was authorized by the central authorities and voted on by local authorities. Nevertheless, the 
main point of distinction in early France is the predominance of arbitrary taxation. Taxes in 
Medieval France were mostly imposed unilaterally by rulers who then spent the revenues as they 
choose. The predominance of arbitrary taxation in Medieval France is justified by the increase in 
the powers of rulers, and the prevailing insecurity. In the free deliberations, the King was free to 
exempt or lessen the tax burdens of individuals or groups. Specifically, in attempt to secure their 
support and perpetuate its reign, the King exempted the nobility from taxation in 1384, right after 
the internal revolts of 1380-82. Taxation in Medieval Europe ultimately spurred the major 
                                                          
58 Barzel Yoram and Edgar Kiser, Taxation and voting rights in medieval England and France, 14.4 Rationality and 
Society 473 (2002). 
59 The Hearth tax was a tax on fixed property, also known as the Chimney tax because collected from each 
household, each Chimney. The collectors of the tax, known as the ‘Chimney men’ were specifically appointed to 
these duties and had considerable powers. 
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revolutions and civil unrest that led not to the abolition of taxation, but rather to a more 
democratization of taxation and arguably, more overall levels of taxation in cities and states 
across Europe. 
 
3. Taxation and Colonial Africa 
In Africa, similar to other societies, a form of taxation has always existed as a way of meeting 
common challenges and satisfying the needs of the greater group. The history of taxation in 
Africa can be analyzed through the lenses of three main periods, before the colonization (pre-
colonial era), during colonization (colonial era) and after the decolonization (post-colonial era). 
First, the pre-colonial era in Africa is marked by unique models of societal organization and a 
form of centralized powers through notions of ‘chiefhood’. The early traits of taxation in pre-
colonial Africa can be traced to Ancient Egypt. Under the reign of Pharaoh,60 the Scribes61 were 
responsible for raising funds for the dynasty. The Pharaoh afforded the Scribes large powers and 
ample discretion in their revenue raising (tax collection) activities. For example and even though 
the most important tax of that period was the grain tax, the Scribes instituted a tax on cooking oil 
for every household. The cooking oil tax was very hard to enforce and many in Ancient Egypt 
attempted to avoid and/or minimize the tax by recycling their oil, and using the same portion of 
the cooking oil several times. In response, the Scribes instituted an audit procedure whereby they 
                                                          
60 Pharaoh was the common name of Kings in ancient Egypt. The Kings reigned over the territory and the ruling 
system was a dynasty. A succession of Pharaohs reigned in Egypt from about 3200 years B.C. to about 30 years B.C. 
Ptolemy, infant son of Cleopatra VII is reportedly the last known Pharaoh who ruled until about 30 years B.C. when 
Rome took over Egypt thereby ending his reign. 
61 In Ancient Egypt, the Scribes were the people who had received special education, learned to read and write, 
and were special members of society. Most of what is known of Ancient Egypt today is because of the work of 
Scribes. Even though some evidence suggests that there existed female Scribes, most Scribes were males, who 
descended from families of Scribes, and who had gone through about five years of learning how to read and write. 
The Scribes were usually tasked by the King, to collect revenues for the dynasty. 
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inspected households to make sure that cooking oil was not being recycled.62 In their discretion, 
the Scribal tax collectors often used coercion to raise revenues for the Pharaohs.  Like most of 
precolonial Africa, the Ancient Egyptian society had a predominantly barter economy. As a 
consequence, the simplest way to exact the taxes was the ceasing of the actual produces, the 
merchandise or property involved in the exchanges. Farmers and the agricultural sector in 
general were the highest and most consistently taxed: their fields could be measured, their 
produces observable, and their yield calculated regularly by the Scribal tax collectors. Scribal tax 
collectors had more difficulties taxing other peoples’ means of livelihood. The ease with which 
taxation was assessed to farmers was not possible for other professions and ways of earning 
livelihoods. Nevertheless, the risk of not paying or reducing one’s tax liability was highly 
punishable and very discouraged. In fact, the law of the Amasis established that anyone who did 
not honestly declare the source of his livelihood was punishable by death.63 The large powers 
afforded to tax collectors created massive corruption and to protect taxpayers, the Pharaoh 
instituted a system of tax receipts and strong punishment to corrupt tax collectors.64 Ancient 
Egypt also adopted tax breaks and exemptions. When a farmer was struggling with his 
production and was not able to meet his tax obligations, the practice was to offer the farmer a tax 
break, and when such farmer returned to prosperity, he was immediately reinstated in the tax net. 
Also, some Egyptians were not subject to tax either because the positions they held in society 
were too influential for tax collection, or because the state needed their services.65 The pre-
                                                          
62 See, Barry Kemp, Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilization, Routledge, ISBN 0-415-23549-9 (2006); See also, 
Michael Rice, Who's Who in Ancient Egypt, Routledge, ISBN 0-415-15448-0 (2001). 
63 Amasis (Ahmose II) was the Pharaoh from 569 to 526 B.C. Amasis was known as a strong leader as is credited as 
the last great King of Egypt as the kingdom is reported to have enjoyed great prosperity under his reign. Amasis 
established the voluntary declaration system whereby each Egyptian was required to honestly report the source of 
his livelihood for tax assessment purposes. Failure to do so accurately, under Amasis law, was punished by death. 
64 The condemned tax collectors would usually be tied to polls and publicly beaten by servants of the Pharaoh. 
65 See Cyril Aldred, The Egyptians, London, Thames & Hudson (1961). 
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colonial era in Egypt is not unlike other African early societies. Early Sub Saharan African towns 
began as fortified villages which grew into larger communities that served several purposes. 
People who lived in the same villages generally claimed lineage to the same ancestor. The 
extended family, made out parents, grandparents, children and other family members even living 
in separate homes or separate villages, comprised a lineage group. The lineage groups were the 
basic building blocks of early Sub Saharan African societies. Members of the same lineage group 
claimed relation to the common ancestor and the leading members of the group had powers over 
others. The lineage group provided support to its members, each member taking care of the 
other. The villages and towns in early Sub Saharan African societies were centers of government, 
entertained markets with goods for trade, artist who made pottery tools and other crafts, and 
farmers trading their crops for goods. In these early societies, the king was the ruler of the 
community. The king held audiences to settle disputes, granted favors to distinguished members 
of the group, allowed merchants to practice their trade, maintained law and order, and levied 
taxes. Similar to Egypt, merchants and other craftsmen used their produces and goods to pay 
their taxes to the King and contribute to the larger community. In most of early African societies, 
the taxes collected by the King were used to provide for the community and to some extent for 
the King’s comfort and prestige. As colonization started and foreign powers started entering the 
African territory, the nature and purpose of taxes changed. 
Second, during colonization, taxes collected by the Kings in early African societies were 
destined to the colonial powers, until the colonial powers started directly exercising their powers 
to directly tax their subjects and territories. Colonial officers were instructed to make Africans 
pay something in tax, “however poor they may appear to be.”66 Colonial taxation was not simply 
                                                          
66 See Crocker WR., Nigeria: a critique of British colonial administration, London, G. Allen and Unwin (1936). 
   27 
  
 
a fiscal measure ensuring revenue and balanced books; it was conceptualized as a moralizing 
force, transforming the primitive and barbaric into good, industrious and governable colonial 
subjects.67 Many colonial powers started relying on duties to raise revenues in their territories; 
however, direct taxes quickly became the main instrument. Frederick Lugard,68 showed his 
preference for direct taxes and was one of the early pioneers of direct taxation in the colonies.69 
The two main colonial powers that were active in Africa are France and England.70 Across 
colonial Africa, taxation was usually imposed by requiring payment of cash. African economies 
and peoples at the time, however, relied on barter economy and did not possess the cash. 
Colonial powers often imposed tax settlement in cash as a way to compel Africans to sell their 
goods, or as a way to create a labor force whereby African would be compelled to work for the 
colonial power to obtain the cash needed to pay their taxes.71 The review of taxation in colonial 
Africa ought therefore to be seen from the lens of Colonial English Africa and Colonial French 
Africa as the two systems presented noticeable differences. Colonial powers in Colonial English 
Africa applied generally a colonial system through indirect administration advocated by 
Lugard.72 The colonial government chose local representatives and built upon the local tribal 
structure to administer their territories. Under these systems, local chiefs and kings were in 
                                                          
67 See Bush, Barbara & Josephine Maltby, Taxation in West Africa: transforming the colonial subject into the 
“governable person, 15.1 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 5 (2004). 
68 Frederick Dealtry Lugard (1858–1945) began his career in the army on the Northwest Frontier of India. He spent 
some time in East Africa, where he was involved in conflicts in Uganda, and in the Kalahari, before gaining prestige 
at home for beating the French in the race to sign a treaty with the rulers of Northern Nigeria at Nikki. Lugard’s 
achievements were rewarded in 1900 when he was made High Commissioner of the newly-acquired Northern 
Nigeria. He held this post until 1906; having spent the intervening years as Governor of Hong Kong, he returned to 
Nigeria in 1912, whereas Governor General he presided over the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern 
provinces until his retirement from the colonial service in 1919. 
69 See Supra at 56, Pp 14. 
70 Each of France and England has more than 10 colonies in Africa, deeply influencing culture and society. 
71 See Munro, Britain in tropical Africa 1880–1960, London, Macmillan (1984); See also Hailey L., An African Survey: 
a study of problems arising in Africa south of the Sahara, revised 1956, London, issued under the auspices of the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs (1957), First published in 1938. 
72 Id., at 57. 
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charge of collecting revenues that they thereafter, remitted to the colonial power representatives. 
Taxes were collected in the form of goods like Ivory, copper, slaves, salt and labor. It was well 
established in these societies that a portion of each inhabitant’s possessions should go to the king 
and the king was in charge of remitting most if not all, to the colonial power.73 As indicated by 
Leigh Garber, the revenues raised by England in its colonies contributed tremendously to fund 
the British Empire costs.74 The British government required each colony to be self-sufficient and 
any excess was reverse to England.75 Nevertheless, empirical data shows that taxes collected in 
English colonial Africa were much lower than the taxes in French colonial Africa. In addition the 
English colonial Africa was unique in that they admitted the principle of “no taxation without 
representation” early on. In its 1920, the first meeting of the newly formed National Congress of 
British West Africa76 adopted a resolution establishing the principle of “no taxation without 
representation” and advocated a more pronounced African control over public revenues of the 
colonies.77 French colonies used a direct system of administration of their colonies. The central 
French government sent a representative in the colonies and such representatives were in charge 
of directly administering the colonies and levying taxes. Taxes collected in French colonies were 
comparatively higher and the coercive means used to collect the taxes were reported more brutal. 
People in French colonial Africa paid their taxes with the goods they produced and their labor. 
The resistance to taxation started in the early days of colonial Africa. Many movements were 
formed to protest the imposition of taxes by a foreign power, but such movements were quickly 
                                                          
73 See Colonial Taxation and Government Spending in British Africa, 1880-1940: Maximizing Revenues or 
Minimizing Effort?, 48 Explanations in Economic History, 136 (2011). 
74 Leigh Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa, the Political Economy of British Imperialism (2012). 
75 Id. 
76 The Congress of British West Africa comprised, in 1920, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Gold Coast, and Nigeria). 
77 See Bourret FM., The Gold Coast: a survey of the Gold Coast and British Togoland, 1919–1946, Stanford 
University Press, P44 (1949). 
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silenced with the brutality and coercion of the conquering power. Notions of Kings and 
‘Chiefhood’ were diminished and their prestige among the population tarnished. In some 
instances, the Kings and Chiefs were used by the colonial powers to raise the revenues and 
enforce punishment against the people attempting any protest of the exercise of the taxing power 
of the colonial authorities. The taxes collected were generally brought to the central 
governmental power and many accounts indicate the necessity of the revenues to fund the central 
powers’ governmental obligations to their citizens in the west. Many authors have argued that 
tax systems imposed in colonial Africa have many consequences in the view of taxation today.78 
African early population were introduced to taxation as a means of funding an oppressor, and 
such image, some argue, has shaped the view of taxation by many African population today and 
their rebellion to tax compliance.79 The compliance rebellion, however, is not the only trait of 
taxation of in post-colonial Africa. 
Finally, taxation in post-colonial Africa is a constant struggle of how to tax the unwilling and 
how to access the hard to tax. As indicated by Fjeldstad et al,80 taxation in sub Saharan Africa 
faces a “trilema”: first, an urgent need for increased revenues and ensuing pressure on taxation to 
provide it; then, the strong resistance of the very few with capacity to actually pay the taxes; and 
finally, the majority of the people with nearly nothing to tax, show similar strong feelings against 
taxation.81 To this list, it is Important to add, following Tadesse and Gunther,82 the impotence of 
African post-colonial tax administrations as well as the ever growing underground economy, the 
hard to tax. After the independence era, many African countries faced the reality of providing for 
their people, the very basics in terms of social services and defense. The weak social structures 
                                                          
78 See Kasara Kimuli, Tax me if you can: Ethnic geography, democracy, and the taxation of agriculture in 
Africa, American Political Science Review 101.01 (2007). 
79 Mkandawire Thandika, On tax efforts and colonial heritage in Africa, The Journal of Development Studies 46.10 
(2010). 
80 Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge, and Lise Rakner. Taxation and tax reforms in developing countries: Illustrations from sub-
Saharan Africa, Chr. Michelsen Institute (2003). 
81 Id.  
82 See Tadesse and Günther Taube, Presumptive Taxation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Experiences and Prospects, 
International Monetary Fund (1996). 
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that had emerged from the colonization needed special attention and many areas required 
considerable investments. The new independent countries faced a high need for revenues and the 
obvious form of obtaining those was through taxation. Governments must be able to ensure 
sustainable funding for social programs and public investments for development. The struggles 
to raise revenues internally have sometimes been compensated by outside aid and assistance. 
However, as aid became more and more questionable or insufficient, African governments were 
faced with a choice to either reduce/eliminate expenditures, and/or raise revenues in order to 
avoid unsustainable balances in their economies. Many governments reduced their expenditures 
to the simplest minimum and still fail to provide a sense of balance to their economies. The 
taxation became quickly the royal means of solving the economic and budgetary threat.83 The 
need for revenue and many attempts at raising states intakes have collided with the refusal and 
rebellion of the peoples subject to taxation. Taxation is not a popular idea in many places but 
African reluctance is unique in many regards and many tax administrations have resolved to 
accessing the accessible and taxing the easily available while acknowledging their inability to 
reach the hard to tax.84 Many specialists have attributed Africans deep feeling against taxation 
and their reluctance to tax compliance to the colonial era.85 During that period and as seen above, 
African were required to pay something in tax, however poor they were, and at the same time 
they were not allowed to “spend a penny” without express authorization of the colonial power. 
Taxes were seen as a reward to their oppressor, and many African have continued to view 
taxation through those lenses and would do whatever necessary to escape the tax net.86 Many 
newly independent African countries continued to rely heavily on direct taxes and duties post-
independence. The tax systems grew to rely primarily on the big industries and big companies 
that existed. Corporate taxation of the bigger companies, even though challenging, yielded more 
revenues as those businesses were regulated and could not easily hide their existence. As a 
consequence of concentration on main big businesses, the major part of the economy fell out of 
the tax net. Many attempts to regulate the so called under-ground economy have proven 
ineffective.87 Personal income taxes are difficult to collect either because of phenomenon of 
                                                          
83 Ghura Dhaneshwar, Tax Revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa-Effects of Economic Policies and Corruption, working 
paper No. 98-135, International Monetary Fund (1998). 
84 Id. 
85 See Supra, Note 79. 
86 Id. 
87 See Supra, at 71. 
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under reporting or because many people are poor and have close to nothing to be taxed on.88 
Business taxes, primarily on big business, have been unable to reach small business and lose 
tremendously on income from small operations. Collection from large businesses, usually 
subsidiaries of multinational companies (“MNEs”) became more difficult as these businesses 
started using more sophisticated tax planning techniques beyond the expertise of the newly 
formed African countries and their tax administrations.89 After colonization and to date, African 
countries have remained at the cross roads of their people despising tax and political price to be 
paid for any pressure otherwise, and large established businesses using complex tax planning 
strategies that African tax administration have neither the physical capacities nor the intellectual 
expertise to respond to and levy the appropriate taxes. Many governments, including in the 
developed world, have been outsmarted and outpaced by big MNEs in the development of 
creative ways to minimize if not evade taxation. Tax administrations have usually played “catch 
up” in these circumstances and have reacted to counter MNEs strategies. The reaction has always 
required seasoned expertise to match the creativity in the private sector. The reaction of tax 
administrations in Africa, if at all, has come late and has shown very slow to curve the patterns 
and, more often than not, ineffective. The ineffective taxation in post-colonial Africa, and the 
various barriers to expanding the tax base have led government to focus on getting their revenues 
mostly from specific industry sectors, such as natural resources industry sectors. Some authors 
have argued that the incompetence to tax citizens has also been a major impediment to the 
establishment and expansion of democracy. Governments, because they get their revenues 
mostly from a restricted sector of industry, do not feel accountable to the nations as a whole, 
instead deal with the stakeholders in the specific industries and feel accountable to them.90 A 
more aggressive tax collection and tax participation from the regular citizens could participate in 
more involvement in the affairs of the nation. Additionally, the collection of the revenues from 
their inhabitants could lead the leaders to feel and express more political accountability toward 
their people.91  
                                                          
88 According to the World Bank, the poverty rate in Africa is slightly below 50% (based on a 2012 study). Available 
at http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/SSA (last retrieved 09/15/2016). 
89 Bird, Richard Miller, and Milka Casanegra de Jantscher, eds. Improving tax administration in developing 
countries. Vol. 19. Washington, DC: IMF (1992). 
90 Ake, Claude, Democracy and development in Africa, Brookings Institution Press (2001). 
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4. Common Denominator in Global Tax History: Tax Disdain  
The existence and collection of taxes has grown hand in hand with the revolts against taxes and 
tax payment. Because taxation has often been onerous, and sometimes excessive and cruel, 
reaction to its enforcement has been consistent, heated and usually violent.92 Tax revolts date at 
least as far back as the Later Han Dynasty in Asia,93 the Hammurabi era in Babylon,94 and the 
Roman Empire in Europe.95 Many major events in world history, including the Magna Carta, the 
American Revolution, and the French Revolution, had their roots as tax protests. Taxation simply 
provides an ostensible cause for protest and insurrection because they represent an easily 
identifiable and detested target.96 Most people understand and deal with taxes at the very 
personal level. Taxes are tangible and almost everyone pays them, whether in moneys or goods; 
therefore, the objections to taxes are easily popularized and the disgruntlement comes 
immediately. As seen above, there has always been a form of taxation. The ancient states of 
Persia, Greece, Egypt, and Rome all relied heavily on a form of taxation to meet their revenue 
needs. Early forms of taxation included real property, sales and inheritance taxes, as well as 
various custom duties. The introduction of these taxes as well as their maintenance sparked 
various revolts and protest throughout history. Nevertheless, and as stated by Benjamin Franklin, 
only taxes and death are certain this world; indeed, many people share the opinion that of the 
certitudes throughout history, it has become easier to avoid death than taxes. Rebellions and riots 
protesting imposition of taxes and the activities of tax collectors exist across centuries. Below, 
we will analyze some major historical events, in diverse geographical areas to underscore the 
                                                          
92 See David Burg, A world History of Tax Rebellions: An Encyclopedia of Tax Rebels, Revolts, and Riots from 
Antiquity to the Present, Routledge (2004). 
93 The Later Han Dynasty in Asia went from AD 25 to AD 220. 
94 The Hammurabi era in Babylon went from 1792 to 1750 BC. 
95 The Roman Empire went from 27 BC to AD 337. 
96 See Supra, at 93. 
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point that the common global trend in the history of taxation is its permanent coexistence with 
revolt and protest. 
In the Roman Empire, in year 6, Augustus Caesar introduced a 5% tax levy on inheritance. The 
tax sparked general protest and was widely unpopular. The furious revolt, known as the Senate 
Tax Opposition forced Caesar to consider alternative levies. However, the alternatives 
considered were less attractive and Caesar used oppression to successfully implement his 
inheritance tax proposal.  
In addition, in year 400, the Roman Empire experienced the so called Garlic Trader’s Tax 
Avoidance movement in Gaul. Badly affected by the tax, many traders in Gaul fled to avoid 
taxation. The legislation of year 400 revealed that the City of Gaul was losing members who fled 
to anonymity of the countryside, preferring to live under the shelter of a wealthy rural patron 
rather than paying the proper taxes. 
In the Byzantine Empire, in year 722, taxes brought to light a deep dislike between the emperor 
and the clergy. After suffering a defeat against the Arab forces in Armenia in 720, the forces of 
the Empire regained momentum by defeating the Arab forces in Isauria in 721. The ongoing 
Arab assault and the response increased the military expenditures of the Empire and the Emperor 
needed further revenues. In an effort to raise the needed revenues to fund the Arab war, Emperor 
Leo III97 levied greatly increased taxes on Rome and Italy in 721 and 722. However, Pope 
Gregory II98 publicly and forcefully rejected the increased taxes. The Pope specifically 
denounced the poll tax. Leo III in fact ordered that the Pope be assassinated and replaced in order 
                                                          
97 Leo was the Emperor of the Byzantine Empire from 717 to 741. 
98 Pope Gregory II was Pope from 715 to his death in 731. His defiance of the Byzantine emperor Leo III as a result 
of the iconoclastic controversy in the Eastern Empire prepared the way for a long series of revolts, schisms and civil 
wars that eventually led to the establishment of the temporal power of the popes. 
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to do away with the opposition to his taxes.99 The Pope sent out communications to the people of 
Rome and Italians, instructing them to oppose Leo III’s decrees. The Italian took up arms to 
defend the Pope against the Emperor, and to protect their own liberties. Italians also endeavored 
to choose their own Emperor instead and in replacement of Leo III. Unable to control Rome, Leo 
III was obligated to back down, abolishing the increased taxes. Many commentators attribute the 
independence of the church from governmental power as well as the tax free status of churches 
to this early fight and resistance by Pope Gregory II which remained known as the Papal Tax 
Rejection of 722.100 
The struggles between the papacy and the kingdom continued late in the 13th Century. In 1297, 
Monarch Edward I101 of England, declared war to King Philip IV102 of France. Both kingdoms 
were already engaged in war, and this new military adventure stretched their military budgets. In 
a search for new revenues to cover the war, Edward I and Philip IV instituted a tax on the Clergy 
and the church. However, these measures were put in place at the time where Cannon Law 
explicitly prohibited taxation of the church by the state. In fact, Pope Boniface VIII103 had 
declared the Prohibition of taxation of Clergy. The Pope saw taxation as an assault to clerical 
right and took a hard stand against it. In 1296 the Pope denounced Edward and Philip’s levies in 
a Bull titled Clericis Laicos104 whereby he indicated the prohibition of any taxation without prior 
and express papal approval. The Pope instructed excommunication of anyone who levies the 
                                                          
99 See Supra, at 93 Pp 65. 
100 Id., Pp 64. 
101 King Edward I also known as Edward Longshanks was King of England from 1272 to 1307. 
102 Philip IV also known as Philip the Fair or the Iron King was King of France from 1285 until his death in 1314. 
103 Pope Boniface VIII was Pope from 1294 to his death in 1303. He declared that both spiritual and temporal 
power were under the pope's jurisdiction, and that kings were subordinate to the power of the Roman pontiff.  
104 Clericis laicos was a Papal bull issued on February 5, 1296 by Pope Boniface VIII in an attempt to prevent the 
secular states of Europe, in particular France and England, from appropriating church revenues without the 
express prior permission of the Pope. 
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taxes or pays them without the required papal approval. In the bull, Boniface stated "they exact 
and demand from the same the half, tithe, or twentieth, or any other portion or proportion of their 
revenues or goods; and in many ways, they try to bring them into slavery, and subject them to 
their authority. And also whatsoever emperors, kings, or princes, dukes, earls or 
barons...presume to take possession of things anywhere deposited in holy buildings...should 
incur sentence of excommunication."105 Nevertheless, the emperors of both France and England 
had a very strong response to the Papal tax opposition. In France, Philip IV prohibited the 
expatriation of property outside of France thereby preventing the transfer of the church’s 
revenues from France to Rome. In England, Edward I denied all judicial protections to the 
church; the church and its members could not bring cases to the royal courts, but every case 
brought against the church and its members was to be heard.106 With these restrictions, Pope 
Boniface had his hands tied and was obliged to agree to the taxation of the church and the clergy. 
France and England therefore instituted clergy taxation. Pope Boniface’s initial opposition to 
taxation in fact led to the diminution of the papacy and the expansion of the monarchal power.107 
In fact, Pope Boniface was ultimately removed and succeeded by Pope Clement V,108 who 
moved the papacy to France and basically subordinated himself to the monarchical power by 
repealing the acts posed by Pope Boniface to establish Church’s supremacy. Further, Pope 
Clement V basically endorsed most policies and demands of the French Monarchy whether as 
regards to tax increases or supremacy of the state over the church.109 
                                                          
105 See Thomas Izbicki, Guido de Baysio's unedited gloss on 'Clericis laicos, 13 Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law 62 
(1983). 
106 See Supra, at 93, Pp 95. 
107 Id., Pp 97. 
108 Pope Clement V was Pope from 1305 to his death in 1314. He is infamous for moving the Curia from Rome 
to Avignon, ushering in the period known as the Avignon Papacy.  
109 See Duffy Eamon, Saints and Sinners: A History of the Popes, Yale University Press (2006). 
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In England in June 1215, King John signed the Magna Carta, the Great Chart, in Runnymede, as 
a symbol of the victory of the English nobility against the King’s tax proposal. King John 
attempted an unsuccessful military campaign to regain control of Normandy, creating an 
increased need for revenues for the Kingdom. To raise the revenues, the unpopular King John 
imposed, in May 1214, a new Scutage, a tax paid in place of military service, on his baronial 
tenants. The barons were already subject to a Scutage, already set at 2 marks, which they 
considered too high. The new Scutage was set at 3 marks, an unacceptable increase for the 
baronial tenants. Most barons refused to pay the new tax. In an effort to compel them, the King 
met with a group of nobles; however, the nobles vehemently rejected the tax and failed to reach 
any agreement with the King. Instead, the barons swore to withdraw their allegiance to the King 
unless he restored their rightful laws and liberties (including the old Scutage tax). The barons 
gathered an armed force to pressure the king and enforce their demands, if needed. The barons 
marched and presented their demands to the King, which the king rejected, forcing the barons to 
officially withdraw their allegiance to the King and march to London. Under growing pressure, 
the King agreed to meet with the insurgents near Windsor. After about a week of discussions and 
negotiations, the conclave produced a document that became the basis of the Magna Carta. 
Although intended to secure a variety of liberties, the Great Chart was largely an outgrowth of 
the barons’ resistance to taxes. Two chapters in the Great Chart were dedicated to taxation. 
Chapter twelve posed the requirement that any new Scutage tax or aid or tallages in the city of 
London be approved by the Common Council of the Kingdom.110 Chapter fourteen on the other 
hand required the assembling of the Common Council of the Kingdom whenever its approval is 
necessary for new taxes, and indicated procedures for notifying the nobles of the assembling of 
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the Council.111 The Magna Carta therefore posed the basis of the principle of ‘no taxation 
without representation’. However, the representation prescribed therein was that of the nobility, 
the most influential and powerful, not the people as a whole. 
The power of representation in taxation, even when afforded to the people in later English years, 
would not go unchallenged. In 1736, a general protest known as the Gin Act Protest of 1736 
would demonstrate the power of the people to protest against an assembly attempting to restrict 
consumption of spirit (specifically Gin) through taxation. In 1727, the annual consumption of 
spirits was 3.5 million gallons; by 1735, the annual consumption had increased to about 5.5 
million gallons. In 1735, the London area alone accounted for more than 7,000 Gin shops 
offering quick and easy access to drinks.  By 1736, the plethora of spirits and Gin shops 
presented a concern of drunkenness especially amongst apprentices and servants. The Parliament 
responded with the Gin Act of 1736. The Act aimed at making the consumption of spirits more 
expensive by levying taxes on them. Under the Act, a duty of 20 shillings per gallon had to be 
imposed on spirits and all spirit retailers had to pay a yearly license fee.112 The Act, along with 
other frustrations sparked massive riots starting in July 1736 displaying over 2000 protesters. 
Also, reports emerged of plans to assassinate the drafters of the Gin Act in the Parliament; and 
many others protested by massive distribution of free Gin to the people. Nevertheless, the revolt 
was not successful at repealing the Gin Act, and its revisions, first in 1743 and then in 1751 
continued the taxation of the spirits and eventually slowed and controlled Gin consumption 
within the kingdom. 
In France, in 1548, the King imposed a tax on salt known as the “Gabelle” and a direct tax on 
land known as the “Taille”. The introduction of these taxes provided the catalyst for revolt. 
                                                          
111 Magna Carta, Chapter 14. 
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People opposing the taxes formed a rebellion, known as the Guyenne Revolt, in Guyenne and its 
neighboring provinces. The rebellion was one of the biggest agrarian rebellions of that century. 
The taxes were widely unpopular and parishes and the church joined in to organize protests 
against the taxes. In August of 1548, protesters slaughtered the King’s Lieutenant General and 
seven supposed tax officials. Many local representatives of the King refrained from taking action 
against the revolt, and some shared the non-fiscal purpose of the protests. King Henry II, in 
1549, rescinded the salt tax forever in Guyenne and its neighboring provinces by pledging that 
neither him, nor his successor in perpetuity would again impose that tax. 
Yet, in 1643, the Taille (the direct tax) is one of attempted tax proposals that met strong protests 
known as the Tax Risings of 1643, a yearlong series of tax revolts across France. In May 1643, a 
five-year-old, Louis XIV succeeded to power, after his father’s death. At that time, France was at 
war with the Habsburgs and more revenues were needed to finance the war.  As always, the 
kingdom imposed new taxes which in turn, provoked several revolts. During the year 1643, 
rebellions were recorded against the Taille across France including in Guyenne, Rouergue, 
Tours, Alencon, Gascony, and Clermont. There were regular attacks against tax collectors 
including protest in Valence where the resident rose up and drove the tax collectors out of town. 
Tax collectors were killed in Toulouse, and a mob of several thousands in Ile-de-France attacked 
a troop of soldiers dispatched to enforce the collection of taxes. 
Even the second great revolution in Western civilization during the 18th Century, the French 
Revolution,113 originated to a large extent, in discontent against taxes. Even though the 
Revolution tackled many issues, taxes ranked high on the agenda. In fact, tax troubles were 
palpable. No laws, including tax laws of the national government applied uniformly throughout 
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France. Taxes in the northern and central districts were notoriously more burdensome than taxes 
in the south of France. Taxpayers in Paris paid more taxes per head than any other person in 
Europe; similarly, French people as a whole, in proportion to their wealth, were more heavily 
taxed than the people of any other nation in Europe. Further, the inequity of the national 
mishmash and the regional comparative burden were worsened by the various tax exemptions 
granted to nobilities including exemptions to Taille,114 Gabelle115 and Corvee.116 As a 
consequence, the ensuing multi-year and generalized revolution drew its inspiration and passions 
from the crucial inequities in the taxation system. The social inequalities were seen as 
encouraged by the tax system, and the drive to abolish classes was fueled by the need to establish 
a tax system uniformly and non-discriminatorily applicable to all throughout France. Following 
the 1789 uprising, marking the beginning of the French Revolution, citizens stopped paying 
taxes and threatened officials who tried to collect them. In years 1790 and 1791, local taxes on 
commerce and consumption including tax on tobacco and salt, were abolished. The Deputies of 
the revolution naively proposed a tax system with direct taxes, no exemptions, no enforcement 
mechanisms with an expectation that citizens would voluntarily pay the taxes since the proposed 
systems met the egalitarian requirements voiced in the 1789 uprising. The policy quickly showed 
to be a mistake. 
In Guatemala in 1659, Guatemalan indigo producers and merchants, the richest and most 
powerful section of that society, designed a system allowing them to evade taxes when they lost 
control of the tax system. Until 1667, indigo merchants controlled the tax system and as a 
consequence no taxes were collected from them. However, when they lost control of the tax 
                                                          
114 Taille was a direct tax imposed on French Citizens. 
115 Gabelle was a tax on salt, imposed on the French. 
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system, and to respond to the state’s efforts to collect taxes on the merchants, taxpayers designed 
a strategy with the then tax exempt church, strategy known as the Indigo Tax Evasion. In fact, 
the merchants sold the indigo to church officials who thereafter, and free of any taxation, sold the 
indigo to the Mexican and the Spanish purchasers.  
Later, in 1763, a series of reforms including increase in taxes initiated by the Spanish crown led 
to generalized protests in Guatemala. The protest was known as the Bourbon Fiscal Reform 
Resistance. In an attempt to reform the Guatemalan tax system which was dominated by the 
indigo merchants and derived most of its revenues from the tributes paid by the Indians, the 
Spanish Crown delegated The Visitador from Mexico into Guatemala. The Visitador abolished 
the Indian Tributes by ending the farming tax system, took control of the tax system from the 
merchants, instituted a sales tax, and doubled the existing Barlovento, a tax originally intended to 
support the Caribbean fleet. The Visitador also levied tax on goods that had never been taxed, 
and added new import and export duties. Under mounting pressure and continuous complaint 
sent to the Crown in Spain, and various threats of massive popular uprising, the Spanish Crown 
agreed to reinstitute pre-existing taxes to their previous levels. Additionally, and to diffuse the 
threat, the Guatemalan president suspended the collection of the tax on resale and distributed 
grains to the poor areas of the city. 
In the 1880s in Egypt, many revolts and resistances were recorded specifically against the salt 
tax. In 1883 for example, as the epidemic of cholera ravaged the people of Cairo, officials in 
charge of tax collection were given absolute powers. Tax collectors had the ‘right to use violence 
in order to enforce respect of the law,’ here, the tax law. The salt tax was widely unpopular and 
many tax collectors suffered fatal experience with the protesters. In 1886 in Faiyum, peasants 
rose up and murdered a salt tax collector. Similarly, a tax collector was assassinated by the 
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people of Wadi Natrum. There were widespread hostilities against tax collectors, which resulted 
in significant loss of revenues in Egypt in the 1880s. 
In the neighboring Ethiopia, taxation and failure to pay taxes led to the so called Bale Rebellion 
starting in 1963. The Ethiopian central government and its corrupt local tax officials used land 
expropriations to sanction any non-payment of taxes. The residents of Bale, a southern province 
of Ethiopia and bordering Somalia took refuge into Somalia when expropriated from their lands 
for non-payment of taxes. With Somalian expansion plans, the anger in Bale presented an 
opportunity. The residents of Bale organized a rebellion against corrupt tax systems and 
protested against their expropriation. Somalia encouraged and supported the rebellion. 
Ultimately, the Ethiopian central government intervened, quelled the rebellion, and offered a 
cancellation of all tax liability and arrears for land owners. Additionally, the government allowed 
a reclaiming of the land by the formerly expropriated owner with no previous tax liability 
attached. 
Tax protests were just as common, albeit non-violent, in India. In 1921, the Guntur district 
organized a tax resistance movement forcing many government officers to resign their posts 
succumbing to intimidation. Rejecting advice from Mahatman Ganghi, resisters initiated their 
non-cooperative campaign centered on the refusal to pay taxes. The campaign continued 
throughout January 1921, causing a big drop in government revenues. The tax resistance 
movement in India along with other contemporaneous revolts had wider political ambitions of 
doing away with the British rule. 
In Japan in 1770, the Fukuyama rising marked the third in a series of tax rebellions in the 
Fukuyama during the eighteenth century. After his accession to power in 1769, Lord Mosatomo 
was presented with a series of nineteen demands. The peasants, authors of the demands, 
specifically requested their Lord reduced the enterprise taxes on cotton. Mosatomo resisted the 
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demands and the peasants organized a movement to protest against Mosatomo. In 1772, 
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B. History of International Taxation Specifically 
As seen above, taxation has been throughout history, the omnipresent tool to raise revenues to 
provide for the community. Throughout history, taxation was justified by the need to provide for 
the defense of the territories and sometimes for the basic social services or a way of honoring 
royalties.117 At national levels therefore, the need to tax was established and taxation was 
commonly applied for transactions within the state. In the United State for example, the passage 
of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 legitimized Congress’s constitutional power to tax residents 
of the U.S. in very broad terms.118 The consensus to tax at national level raised questions when 
cross border activities became involved. With growing need for bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation, taxation of cross border and international transactions became a concern. Very early 
on, as economic activity grew and evolved beyond the frontiers of one country, there were 
questions regarding the application of sovereign taxing powers of several countries on the same 
income. Each state, aiming at taxing economic activity within its borders and/or income of its 
citizens, targeted all kinds of income. It therefore became obvious that double taxation would 
exist and would interfere with cross border transactions and transnational economic activities.119 
This concern was very important in the early twentieth century, specifically after World War I, 
when most countries engaged in behaviors of protectionism and retrieval from global 
cooperation.120 Possible double taxation was seen as added threat for countries growing further 
apart from each other. When income is earned in one country by a citizen or resident of another 
                                                          
117 Ring, Diane, What's at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate: International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 Va. J. Int'l 
L. 155 (2008); See also, Chodorow Adam, Agricultural Tithing and (Flat Tax) Complexity, University of Pittsburgh 
Law Review 68 (2007); See also, Brauner, Yariv, International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 Tax L. Rev. 259 
(2002). 
118 See U.S. Const. Amend. XVI. 
119 See Michael Graetz and Michael O'Hear, The “Original Intent" of US International Taxation, Duke Law 
Journal 1021 (1997). 
120 Increase in global Protectionism following World War 1. 
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country, both the country where income is earned (the source country) and the country where the 
investor or earner resides (the residence country) have legitimate claims to tax the income. The 
basic task of international tax rules was to resolve the competing claims of residence and source 
nations in order to avoid the double taxation that results when both fully exercise their taxing 
powers. 
Facing this situation, the League of Nations, newly created after World War I and aiming at 
promoting international cooperation between countries looked to find a solution to double 
taxation as a way of promoting international economic cooperation. In early 1920s, the League of 
Nations appointed a Commission121 and charged it with the task of finding a solution to the threat 
of international double taxation. The Commission composed of four prominent economists 
representing both capital importing and capital exporting countries had to design a solution that 
would allow cross border cash flow to be subject to a single instance of taxation. Members of the 
commission had different perspectives on the issue. View from the side of capital exporting 
countries and led by Professor Seligman122 of the United States on the Commission, the argument 
was that all taxation has to be by the country of residence. Professor Seligman used arguments of 
ability to pay to declare that any source based taxation was “illegitimate” in that view.123 Under 
his view, the residence country has an exclusive right to levy tax and the source country has the 
obligation to assure that there is no double taxation. On the other end of the spectrum, capital 
                                                          
121 The Commission was composed of: Professor Edwin R.A. Seligman of the United States, Sir Josiah Stamp of 
Great Britain, Professor G.W.J. Bruins of the economists, Netherlands, and Professor Luigi Einaudi of Italy. 
122 Professor Edwin Seligman (1861-1939) was an American economist who spent his entire academic career at 
Columbia University in New York City. Seligman is best remembered for his work involving taxation and public 
finance. 
123 Edwin Sligman, Essays in Taxation, 98 (1900). 
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importing countries represented on the Commission by Professor Luigi Einaudi124 of Italy argued 
that taxation shall be exclusive to the country of source. Under this view, the connection to the 
source country and the ability of the country to levy the tax gives exclusive taxing power to the 
source country and the residence country has the obligation to assure that there is no double 
taxation. The debate was framed in terms of rich versus poor countries. In fact, rich countries 
exporting capitals needed to ensure that their investment was not subject to taxation locally and 
that taxation should only occur where the investors reside, thereby giving such rich countries, the 
exclusive power to tax. Poor countries on the other hand maintained that economic activity was 
within their borders, and income earned within their borders; consequently they were sole qualify 
to exercise taxing power.125 
After intensive debate, the Commission came out with a solution, labeled the “great compromise 
of the 20s.”126 The Commission submitted its report in 1923 representing the compromise 
reached by the four economists in eliminating double taxation. The League of Nations adopted 
the report and it was publicized in 1923. Under the Compromise, income was divided into two 
main categories: active income,127 and passive income.128 The solution was to allow source 
countries the privilege of taxing active income, and residence countries, passive income. This 
translated into capital export countries taxing income from return of capital and other passive 
income, while capital import countries tax income from business activities and other active 
                                                          
124 Professor Luigi Einaudi (1874-1961) was an Italian politician and economist who served as the second President 
of the Italian Republic between 1948 and 1955. 
125 See Seligman, Supra note 123; but see T.S. Adams, Federal Taxes Upon Income and Excess Profits, 3 AM. ECON. 
REV. 19 (1918). 
126 See Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Comm., League of Nations Doc. E.F.S. 73 F.19, 40 
(1923). 
127 Generally, active income is income for which services have been performed. This includes wages, tips, salaries, 
commissions and income from businesses in which there is material participation. 
128 Generally, passive income is made of earnings a person derives from an enterprise in which the person is not 
materially involved. 
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income within their borders. This Compromise shaped the international tax regime for a century 
and has its marks on all tax legislations throughout the globe to this day.129 In fact, in late 1920s, 
the League of Nations published the Model International Tax Treaty founded on the Great 
Compromise which continues to serve as the basis for countries international tax policy to date.  
Even before the Great Compromise, many countries endeavored unilaterally to solve the threat of 
double taxation. In the US for example, the Foreign Tax Credit (“FTC”) legislation was passed 
in 1918 to allow for tax credit to US persons for any taxes paid outside of the US.130 The FTC 
system created in the US quickly enjoyed popularity globally as many countries quickly adopted 
it. The need to avoid double taxation of the same income was therefore reduced and serious plans 
and strategies were designed globally to eliminate it. The ensuing national laws and international 
tax treaties followed the same basic compromise in allocating the power to tax. To the question 
of whether the same income should be taxed multiple times only due to the fact that it has a cross 
border character, the answer was unanimously, no. To the question of what country had the 
power to tax, the Compromise divided this power according to the nature of the income. The risk 
of double taxation was therefore, at the very least, mitigated. 
However, the four economists at the negotiating table in the 1920s could not have foreseen the 
intensity in which international economic activity and international taxation would expand. They 
could not imagine that the world would mainly function through cross border transactions and 
that transnational economic activity would dominate the landscape. The compromise which has 
continued to shape the international tax policy a century later shows inadaptable to the current 
realities. The advent of multinational companies has changed the entire landscape and the global 
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fiscal response has been, at the very least, disappointing. The solutions designed are 
inappropriate, and have proven suicidal to developing countries which often do possess neither 
the material nor the human resources necessary to implement mind-boggling complex 
mechanisms designed by the developed world to avoid, or at least, reduce illegitimate erosion of 
tax base. 
In the US, specifically, the development of international tax has aligned, and to some extent has 
shaped the development of international taxation globally. As presented by Professor Reuven 
Avi Yonah, the evolution of international taxation in the US can be analyzed under four major 
periods representing each the major policies that drove reform.131  
The first period was dominated by the right to tax and largely resulted in an emphasis on source-
based taxation. The legislative act consecrating this period was the FTC Act of 1918.132 Under 
this period which lasted until about 1960, the dominant argument was that taxing jurisdiction 
should be based on the benefits conferred by the taxing state.133 Most US international taxation 
architects of the time recognized source taxation as the convenient and more efficient way of 
addressing issues of double taxation.134 The enactment of the FTC act of 1918 legitimized 
Professor Thomas Adam’s argument of a predominance of source based taxation while not 
allowing for opportunities for double non taxation.135 The Great Compromise of 1923 gave 
                                                          
131 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece ThroughoutL the Four Ages of U.S. International Taxation, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 
313 (2005). 
132 See Supra, note 130. 
133 See Avi-Yonah, Supra note 131; Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah calls this period The Age of Benefits. 
134 The emphasis can be seen on the works of the main US international tax figures of the time including Thomas 
Adams, the Yale economics professor and the principal international tax adviser to the US Treasury of the 1910s 
and 1920s; Professor Edwin Seligman, the Columbia economics professor who was the US representative and the 
guiding spirit of the Great Compromise of the League of Nations in 1923; and Mitchell Carroll, a Lawyer and 
founder of the International Fiscal Association who was involved on the League of Nations’ early Model Tax 
Treaties. 
135 See Graetz, Supra Note 119. 
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credibility to Professor Seligman’s view of the idealistic nature of pure residence taxation.136 The 
Permanent Establishment (“PE”) limitations on source based taxation are in recognition of the 
incidence of PE on taxation, developed by Mitchell Carroll. 
The second period saw an increased attention to the notion of residence based taxation based on 
the dominant concept of capital export neutrality at the time.137 This period which lasted from 
about 1961 to 1980 is referred to as the “Age of Neutrality.”138 Under the Kennedy 
administration there was a profound shift in the principles underlying US international tax 
policy. The long standing principle of benefits afforded by the state as well as fairness were 
abandoned and gave way to the notion of efficiency which in taxation, translated to neutrality.139 
The main architect of this switch was Stanley Surrey who advocated for neutrality and whose 
marks on US international tax policy remain apparent today.140 Surrey was the main driver of the 
Subpart F rules in the 1960s allowing the US to currently tax some incomes earned outside of the 
US.141 The debate centered on neutrality and the choice, highlighted by then Secretary Dillon in 
his 1961 address to the House Ways and Means Committee, was between Capital Export 
Neutrality (“CEN”) and Capital Import Neutrality (“CIN”).142 As a matter of fact, Stanley Surrey 
who prepared the remarks for Secretary Dillon indicated the choice was about designing an 
international tax policy that either encourages investments in the US or investments abroad.143 
                                                          
136 See Report, Supra note 126. 
137 Capital export neutrality has generally been associated with worldwide taxation coupled with a credit for 
foreign income taxes. 
138 See Avi-Yonah, Supra note 131. 
139 Id. 
140 Professor Stanley Surrey was a Harvard Law professor and the First Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy from 1961 
to 1969. 
141 David Tillinghast, The Passage of the Revenue Act of 1962: Subpart F at its Birth, presented at TCPI Conference 
Session 1 (2005). 
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The US treasury at the time which expressed its preference for CEN ushered an era of 
prioritization of residence based taxation over source based taxation.144 Surrey went on to 
influence tax policy enactments such as the 1966 Foreign Investors Tax Act that invented the 
notion of “effectively connected” income;145 and the 1968 transfer pricing regulations.146 The 
concept of neutrality was at the heart of any tax policy discussions during this period and any tax 
policy enactment was viewed from the lenses of their impact on tax neutrality, whether import or 
export neutrality. 
The third period which lasted from about 1981 to 1997 focused the attention of US tax policy 
making on competitiveness and competition. 147 Professor Avi-Yonah refers to this period as the 
“Age of Competition”.148 The new emphasis on competitiveness encouraged unilateralism in tax 
enactments. Many legislative and regulatory actions taken during this period endeavored, 
unilaterally, to level the playing field for MNEs. Legislative action of this era included the 
Foreign Investment Real Property Act (“FIRPTA”),149 the Branch Profits Tax rules of 1986,150 
the earning stripping limitations and interest deductibility rules of 1989,151 the portfolio interest 
exemptions of 1984,152 or the reduction in the scope of the Subpart F rules between 1994 and 
                                                          
144 See, e.g., The President’s Tax Proposals to Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity, 383 (1985) ("The 
longstanding position of the United States that, as the country of residence, it has the right to tax worldwide 
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145 Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539. 
146 See Treas. Reg. 1.482-2 (1968). 
147 See, e.g., William McClure & Herman Bouma, The Taxation of Foreign Income from 1909 to 1989: How a Tilted 
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149 Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2682. 
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1997.153 As a result, this period saw a reduced emphasis on US residence based taxation and 
growing criticism of the CEN as well as growing unilateral action for the sake competition. 
The fourth period started in the late 1990s and is still prevalent today. Under this period, US tax 
policy makers understand the need for coordinated action to achieve both competitiveness and 
avoid double taxation and ideally double non-taxation. Professor Avi-Yonah refers to this period 
as the Age of Cooperation.154 Long urged to cooperate by their European counterparts, it is only 
under this period that US tax policy actors engage in cooperation and accept to meet 
international tax challenges in cooperation with at least the US major trading partners. The US 
took the lead in international organizations such as the OECD to define a coordinated tax policy 
with and for the member states. The OECD’s initiative on harmful tax competition155 was mostly 
driven by Professor Hugh Ault, and main figure in US international tax policy. The US 
negotiated/renegotiated and concluded many tax treaties during this period all of which 
contained measure of cooperation including the exchange of information with major partners. 
Most recently, the US has led in the OECD’s effort to combat Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(“BEPS”).156 With US cooperation, the BEPS project has developed a number of Action Items 
understood as needed to combat the phenomenon.157 Even though the US has not signed on to 
and does not agree with some of the action items proposed, the US has been involved in the 
process throughout as a testament of its activism in the international tax arena in this era of 
cooperation.158 
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The salient point in the review of the history of the US international taxation  
historical shifting from source to residence taxation and back, as well as motive of 
competitiveness or cooperation have still not answered the question of how to prevent both 
double taxation and double non taxation at the same time. Adams struggled with the question in 
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The formation of international taxation rules in the developing world has to contend with various 
philosophies and structures of the respective nations. The design and adoption of rules, including 
international tax rules is motivated by various underlying economic positions and philosophies. 
Ideas, interests, and institutions play a central role in shaping tax policy. As indicated by Vito 
and Zee in their 2001 piece entitled Tax Policy for Developing Countries: “In developing 
countries, tax policy is often the art of the possible rather than the pursuit of the optimal.”159 
Even though, as will be shown, the specificities of each system may differ, there are general 
philosophies that underlie the design, adoption and implementation of international tax rules in 
developing countries. Most developing countries aim to (A) attract investments, (B) encourage 
exports, (C) deal with the hard to tax, (D) provide simplicity, and (E) set special rules for their 
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A. Attracting Investments: the Phenomenon of Tax Incentives 
Many countries in the developing world have sought to attract investments and ignite more 
business activities within their borders. Attempt to convince investors to intervene have touched 
many areas of the local laws. However, not many areas have been used as often as tax law design 
and implementation for purposes of attracting business investments. The decisions to adopt a tax 
rule and incorporate it into the country’s legislation, as well as the decision to implement those 
rules that were already incorporated in the local laws have had to contend with the idea of 
whether those decisions contribute to attract investments. The concern is even more vividly 
expressed in recent years as global completion grew and many countries battle to be home of the 
major multinational companies. In this context, developing countries which are already 
shorthanded by their very many other impediments to business investments have had recourse to 
heavy and ever controversial tax incentive constructs.160 
A tax incentive is defined as any measure that provides for a more favorable tax treatment of 
certain activities or sectors compared to what is available to general industry. The very existence 
of tax incentives was largely sparked by tax completion. Many countries, both in developing and 
the developed world, endeavored to attract capital by reducing taxes on capital and other creative 
fiscal strategies. Typical tax incentives include tax holidays, special zones, investment tax credits 
and other investment tax allowances, accelerated depreciation, targeted reduced tax rates, 
targeted tax exemptions, exemptions or deferrals of customs taxes on imports, and tax incentives 
on financing. 
                                                          
160 Eifert Benn, Alan Gelb and Vijaya Ramachandran, The cost of doing business in Africa: Evidence from enterprise 
survey data, 36.9 World Development 1531 (2008). 
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Tax holidays are very popular in developing and developed countries alike. A tax holiday is a 
temporary reduction or elimination of a tax. Examples of tax holidays have included all areas of 
taxation including income taxes, indirect taxes, or property taxes. Tax holidays may be granted 
to particular activities or to particular taxpayers. In developing countries specifically, tax 
holidays are used to attract Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”), to stimulate growth in selected 
industries, or to develop specific business sectors. Tax holidays can however be particularly 
harmful. The fact that tax holidays are temporary in nature make them most attractive to short 
term footloose and rapidly profitable investment. The absence of a long term view and structure 
leads to opportunistic investor behavior, establishing a short term investment to benefit from the 
tax holiday and planning on winding the investment down when the holiday ends. Nevertheless, 
most economic data indicate that tax holidays, more often than not, serve their purpose by 
boosting a business sector, albeit short term. 
Special zone, originally with labor and trade undertone, are now frequently used in the tax debate 
as a tax incentives. Special zones traditionally have many objectives including increased trade, 
optimal taxation, increased investment, or lenient labor requirements. In developing countries, 
special zones are used to allow fiscal benefits. The zones can be determined geographically or 
based on the business sectors. Special zones are still used as tax incentives even though many 
commentators doubt their ability to attract investments.161 
Investment allowances which have the same effects as investment tax credits are another 
common form of tax incentives. Under the investment allowance, the investor can deduct a 
percentage of its capital cost, including depreciation, from its taxable income. Whereas, under 
the investment credits, the investor is allowed to deduct the investment cost directly from their 
                                                          
161 Aggarwal Aradhna, Special economic zones: revisiting the policy debate, Economic and Political Weekly 4533 
(2006). 
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tax liability. Many developed countries experimented both investment allowances and 
investment credits before generally abolishing those systems.162 The investment incentives are 
directly related to the investment. In fact, investment incentives are contingent on the investment. 
Many commentators argue that investment incentives are only useful to profitable businesses and 
as such may not be as valuable to those already highly profitable corporate entities.163 Investment 
incentives remain largely used however, specifically in the developing world. 
A tax incentive seen as much in the developing and developed world alike is the accelerated 
depreciation. Accelerated depreciations are mechanisms through which a tax system allows for a 
business to depreciate some assets faster disregarding their regular useful life. The particularity 
of this incentive is that it is simply a timing advantage afforded to the investor. Investors are 
allowed to frontload their depreciation deductions, reducing their taxable income in the early 
years of acquisition of the depreciable asset.164 The accelerated depreciation incentive is 
effective as it allows the investors to enjoy the time value of money and pay tax later. On the 
other hand, the government does not indefinitely forgo the revenue; it simply delays the time the 
revenue is collected. This incentive has particularly shown effective and helpful for cash-
constrained, but highly profitable businesses. 
Even though tax incentives have expanded globally, the question remains as to whether they are 
fit for purpose. Are tax incentives effective in attracting investment or boosting growth? The 
general answer to that question seems to be that tax incentives are ineffective. In fact, many 
commentators have argued that there is no link between tax incentives and business development 
generally; and in the case of developing countries, that there is no evidence that tax incentives 
                                                          
162 The U.S. adopted investment allowances in 1962 to protect domestic corporations against foreign competition, 
but then abolished the system in the 1969 Tax Reform Act. 
163 De Mello Luiz, Foreign direct investment in developing countries and growth: A selective survey, 34.1 The Journal 
of Development Studies 1 (1997). 
164 Davidson Sidney, Accelerated depreciation and the allocation of income taxes, Accounting Review 173 (1958). 
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lead to increased FDI.165 There is however broad understanding and acceptance that tax 
incentives are used for tax competition. Many countries have adopted some tax incentives in 
order to mimic behavior seen elsewhere, to compete for mobile tax base, or to align their tax 
policies with other jurisdictions. Within developing countries, tax incentives continue to be 
adopted despite overwhelming evidence of their infectivity. Many commentators have 
endeavored to demonstrate how and why tax incentives are ineffective; however, there has been 
no concrete proposal of what they should be replace with. In the developing would the need to 
attract investments is so profound that it leads to countries being pushed to do something, and in 
the absence of a viable alternative, tax incentives continue to be introduced in tax legislation. 
The debate therefore is not whether tax incentives should be adopted, but rather which types of 
tax incentives are less harmful and can be put in place in situations where they are most likely to 
work. Understandably the trend in many countries has been to replace tax holidays with for 
example accelerated depreciation.166 The need to attract investment continues therefore, through 
tax incentives or otherwise, to dictate international tax policy design and debate in most 
developing countries. Another philosophy that influences international tax rule making is the 









                                                          
165 Agostini Claudio and Soraphol Tulayasathien, Tax Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment, (2006). 
166 See for example US rules on accelerated depreciation. 
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B. Encouraging Exports and Markets Openness 
Major policy design in the developing world has to contend with the need to encourage exports 
from those countries as a way to grow local economies. Dating as far back as in the writings of 
Adam Smith, it has been generally accepted that international trade is the engine of growth. 
Many protectionists policies experienced with, specifically in the twentieth century, were short 
lived and the general consensus today remains that international trade and countries openness 
lead to major economic benefits and growth.167 In fact, major international organizations such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) have made market openness and 
reduction in trade barriers, a condition for financial assistance in developing countries.168 The 
success of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in increasing international trade including in 
developing countries is another proof of the general belief that more trade is good for the 
economy.169 In the current era of globalization, many developing countries are encouraged and 
expected to ‘bring something’ to the international market. International trade has opened global 
markets and presents an opportunity for developing countries to access major trading centers and 
sell their goods and services. The design of the rule of law in general and of taxation law 
particularly including international taxation, must therefore satisfy the need to promote exports 
as many developing countries measure their economic success by how many goods and services 
they are able to offer in the international markets. 
In the tax arena, the promotion of exports and the openness of markets generally translate into 
national tax rules that allow for incentives and sometimes international tax rules that struggle to 
                                                          
167 See Edwards Sebastian, Openness, trade liberalization, and growth in developing countries, Journal of economic 
Literature 1358 (1993). 
168 Taylor Lance, Editorial: The revival of the liberal creed—The IMF and the World Bank in a globalized economy, 
25.2 World Development 145 (1997). 
169 Barton John, et al, The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and the WTO, 
Princeton University Press (2008). 
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balance source based versus residency based taxation. As will be shown in the case studies 
below, sometimes, there are contradictory tax policy goals and design of contradictory tax rules 
that aim to attract investment into the local jurisdiction while promoting local exports from that 
jurisdiction. Many countries have adopted tax holidays for companies investing into products 
exclusively destined for exports. Encouragement of exports is not a concern for developing 
countries alone. In fact, many developed countries continue to design rules that would boost their 
capacity to export goods to foreign markets. In the US for example, it was a central promise of 
then presidential candidate Barack Obama to double US exports by the end of his first term in 
office, a promise that he argued he was on his way to achieving and even doubled down on it 
during his second run for president in 2012.170 The goal to promote exports, while noble from a 
local country perspective, is not always in line with the rules of some international organizations. 
The design of rules, including taxation rules that promote local countries exports have usually 
faced obstacles regarding their compliance with rules of international organization such as the 
WTO. As an example, the US as well as China, in their endeavor to promote local exports, have 
been engaged in litigation regarding violation of WTO rules.171 Any design of tax rules, and 
international tax rules specifically should satisfy the need of developing countries to encourage 
exports but at the same time should not put compliance with international tax provisions of 







                                                          
170 Dixon Peter and Maureen Rimmer, Doubling US Exports Under the President's National Export Initiative: Is it 
Realistic?: Is it Desirable?, Monash University, Centre of Policy Studies and the Impact Project (2011). 
171 Harris Donald, The Honeymoon is over: The US-China WTO Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 Fordham Int'l LJ 
96 (2008). 
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C. Inability to Reach the Hard to Tax and Heavy Reliance on Corporate Taxation 
Exercising the taxing power is one of the most daunting tasks that countries face globally. In 
fact, one of the quintessential issues facing tax administrations around the world is how to deal 
with tax evasion, both on the large and most publicized scale, and on the smaller, less headline 
grabbing scale.172 The issues varying from the “hard to levy”173 to the “hard to tax”174 pose 
specific challenges to developing countries. The proliferation of small businesses, the engine of 
any economy, has created a quasi fiscal nightmare for developing countries tax administrations. 
The question remains how to deal with the hard to tax, how to reach the underground economy. 
In the developed world, tax administrations are relatively well resourced and have the expertise 
to track the otherwise hard to tax. In the developed world, government allocate necessary 
resources to form robust and ever increasingly skillful tax administration with the time and the 
man power to go after tax evasion, on a large as well as small scale. In these systems, tax 
administrations are organized around voluntary assessment by taxpayers, with regular and robust 
audits by the tax administrations to correct any irregularities or sanction fraud. In developing 
countries, challenges are different and more fatal. In developing countries, skillful personnel are 
scarce and the necessary manpower is unsustainable.175 In these countries, most of the economy 
is underground and out of the tax authorities reach and the infrastructure needed to reach such 
underground economy is inexistent. As a consequence, many tax authorities in developing 
countries have focused on relatively bigger businesses that are within the tax net, slamming them 
                                                          
172 Tax Justice Network and Mike Lewis, Global tax evasion, (2006). 
173 The expression hard to levy has generally been used to describe a pool of income the base of which is not 
determinable for assessment for tax purposes. 
174 The expression hard to tax has generally been used to describe a pool of income difficult to locate and account 
for, for tax purposes. 
175 Bird Richard, Tax challenges facing developing countries, Institute for International Business Working Paper 9 
(2008). 
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with high taxes and relentless audits. The phenomenon, described as that of ‘milking the cow 
already in the barn’ has led any effort to develop tax rules laser focused on big companies as the 
only source of the ever-increasing need for government revenues. The reality of the developing 
countries is that self-assessment of tax is not trusted and tax administrations have neither the 
resources nor the time to enforce notoriously complex tax structures. The design of tax rules, and 
international tax rules specifically in developing countries have to face the reality of weak tax 
administration infrastructures and the resulting heavy reliance on relatively big companies 
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D. Need for Simplicity and Simplification Concerns 
Legal simplicity in general and tax simplicity specifically have always been a goal of legislators 
globally.176 In the developing world in fact, tax simplicity is not only an ideal, it is a necessity for 
optimal tax administration.177 The definition of simplicity itself has animated many debates.178 
Many commentators have defined simplicity solely from its economic perspective while others 
have looked at simplicity solely from a legal standpoint. Even though the debates have merits, 
we will limit ourselves to the notion of legal simplicity in our discussion of tax simplicity in 
developing countries because we believe legal simplicity is not totally separate from economic 
simplicity and a well-rounded legal simplicity will lead to the economic simplicity in tax. The 
commonly accepted definition of legal simplicity of taxation is the ease by which a body of a tax 
law can be read and correctly understood and applied to practical situations.179 Legal simplicity 
of taxation therefore requires clarity, consistency and certainty.180 
Clarity in tax simplicity refers not only to the linguistic expression of the legislation, but also to 
the organizational scheme by the drafters. The notion of consistency refers to both internal and 
external consistency. Internal consistency requires coordination, harmonization and linkage 
between all the parts of the legislation. External consistency requires the laws at large181 to not 
contradict with any other adopted tax legislations in the jurisdiction.182 The requirement of 
certainty is arguably the most important in the concept of simplicity.  Certainty means that the 
                                                          
176 See Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book Five, Chapter II (1776). 
177 See Supra, at 89. 
178 Tran-Nam Binh, Tax Reform and Tax Simplicity: A New and Simpler Tax System, 23 UNSWLJ 241 (2000). 
179 Id., at 241. 
180 Id. 
181 Laws at large refer to law passed by the legislative body but also regulations and other official pronouncements 
of the tax administration agency. 
182 See Cooper, Themes and Issues in Tax Simplification, 10 Australian Tax Reform 417 (1993). 
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taxpayers ‘true’ tax liability can be uniquely determined from a minimal supply of relevant data 
with reasonable efforts.183 Tax simplicity can therefore be measure by answering a number of 
questions including: how simply is the tax legislation written? How simple is the content of the 
tax legislation? How taxpayers respond to the tax law? How tax administrations respond to the 
tax law? How expensive is it to operate the tax? This last question factors in the economic 
simplicity as the economic simplicity looks at the interaction between the tax law and the 
economy. The economic simplicity shifts the focus from comprehensibility to applicability, but a 
well-rounded legal simplicity takes applicability into account. 
Changes in tax legislations in general and international tax rules specifically in developing 
countries have been preoccupied with the need to achieve simplicity. Any proposal to change 
international tax rules in developing countries needs to be simple, in both the legal and economic 
sense in order to achieve optimum tax administration. The need for simple tax rules is very 
pronounced in developing countries because, as indicated, those countries usually lack the 
expertise and resources to apply complex rules. The current rejection of the transfer pricing 
regulations adopted by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) 
by developing countries is rooted in the fact that the regulations are too complex and resources 
available to developing countries tax administrations do not allow them to apply those 
regulations.184 Developing countries need simple rules, easily applicable, easy for taxpayer to 
comply with and for tax administration to enforce, and able to be coordinated with rules of 
external jurisdictions. 
                                                          
183  See Tran-Nam Binh Supra note 178. 
184 Neighbour John, Transfer pricing: Keeping it at arms' length, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Developmen, 29 The OECD Observer 230 (2002). 
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E. Special Regimes for Extractive Sectors 
In many developing countries, the extractive sector, specifically the oil and gas industry account 
for the major part of the economy and taxes therefrom constitute the major source of revenues 
for those governments.185 In Nigeria for example, the largest oil producer in the African 
continent, statistics show that the country produces approximately 2 million barrels of oil per 
day, 1.9 million of which were exported.186 The oil industry is the main sector of the economy 
representing approximately 95% of the country’s total exports. Oil revenues in Nigeria represent 
approximately 80% of the government’s total revenues, and the oil and gas sector accounts for 
approximately 35% of the Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”).187 Similar to Nigeria, many 
developing countries have the oil and gas industry at the center of their economies and any tax 
policy discussion or proposal is bound to give special consideration to the sector.188 The dilemma 
in designing tax policy for these countries is to raise enough revenues from the oil and gas sector 
while not consecrating a tax system that would discourage investments in the sector. The 
concerns in this area are taken more seriously today as research overwhelmingly shows that 
countries with high reliance on oil have performed poorly comparatively to their counterparts 
who are less reliant on oil. The so called “resource curse” obliges any tax policy to aim carefully 
at solving/mitigating the curse, at least from a fiscal policy perspective.189 The dependence of 
revenues on oil proceeds, which are volatile, unpredictable and exhaustible, significantly 
complicates fiscal design and fiscal management specifically from a short as well as long term 
                                                          
185 See for example, in the case of Nigeria, Khan Ahmad, Nigeria: The political economy of oil, (1994).  
186 See the 1998 statistics reported by Amponsah et al (2012). 
187 See OPEC Statistics, available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm, last retrieved 
(11/10/2014). 
188 See Amponsah Enahoro and Ali-Nakyea, Issues of Taxation in the Oil and Gas Sector in Selected Countries: 
Lesson for Ghana, 5 CS Canada International Business and Management 167 (2012). 
189 See Shalk and Hemming, providing a survey of fiscal sustainability (2000). See also Alier and Kaufman (1999); 
Engel and Vlades (2000); Bjerkholt (2002), or Hausmann, Powell and Rigobon (1993). 
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perspectives.190 From a short term point of view, taxation of the central extractive industries must 
raise enough funds to provide for government expenditures while providing enough incentives 
for continued investments in the sector. From a long-term perspective, taxation of this central 
sector must be done in a way that designs non-reliance of governments to those industries alone. 
As a consequence, and on a long-term basis, governments must utilize tax policy that encourages 
and boost other forms of investments in other sectors in order to proactively deal with the 
unpredictability of the extractive sector and its exhaustiveness. It is accepted that fiscal policy is 
not the only way to deal with the “resource curse” but it is also widely accepted that fiscal policy 
is a central way to deal with it. The taxation policy and its redistributive underpinning can lay the 
ground for enhanced government services and enticement to develop alternative industries 
making the system sustainable for the long run. Also the design of tax policy takes into account 
the way in which the natural resources sector is operated. In most developing countries, 
resources are operated through private companies which then pay taxes to the government on 
their profits.191 Taxes are usually high in this industry but often accompanied by many incentives 
and loopholes that major natural resource companies willingly take advantage of. Most high oil 
producing companies have grown creative as to how to raise funds through taxation of the 
industry. It is therefore common to encounter special taxes on the industry for education, or 
wellbeing of the localities.192 On the other hand, in some other countries, the governments 
directly operate the natural resources, and in that setting tax policy might be less impactful.193 
 
                                                          
190 See Davis Jeffrey, Annalisa Fedelino, and Rolando Ossowski, Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in 
Oil-Producing Countries, IMF (2003). 
191 Most oil producing countries have the oil industry operated by private companies.  
192 In Nigeria or Chad, the Oil industry is subjected to a special tax to fund the education trust fund. 
193 Some countries directly operate the oil and gas industry, using state owned and operated companies. Examples 
include Venezuela or Mexico. 
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The tax policy philosophies discussed in Chapter II are discernable in the international tax rules 
and systems that exist currently on the developing world. As details below demonstrate, the 
struggles to satisfy the major fiscal policy philosophies discussed above are noticeable from 
Africa to South America and Asia. The analysis below focuses on a few countries, in a sampling 
manner, to characterize the systems as a whole. As any sampling exercise, the choice of the 
countries below did not meet an exact and wholly objective standard. Instead, the below case 
studies were decided based on a number of criteria including whether the countries meet the 
definition of a developing countries and the pertinence of the potential link between its tax 
policies and its overall development. Also, the choice of the below countries as case studies was 
informed by the aspiration of this thesis to bring a novel contribution to the discussion; as a 
consequence, we intentionally avoided the large yet classified as developing countries but for 
which ample writing on their tax systems is readily available. Our intention was therefore 
twofold: first, to study those countries judged, a priori, ‘interesting’ because their tax structures 
are either strong or weak, and the impact is readily ascertainable on the overall economy. And 
second, to bring into light in an academic setting, the policies existent in those fiscal 
jurisdictions194 that are not abundantly explored in academic tax research. 
 
 
                                                          
194 Stotsky Gale and Asegedech, Tax effort in sub-Saharan Africa, IMF (1997). 
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A. Current International Tax Positions in Africa 
Developing countries in general and African countries specifically face many hurtles when it 
comes to taxation. The need to raise revenues is urgent in these countries. However, authorities 
have struggled to use taxation as a means to provide for the optimum operation of the state. In 
the sub Saharan Africa context for example, tax authorities have little to no powers and are 
unable to collect tax from ‘the very few’ who are wealthy and powerful; at the same time the 
enforcement powers they possess toward ‘the many’ are ineffective because ‘the many’ have 
next to nothing to be taxed on.195 Countries are diverse and tax systems vary profoundly from 
one country to another. For instance Mauritius has adopted the worldwide system of taxation, 
Congo the territorial system of taxation, and Liberia applies a blend of both systems. 
Nevertheless, there are common concerns across the continent including those related to 
enforcement of the international tax rules that have been incorporated into most of these systems. 
The task of choosing two countries in the continent that might provide a relatively acceptable 
representation of the situation as a whole is bound to be imperfect. The choice of Cameroon and 
Nigeria for the cases study below was necessary in order to portray the situation as a whole by 
showing both ends of the spectrum. On the one hand, Cameroon, a smaller country196 which 
inherited most of its fiscal policies from its former colonial power, France, is an example of a tax 
system in a smaller African economy.197 On the other hand, Nigeria, a larger country198 whose 
fiscal policies early influences came from England,199 shows a tax system in a larger economy.200 
                                                          
195 See Fjeldstad Rakner and Lise, Taxation and tax reforms in developing countries: Illustrations from sub-Saharan 
Africa, CMI Report 6, ISBN 82-8062-056-7 (2003). 
196 Cameroon has approximately 23 million inhabitants. 
197 Cameroon is a smaller economy, and yet one of the fastest growing countries in the continent and in the world 
(See statistics from the world economic forum, 2015). 
198 Nigeria has approximately 200 million inhabitants. 
199 Nigeria was colonized by England. 
200 Nigeria is the second largest economy in Africa. 
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It should be noted that most African countries rely on indirect taxes, specifically Value Added 
Tax (“VAT”) which since its introduction throughout the nineteen nineties, has had it percentage 
increased many a time.201 The case studies below disregard the study of VAT and it specific 














                                                          
201 In Cameroon for example, VAT was introduced in 1996 at a rate of about 17%, ever since, it has drastically 
increased to stand at 19.25% today. 
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1) Cameroon Fiscal Environment: a Case Study 
Cameroon is a developing country in the Central Region of Africa. Like most countries including 
industrialized countries, the Cameroonian tax system is separated into individual taxation and 
entity taxation. Further, taxation should be viewed from an internal as well as an international tax 
perspective. The focus of this case study is to present, in a topical manner, the international tax 
aspects of the Cameroonian tax system. The impact of the fiscal policy and tax structure in the 
overall economy is widely acknowledged by both the government and the private sector. In fact, 
in 2007, the government initiated an effort to reform the fiscal structure in Cameroon in order to 
produce a simple yet competitive tax system capable of meeting the then current and ever 
changing national and international fiscal challenges. The commission for fiscal reform was 
therefore created to carry that mission through consultation with the various stakeholders and 
policy recommendations.202 
Cameroon adopted the territorial tax system whereby Cameroonian companies that carry out 
trade outside of Cameroon are not taxed on their foreign sourced profits. Likewise, foreign 
companies with activities in Cameroon are subject to Cameroonian corporate tax only on their 
income sourced in Cameroon.203 Further, Cameroon adopted residency requirements similar to 
those applicable in the US. Thus, a company is classified as a Cameroonian company only if it is 
registered in Cameroon, and regardless of whether or not it is managed and/or controlled in 
                                                          




ywPHw4K4DA&usg=AFQjCNGhgacK1b8xeNt7L_RpW05k8F1sxQ&sig2=f3uYt1DbhxbMvBZlDNWFBw, (last retrieved 
11/18/2014). 
203 See Article 5, Cameroon Internal Revenue Code. 
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Cameroon.204 In the event of an entity managed and/or controlled from Cameroon, there is a 
likelihood of the entity having a permanent establishment in Cameroon thereby subjecting its 
income sourced in Cameroon to Cameroonian taxation. 
The individual income tax system in Cameroon relies on a progressive tax rate. Depending on 
the income of the individual, the tax rate ranges from 0% to approximately 40%.205 The 
Cameroonian tax legislation establishes a number of conditions in order for one to be liable for 
tax in Cameroon. The conditions include the requirement to have a home or principal place of 
residence in Cameroon, or to maintain a ‘center of business’ in Cameroon, or be a civil servant. 
The requirement of one’s principal place of residence is satisfied if one spends 183 days per year 
in the country.206 The individual tax allows for both personal and business deduction of expenses 
where applicable. However, in 2012, the law was amended to preclude deductions where 
payments are deemed made to a recipient in a ‘tax heaven’. Nevertheless, the tax authorities are 
unable to clearly construe the notion of tax heaven, and are unable to track and trace those 
payments that are destined to recipients in the designated tax heavens. This situation is similar to 





                                                          
204 See OHADA, Droit des Societes (1999); as regularly amended and restated. 
205 See Article 21 for companies and 69 for individuals, Cameroon Internal Revenue Code. 
206 See Article 21, Cameroon Internal Revenue Code. 
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Taxes on Income and gain of Corporations 
As indicated above, Cameroon applies the territorial tax system whereby Cameroonian 
corporations are not taxed on their foreign sourced income, and foreign companies are only taxed 
in Cameroon on their income sourced in Cameroon.207 The regular corporate income tax rate is 
38.5% (35% plus a 10% council surtax).208 Cameroon also adopted a turn over tax to serve as an 
alternative minimum taxation. Cameroonian companies are tax on the higher of either 
corresponding corporate tax rate or 1.1% of their turn over, meaning, their gross annual sales. It 
should be noted the turn over tax is presumed from the previous year turn over, it varies 
depending on the kind of industries or sectors of activities, and it should be remitted throughout 
the current financial year with a credit being allowed at the end of the year.209 
Profits realized by branches of foreign companies in Cameroon are presumed distributed to the 
parent companies and are consequently subject to the branch profits withholding tax currently at 
16.5% of the after-tax income. 
 
Capital Gains and Dividends 
In Cameroon, capital gains, specifically return on investments, are subject to the regular 
corporate tax rate of 38.5%.210 Capital gains include gains on the sale of real estate, corporate 
shares and business assets.211 Cameroon has not adopted the preferential tax treatment of capital 
gains as applied by most other jurisdictions. It should be noted however that the tax can be 
deferred or eliminated in the event of a merger. Additionally, if a business is wholly or partially 
                                                          
207 See Territoriality Supra, note 203 
208 See Supra at 230. 
209 The minimum tax payable is higher for companies under the simplified tax regime (3.3% for non-importing 
traders, and 5.5% for producers, service providers and importation traders).  
210 See Article 44, Cameroon Internal Revenue Code. 
211 Id. 
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transferred or discontinued, only one half of the capital gains would be taxed if the transfer or 
termination occurred less than five years after the business started or was acquired, or only one 
third of the capital gains would be taxed if the business started or was acquired more than five 
years before the transfer or discontinuation.  
A unique characteristic of the Cameroonian system of capital gains taxation derived from its 
need to promote and encourage investments in the local stock exchange. In fact, any capital gains 
realized on the Cameroonian (and planned to be regional) stock exchange are exempt from 
corporate income tax and taxation on movable capital.212 The exception to that generous 
treatment is however related to capital gains derived from the disposition of the oil and gas 
related interest when the exploitation of the Cameroonian subsoil is involved. In fact for all oil 
and gas related capital gains, whether realized inside or outside of Cameroon, the corporate tax 
rules would apply provided the interest is related to the exploitation of the Cameroonian 
subsoil.213 
Dividends paid to residents in Cameroon are subject to a 16.5% withholding tax (15% plus the 
10% council surtax).214 Resident recipients must include the gross dividend in their taxable 
income, but they receive a corresponding 16.5% tax credit to prevent double taxation.215 
Dividends paid to nonresidents are subject to a 16.5% withholding tax, which is a final tax.216 A 
parent corporation may exclude up to 90% of the dividends received from a 25%-owned 
subsidiary if the parent company and the subsidiary have their registered office in a Central 
                                                          
212 See Article 56, Cameroon Internal Revenue Code. 
213 See Cameroon 2014 Financial Law, available at 
http://www.journalducameroun.com/files/communiques/133.pdf, (last retrieved 11/18/2014). 
214 See Article 11, Cameroon Internal Revenue Code. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
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African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) country.217 In this case, however, no 
withholding tax credit is allowed. Instead, the tax can be offset against any withholding tax due 
on its own dividend distributions. 
 
Tax and Other Investment Incentives 
Cameroon, like many other developing countries has always maintained various incentives to 
encourage investment and spur economic growth. Tax incentives have usually served as the 
primary vessel for attracting investments. The recent provisions in Cameroon were laid in the 
2013 law to provide for various preferential tax treatments to attract investment. The law of April 
18, 2013 establishes two main kinds of incentives. On the one hand, incentives that affect the 
installation phase of the enterprise. The April 18, 2013 law defines the installation phase of the 
enterprise as the period of five years from the date of issuance of the approval of the enterprise as 
pertaining to the special regime.218 During the installation period, the April 18, 2013 law offers 
exemptions from registration duties, transfer duties, custom duties and Value-Added-Tax on 
certain items.219 On the other hand, the April 18, 2014 law establishes incentives that affect the 
operational phase of the enterprise. The April 18, 2014 law defines the operational phase as the 
period of ten years from the time the company qualified for the incentive.220 Incentives during 
the operational phase are many and very impactful for the approved enterprises. As a matter of 
fact, and under the April 18, 2014 law, operational phase incentives include exemption or 
reduction with respect to the minimum tax, exemption or reduction of the corporate tax, custom 
                                                          
217 CEMAC Countries are Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. 
218 This period usually coincides with the formation of the enterprise. In fact, at the time the enterpreneurs decide 
to get into a business and form a business enterprise, they petition the competent authority for the granting of the 
incentive, and if approved, their installation period would be five years from the date of their formation. 
219 See Law N*2013/004, Cameroon law on Incentives Measures to Encourage Private Investments (2013). 
220 For most companies the date of qualification for the incentive coincides with the date of their incorporation. 
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duties, and other specified taxes and duties. Also, even though the general rule on loss carry 
forwards in Cameroon is four years, a company under operational phase of the incentives would 
be allowed to carry losses forward into the fifth year. 
 
Tax Treaty Network 
Even though Cameroon has various investment tax treaties, the country only has a few executed 
tax treaties. Currently, Cameroon has eight executed tax treaties, only two of which are with non-
African countries.221 Each of the tax treaties contains specific provisions and some of the 
provisions are now outdated as they provide for a worse fiscal treatment than no treaty. For 
example, in the Financial Law of 2014, Cameroon established a 0% withholding tax on interest 
payments to non-resident lenders. However, all tax treaties executed by Cameroon provide for at 
least 15% tax on interest payments.222 Some provisions in the treaties reveal the balance of 
power when the treaties were negotiated and ought to be revised. The tax treaty between 
Cameroon and Canada for example provides for different tax rates for the same income 
depending on source of such income. The tax treaty provides that if the dividend, interest or 
royalty is paid from sources in the Cameroon, there shall be a 15% withholding tax; however, if 
the dividend, interest or royalty is paid from sources in Canada, there shall be a 20% withholding 
tax.223  
                                                          
221 Cameroon has Tax Treaties with Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, France, 
Gabon, and Tunisia. 
222 Example all the Treaties have a 16.5% tax on interests, except the Treaty with Canada providing for a 15/20% 
tax, and the treaty with Tunisia providing for 15% tax on interests. 
223 See Convention Between Canada and the United Republic of Cameroon for the Avoidance of Double Taxation 
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (1982). 
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It should be noted however that all the rules discussed above apply only when there is no double 
tax treaty otherwise applicable. The existence of the tax treaty supplements the above rules and 
rules under the executed treaty are dispositive. 
 
Transfer Pricing 
In 2012, Article M19 bis in Book II of the General Tax Code on Manual of Tax Procedures was 
introduced to increase the regulation and control of transfer pricing.224 Under the new rules, if in 
the course of an audit, the administration has evidence that a company indirectly transferred 
profits, the administration may request that the company provide information and documents 
regarding relationship between the company and other companies or groups outside of 
Cameroon, the pricing method utilized and the justification, the tax treatment for the other 
company or related party in the foreign jurisdiction, and a description of the activities of the 
other party located outside of Cameroon. The 2012 law allows for a request, in addition to the 
regular disclosure requirements, of a detailed statement of transactions with the companies which 
control or are controlled by 25% or more. Specifically, 25% companies must provide a statement 
of their shareholding in other companies, and a detailed statement of intercompany 
transactions.225  
The 2012 amendment was introduced in order for the Cameroonian tax authorities to respond to 
undue base erosion and profit shifting schemes that are on the rise across the continent. 
Cameroon, like many other tax administrations across Africa is reacting through an increase in 
requested information. The issue however is whether the tax authorities in Cameroon possess the 
                                                          
224 See Cameroon Finance Law of January 1, 2012, as enhanced and updated by Law N*2014/026 (2014). 
225 Id. But see Law N* 2014/004 (2013) providing for exceptions to the documentation requirement. 
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necessary human capital to digest the ever-growing list of information requested from MNEs. 
The Director of the tax collection sub-division at the ministry of revenues indicated that transfer 
pricing is by far their major challenge around tax administration and tax collection in the 
country.226 The Director specified that the information they are given is abundant and overly 
confusing; the information does not easily trace the movement funds and the rational. Base 
erosion and profits shifting seems therefore easily achievable and the potential for redress 
pursuant to an audit is slim to none. The Cameroonian tax authorities, heavily reliant on 
corporate taxation, have been outspoken about the need to curve issues of base erosion and profit 










                                                          
226 Interview with Makon, under director at the ministry of revenues, conducted 11-14-2014. 
   78 
  
 
2) Nigerian Fiscal Environment: a Case Study 
Nigeria is a developing country in West Africa, and one of the largest economies in Africa. 
Nigeria operates under a fiscal federalism composed of three layers, federal, state and local 
taxing authorities. Taxation has existed from the pre-colonial era of the Nigerian society but its 
modern state can be assessed from the post-independence period.227 Since Nigeria became 
independent, major political and social needs have dictated tax policy orientations.  
Right after independence, the most urgent need of the system was to provide revenues to finance 
public sector programs.228 As a consequence, early post-independence tax policy making was 
driven by the need to provide as much revenues to the government and possible. As Nigeria 
evolved after independence, the tax policy began to be influenced by the need to develop an 
internal economy and an internal business sector. Tax policy making therefore shifted from 
exclusive revenue raising mission to a mission to encourage business venture and national 
economic development. Tax legislation during this period was evidenced by several measures to 
encourage national production and slow imports. Government revenues during this period 
originated primarily from import duties levies. Also, the Nigerian tax policy relied heavily on 
revenues from the oil and gas industry as major reserves were found in the country.  
Later into its independence and more recently, the Nigerian tax policy has been focusing on 
diversifying tax revenues sources, reducing the dependence in oil revenues, and producing a 
globally competitive tax system.229 
                                                          
227 See Ariyo Ademola, Productivity of the Nigerian tax system, 1970-1990, 67 African Economic Research 
Consortium (1997). 
228 See onireke Ibadan, A Comprehensive Tax History of Nigeria, Federal Inland Revenue Service, ISBN: 978-978-
48776-4-0 (2012). 
229 Id. 
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Nigeria applies the worldwide system of taxation whereby Nigerian persons are taxed on their 
worldwide income.230 On an individual income tax perspective, Nigerian tax legislation specifies 
condition for tax liability as well as the taxable amount. 
The main condition for individual tax liability in Nigeria is the requirement of Nigerian 
residency. Under Nigerian law, individuals are considered Nigerian residents if they reside in 
Nigeria, expatriate employees present in Nigeria for employment purposes, or anyone present in 
Nigeria for more than 183 days during any 12 months’ period. These rules regarding individual 
tax liability are preempted in the presence of a tax treaty. 
The Nigerian tax legislation subjects various kinds of individual income to taxation in. The 
individual income tax rate, depending on the income, varies from 0 to approximately 40%.  
First individual taxable income includes employment income. Employment income has a wide 
definition which includes salaries, wages, fees, allowances, pensions, non-cash benefits, bonuses 
and other premiums or gratuities. Individual partners are taxed on their share of the partnership 
profits whether the profits are distributed or not. Income from self-employment is subject to 
individual taxation. Individuals are also subject to taxation on their investment income.  
Nigeria imposes a 10% tax rate on payments of interest, dividends or royalties. Further, the 
Nigerian tax legislation subject individuals to a 10% tax rate on their capital gains including the 
sale of land and/or buildings located in Nigeria. Finally, the Nigerian tax legislation imposes 
various taxes on individuals including the inheritance tax, the gift tax, the social security tax, or 
the national housing find tax. 
                                                          
230 See Section 14 of the Nigerian Companies Income Tax Act (2004), as amended from time to time. 
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Contrary to individual taxation that is relatively easy to grasp, corporate taxation in Nigeria and 
international taxation specifically have a more complex structure. 
 
Taxes on Income and gain of Corporations 
As indicated above, Nigeria operates a system of worldwide taxation whereby companies 
resident in Nigeria are subject to tax on their worldwide profits. Similarly, non-resident Nigerian 
companies are only subject to tax on their Nigerian sourced profits. A company is resident of 
Nigeria if it is incorporated in the country. Any foreign company that intends to carry on a trade 
or business in Nigeria is required to incorporate a company in the Country.231 
The general corporate tax rate in Nigeria is 30%, and the rate can be reduced in various 
circumstances. However, all companies are subject to a minimum tax representing the greater of 
either 0.25% of turnover, 0.25% of paid in capital, 0.5% of net assets, or 0.5% of gross profits. 
Companies are subject to a 10% withholding tax on payments of interest, dividends and royalty 
to all recipients in non-treaty jurisdictions. 
Nigeria has no specific thin capitalization rules. Thus, generally speaking, there are no ratios 
which may limit the amount of debt that may be applied to fund a company. However, 
companies that intend to engage in banking or insurance business are required to have specified 
minimum paid-up capital, capital adequacy ratios and/or solvency margins.  
 
Capital Gains and Dividends 
In Nigeria capital gains arising from the disposal of capital assets are taxable at a 10% rate. 
Generally, capital gains arise from disposal of assets such as land and buildings, options and 
                                                          
231 See the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Chapter 59 (1990), available at http://www.nigeria-
law.org/CompaniesAndAlliedMattersAct.htm (last retrieved 11-25-2014). 
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other property rights, currency exchange gains, or movable assets. The general rule is applied to 
assets situated in Nigeria. For residents, disposal of those assets are subject to taxation even if the 
assets are located outside of Nigeria. 
Dividends are generally subject to 10% withholding tax rate. The rate is reduced or eliminated in 
cases involving treaty jurisdiction. The Nigerian tax legislation also provides various instances of 
tax exemption on dividend payments, as part of general tax incentives. 
 
Tax and Other Investment Incentives 
In an attempt to make its tax regime more modern and more competitive in the globalization era, 
the Nigerian government has enacted various tax and other investment incentives. 
First, even though as indicated above the general corporate tax rate is 30%, Nigerian tax law 
allows a reduction to 20% tax rate during the first five years of a company’s existence if the 
company is engaged in agricultural or mining production. Similarly, companies are exempt from 
the minimum tax requirement in their first five years of existence. 
Second, Nigeria has implemented various tax holidays. For example, if a limited liability 
company is operating in an industry that the government recognizes as vital to Nigeria’s 
economic development; such company would be granted a general tax holiday of up to five 
years. Any such company would have no tax liability in Nigeria during up to five years from 
starting its operations in the country. 
Third, Nigeria has instituted free-trade zones to encourage exports of Nigerian products.232 Any 
approved Nigerian company operating in an export free-trade zone is exempt from all federal, 
                                                          
232 See Nigeria Export Processing Zones, Act 63, 1992, available at 
http://www.babalakinandco.com/resources/lawsnigeria/LAWS/9263NIGERIA%20EXPORT%20PROCESSING%20ZON
ES.htm (last retrieved 11/25/2014). 
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state, and local government taxes, levies and fees. Additionally, any new export oriented 
companies, even if located outside of the free-trade zones maybe eligible for the preferred tax 
treatment.233 
Fourth, new companies engaged in mining in Nigeria are eligible for a general tax holiday for up 
to five years from their start of business.234 Similarly, companies engaged in downstream 
operations in the oil and gas industry are eligible for a general tax holiday of up to five years. 
Generally, at the end of the specified tax holiday period, the Nigerian tax legislation offers the 
selected companies accelerated capital allowances. 
Finally, Nigeria offers tax exemptions to interest payments on foreign loans. The exemption 
from withholding is dependent on the time for repayment of the loan, and generally the 
exemption is limited in time.235 The presence of a tax treaty might however make the exemption 
permanent. 
 
Tax Treaty Network 
Nigeria has a relatively expansive tax treaty network, compared to other African countries. 
Nigeria has entered into such treaties with Belgium (effective January 1, 1990), Canada 
(effective January 1, 1993), China (effective January 1, 2010), Czech Republic (effective January 
1, 1991), France (effective January 1, 1991), Netherlands (effective January 1, 1994), Pakistan 
(effective January 1, 1990), Romania (effective January 1, 1993), South Africa (effective January 
                                                          
233 Id. 
234 See the Mining and Minerals Act of 2007, available at 
http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/Nigeria%20Minerals%20&%20Mining%20Act%202007.pdf (last retrieved 
11/25/2014). 
235 Foreign Loan Interest Tax exemption: If more than 7 years for repayment of loan, not less than 2 years of 100% 
exemption. If 5 to 7 years for repayment of loan, not less than 18 months of 70% exemption. If 2 to 4 years for 
repayment of loan, not less than 12 months of 40% exemption. If less than 2 years for repayment of loan, no 
exemption. 
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1, 2009), and the United Kingdom (effective January 1, 1988). In addition, Nigeria has signed 
double tax treaties with Bulgaria, Mauritius, the Philippines, Spain, Sweden, or Poland. Those 
treaties have yet to be ratified. Nigeria is also engaged in many treaty negotiations including with 
Algeria, Denmark or Tunisia. 
In all tax treaties concluded by Nigeria, passive income, namely income from dividends, 
interests, and royalties is subject to a 7.5% withholding tax rate.236 This is a preferential rate 
compared to the regular rate of 10% on such incomes in transactions involving non-treaty 
jurisdictions. It should be noted however that even though the treaties with China and South 
Africa have not been updated to reflect the 7.5% rate, the Nigerian authorities apply that reduce 




For a long time, there were no special transfer pricing rules in Nigeria. There were general anti-
avoidance provisions in the tax laws that empowered the tax authorities to adjust the tax liability 
of a company where they believed the company’s transactions were not conducted at arm’s 
length. Transactions between a company and related entities were usually scrutinized by the tax 
authorities, to ensure that they were conducted on competitive terms. Certain expenses (such as 
management fees and offshore expenses), for which relevant regulatory approval was not 
obtained, may also be disallowed for corporate income tax purpose. 
                                                          
236 See Articles 10, 11, and 12 of the tax treaties executed by Nigeria.  
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On August 4, 2012, transfer pricing regulations took effect in Nigeria.237 The regulations apply 
to transactions between connected taxable persons.238 Under the regulations, the notion of 
connected taxable persons refers to related parties as specifically defined in the regulations. 
Related parties entering into transactions to which the regulations apply must determine the 
taxable profits resulting from such transactions in a manner that is consistent with the arm’s 
length principles. Further, for purposes of the regulations, a permanent establishment is treated as 
a separate entity. Transactions between the permanent establishment and its head office or other 
related persons are subject to the regulations.239 
The transfer pricing regulations of 2012 in Nigeria incorporated the international norms of ALS 
advocated in Article 9 of both the United Nations (“UN”) and the OECD Model tax treaties.240 
The Nigerian regulations require that related parties transactions satisfy the arm’s length 
principle and that the parties produce documentation to establish that the transactions are at 
arm’s length. Nigerian tax authorities will receive information regarding the covered 
transactions, however, the question remains as to whether the authorities would always be able to 
determine what arm’s length should be, and adequately evaluate the methods used to arrive at the 





                                                          
237 See Nigeria Transfer Pricing Regulations of August 4, 2012, available at http://www.firs.gov.ng/Tax-
Management/Tax%20Forms%20Documents/TP%20Regulation.pdf (last retrieved 11/25/2014). 
238 Related persons under the regulations refer to entities that meet a certain threshold of ownership interest, 
companies that own or are owned by others in the transaction.  
239 Id. 
240 Article 9 in both the UN and the OECD Model Tax Conventions discuss tax treatment of related enterprises 
transactions based on arm’s length principles. 




B. Current International Tax Positions in Latin America 
Any regional study on South America has to refrain from any generalization because even 
though the countries might be in close geographical proximity, their divergence is very profound.  
South American countries differ largely including in their economic structure, their dimension, 
their historical heritage, their wealth, and their administrative and political institutions. The 
challenges posed by diversity are even more pronounced when it comes to the study of taxation 
in South America. The region has known two major influences both from Europe and from the 
United States that have shaped many of its cultural background and other political philosophies. 
The northern part of the region was more exposed to American influence, while the southern part 
was more impacted by forces from Europe. The selection of two countries with a hope they 
would provide a general sense of taxation in the region was therefore a task bound to be 
imperfect. However, similar to the approach adopted in the case study on Africa above, we have 
selected two countries approximately at both ends of the spectrum. I fact, Argentina will offer a 
view of taxation in the context of a south American large and heavily populated country while 
Panama would offer a perspective of a smaller south American country and its experiences with 
taxation in general, and international taxation specifically. 
It should be noted that most African countries rely on indirect taxes, specifically Value Added 
Tax (“VAT”) which since its introduction has usually followed an increased trend. The case 
studies below disregard the study of VAT and it specific impact in the selected jurisdictions. 
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1) Argentinian Fiscal Environment: A Case Study 
The Argentine Republic (“Argentina”) is a country located in the southeastern part of South 
America.241 Argentina became independent from Spain in 1816 following a fight for 
independence that lasted for almost a decade.242 With approximately one million square miles of 
territory, Argentina is the eighth largest country in the world, and the second largest in South 
America. Argentina is classified as a middle emerging economy with historically high ratings on 
the human development index.243 The country is organized as a federation of provinces with 
Buenos Aires as the capital and largest city. The population of Argentina is estimated at 
approximately 43 million inhabitants.244 The country has known a tumultuous modern history. In 
fact, Argentina is classified as an emerging market today despite being the 7th wealthiest country 
in the world in early 20th century. Political and social instability in the last few decades have 
impacted the Argentinian economy. Today Argentinian leadership endeavors to deal with the 
many economic challenges of the country through economic and tax policy philosophies that 
encourage local production, attract foreign investment, encourage exports, and promote local 
employment. Taxation, and international taxation policy plays a central role in the struggles for 
Argentina for remain globally competitive while providing enough revenues for the optimum 
functioning of the government. 
                                                          
241 Romero Luis Alberto, A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century, Updated and Revised Edition, Penn State 
Press, 2013. 
242 See Camogli Pablo and Luciano de Privitellio, Batallas por la Libertad, Buenos Aires, Aguilar, ISBN 987-04-0105-8 
(2005). See also Luna Félix, La independencia argentina y americana, Buenos Aires, Planeta, ISBN 950-49-1110-2. 
(2003).  
243 It should be noted however that Argentina’s rating has decreased in recent years, ranking 49th in the 2014 
Report of the Human Development Index. 
244 Per the latest census, in 2014, the population is estimated at 42,669,500 inhabitants. 
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The government of Argentina is the sole entity in charge of national tax policy and tax 
collection. Fiscal responsibilities are entrusted to a government agency known as the 
‘Administracion Federal de Ingressos Publicos’ (“AFIP”) which is in charge of administering the 
income tax system. Argentina has adopted a worldwide system of taxation. The tax system, like 
many others, is divided both into individual and corporate tax, and into internal and international 
taxation. 
From an individual tax perspective, residents of Argentina are subject to tax on their worldwide 
income while non-residents are only taxed on their income that is sourced in Argentina. To be a 
resident of Argentina, one must satisfy either of three conditions: be a native or naturalized 
citizen of Argentina; be a foreign individual who is granted permanent residence in Argentina; or 
be a foreign individual who remain in Argentina under temporary authorization for a period of 
12 months or longer.245 
Argentina adopted a progressive individual tax system. Individual tax rates range from 0 to 
approximately 40%. Argentina taxes various kinds of incomes including: employment and self-
employment income; education allowances; investment income; interests and royalties; 
directors’ fees; capital gains; and employer provided stock options. Argentina, in an attempt to 
encourage investment and development of its local stock exchanges, exempts from taxes, capital 
gains from the sale of stock on national exchanges. Sales of real estate are subject to a transfer 
tax at a rate of 1.5% of the sale price. 
                                                          
245 It should be noted however that, under Argentinian tax law, individuals under temporary authorization who 
have not been granted permanent residence are deemed non-residents if they can prove that they do not intend 
to stay permanently in Argentina. 
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From a corporate tax perspective and as indicated above, resident companies are taxed on a 
worldwide basis. As a consequence, any profits, including capital gains of Argentinian 
companies are taxable in Argentina whether earned in the country or not. Businesses in 
Argentina as well as branches of foreign companies are considered residents of Argentina and 
are subject to taxation in the country. 
 
Taxes on Income and gain of Corporations 
The statutory corporate tax rate in Argentina is 35% of companies’ profits.246 Additionally, 
Argentina adopted the Tax on Minimum Presumed Income (“TMPI”). This tax is imposed on 
resident companies in Argentina and is applied instead of the regular corporate income tax if the 
regular corporate income tax rate leads to a tax liability that is lower that the TMPI. The TMPI is 
similar to the notion of Alternative Minimum Tax in other jurisdictions; however, the TMPI is 
calculated on the basis of the company’s assets. TMPI is imposed at a rate of 1% of the 
company’s qualifying worldwide assets which constitute its tax base.247 In an effort to encourage 
certain industry sectors, Argentina tax legislation provided for a special rate of TMPI (generally 
lower rate) for certain industries. 
Generally, Argentinian tax legislation provides that a tax year for a company is its accounting 
year. AFIP, the Argentinian tax administration, requires that resident companies make advanced 
tax payments each month, on the basis of the previous tax liability. In certain circumstances, 
advance payments of TMPI may be required to be made by certain companies. At the end of the 
                                                          
246 See The Federal Administration of Public Revenue. 
247 TMPI is calculated on the basis of the resident company’s or branch’s worldwide assets at the end of the year. 
However, some assets are excluded from these tax base computations. 
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year, companies must file their tax returns, and make payments of any balances due. The 
payments are generally due within five months of the end of the accounting year and Argentinian 
tax legislation has adopted a system of interest and penalties for late tax payments. 
 
Capital Gains and Dividends 
Capital gains derived by Argentinian tax residents companies are included into their normal 
taxable income and are taxed at the regular corporate income tax rate of 35%. However, capital 
gains derived by Argentinian non-resident companies are taxed at a rate of 15%, which can be 
decreased to 13.5% in certain circumstances, and generally, in the case of presumed income. The 
capital gains arise generally from the transfer of shares, bonds and other securities. It should be 
noted that capital gains tax is not applicable for the transfer of government bonds. Traditionally, 
Argentina had maintained a tax exemption for transfer of stock by non-residents. In fact, Section 
78 of the Decree N*2,284/1991 of 1991 established an exemption from tax for foreign 
beneficiaries on income derived from Argentinian share transfer.248 In 2013, in an effort to 
mitigate an expected decrease in tax revenues, the Argentinian tax legislator repealed the non-
resident capital gains tax exemption and replaced it with a 15% or 13.5% tax rate. The transferee, 
in these instances, is liable for the tax that applies to the transferor. This tax does not, however, 
applies to indirect transfers which could produce the same result while remaining out of the 
Argentinian tax net. 
Dividends distributions from Argentinian companies are subject to a 10% tax rate. The tax is 
administered through withholding mechanism whereby the distributing entity is required to 
                                                          
248 See Decree N*2,284/1991, Section 78 (1991). 
   90 
  
 
withhold the tax and remit to the Argentinian tax authorities. Similarly, branch profits remittance 
is subject to the 10% withholding tax rate if a branch located in Argentina distributes its profits 
to its parent. Argentina has adopted the Argentine Equalization Tax currently imposed at a rate 
of 35% through withholding. Under this tax, if any distribution or any branch profits remittance 
exceeds the accumulated tax earnings of the distributing or remitting entity, then such excess 
distribution or remittance is subject to the 35% withholding tax rate. The 10% withholding tax 
rate is administered simultaneously with the 35% withholding tax rate, the latter being applicable 
only to the excess distribution. 
Argentina imposes a withholding tax on interest and royalty payments. The general rate for 
interest payments is a 35% imposed through withholding. However, under certain circumstances, 
the rate is reduced to 15%; such circumstances include interest payments on loans granted by 
financial institutions not located in tax heavens, or interest on loans for the importation of 
movable assets. The general rate for royalty payments is 31%. The royalty tax rate can be 
reduced to 21% if certain conditions are met. The royalty tax is enforced through withholding tax 
mechanisms. 
 
Tax and Other Investment Incentives 
Like many other developing nations and middle economies, Argentina relies on tax and other 
investment incentives to boost its economic growth. Argentina introduced and maintains a tax 
incentive to attract energy investment in the country. Introduced in 2013 and extended thereafter, 
the tax incentive allows energy companies who invest $250 million over five years, to sell 20% 
of their energy production in international markets without Argentinian export taxes. 
Additionally, those energy companies are able, tax free, to keep some of the export revenues 
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outside of the country.249 Tax incentives further exist for certain activities such as mining, 
software production, biotechnology, and biofuel production.  
In addition, Argentina maintains tax-free zones (“Tierra del Fuego”) with special incentives for 
certain activities. The appurtenance in a tax-free zone, for qualifying industries results in an 
exemption from taxation on the activities and production of such entities. 
Tax Treaty Network 
Tax treaties negotiations in South America in general, unlike other regions of the developing 
world, have been very aggressive in the past decades. Argentina maintains one of the oldest and 
most established tax treaty networks in South America. Countries that have signed bilateral tax 
treaties with Argentina include: Australia (1999), Austria (1979), Belgium (1996), Bolivia 
(1976), Brazil (1980), Canada (1993), Chile (1976), Denmark (1995), Finland (1994), France 
(1979), Germany (1996), Italy (1979), Netherlands (1996), Norway (1997), Russia (2001), Spain 
(1992), Sweden (1995), Switzerland (2000), United Kingdom (1996), or United States (1981). 
Most Argentinian tax treaties have been drafted along the lines of the UN Model Convention 
with general bias toward protecting source based taxation. 
In general, the treaties above provide for preferential tax treatment compared to rules that apply 
in the absence of treaties. For example, in the absence of a treaty, dividends income is subject to 
a tax rate ranging from 10% to 35%. In most treaties signed by Argentina however, dividend 
payments in a treaty situation are subject to a tax rate that ranges from 10% to 15%.250 Similarly, 
interest payments in the absence of a treaty are subject to a tax rate ranging from 15.05% to 35%. 
Whereas, in a treaty context, interest payments are subject to withholding tax rate ranging from 
                                                          
249 See Wall Street Journal, Argentina To Expand Oil & Gas Investment Incentives, June 10, 2014. 
 
250 See for example, Article 10 of the United Kingdom and Argentina double tax convention. 
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0% to 15.05%.251 Further royalty payments in the absence of a treaty are subject to a withholding 
tax rate ranging from 21% to 31.5%, but in the event a treaty is applicable, the withholding tax 
rate for royalties can be reduced down to 3%.252 It should be noted however that certain 
requirements must be satisfied for application of the preferential treatment provided for by the 
bilateral income tax treaties. 
 
Transfer Pricing 
The law in Argentina includes transfer pricing rules generally applicable to transactions between 
related parties. The law also applies to transactions that do not involve related parties if the tax 
authorities believe or have reasons to believe that such transactions were not carried under the 
ALS principles. A regulatory decree in Argentina contains a list of countries that are qualified as 
low tax jurisdictions and any transactions with entities located in such jurisdictions are ipso facto 
considered not carried on under the ALS principles and therefore, subject to transfer pricing 
rules. 
Argentina generally accepts five methods of transfer pricing analysis: the comparable 
uncontrolled price method; the resale price method; the cost plus method; the profit split method; 
and the transactional net margin method. However, in 2003 and under the General Anti-
Avoidance Rules (“GAAR”), Argentina introduced a law that in fact provided for a new method 
of transfer pricing for the agricultural sector. The commonly known as the sixth method of 
transfer pricing, is still pending litigation as to its constitutionality in Argentina. Under such de 
facto sixth transfer pricing method, if exports of agricultural products with publicly quoted price 
are made to related parties and if an international intermediary who is not the effective purchaser 
                                                          
251 See for example, Article 11 of the United Kingdom and Argentina double tax convention. 
252 See for example, Article 12 of the United Kingdom and Argentina double tax convention. 
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of the products is involved in the transaction, the appropriate transfer price is deemed the higher 
of either the market quote on the day the products are delivered, or the transaction price. 
To justify the use of any transfer pricing method, Argentinian tax authorities require that each 
taxpayer submit specific documents that are part and based on their mandatory transfer pricing 
study. The required documents include: special tax returns and other reports signed by 
independent certified public accountants. 
Argentina has adopted debt-to-equity rules. Under general rules and as indicated above, 
transactions must be carried under the ALS principles. The debt-to-equity ratio in Argentina is 
generally 2:1. As a consequence, interests paid on liabilities in excess of the debt-to-equity ratio 
are non-deductible. Further, the disallowed interests’ deductions because of the debt-to-equity 
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2) Panama Fiscal Environment: A Case Study 
The Republic of Panama, as it is officially known, is a country in the most southern part of 
Central America, at the junction of North and South America. Along with Colombia, Panama 
was colonized by Spain and acceded to independence as part of Colombia. In 1903 however, 
Panama separated from Colombia to become its own country. According to the World Economic 
Forum’s for Global Competitiveness Index, Panama is the second most competitive economy in 
Latin America.253 With only over six million inhabitants, Panama is one of the fastest growing 
countries in Latin America. The relatively small size of the country makes it more realistic to 
analyze the impact, if any, of tax policy on the economy as a whole. Panama is known for its 
relatively clement tax system. 
On an individual tax perspective, Panama taxes income of all those who qualify as residents, 
regardless of their country of citizenship.254 To qualify as a resident and be subject to tax in 
Panama, one must reside in Panama or must have remained in Panama, continuously or not, for a 
period of more than 183 days in a calendar year.255 Panama adopted a territorial system of 
taxation whereby all residents and non-residents are taxed only on their Panama sourced 
income.256 Panama taxes individuals on various types of income including employment income, 
self-employment income, investment income, dividend income, income from stock option plans, 
or education allowances. The individual income tax structure in Panama is the progressive 
income tax system with rates ranging from 0% to 25%.257 Panama draws no distinction in taxing 
Panama sourced income whether the person entitled to the income is resident of non-resident. All 
                                                          
253 The World Economic Forum (“WEF”) is a Swiss non-profit organization based in Geneva. The organization is 
independent and dedicated to shaping regional and global industry agenda by engaging world leaders. 
254 See Bradley Hackford, Tax Residency in Panama, available at http://www.bradleyhackford.com/en/panama-
relocation-panama-tax-residency/ last retrieved 10/20/2016. 
255 Id. 
256 See Garay Eduardo González, The Panama trust in international tax planning, 17.5 Trusts & Trustees 401 (2011).   
257 See Supra, at 254. 
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income sourced in Panama is subject to taxation in Panama, a principle that constitutes a basic 
foundation of the corporate tax system in Panama. 
From a corporate income tax perspective, taxation in Panama is based on the territorial system of 
taxation. Therefore, any person whether individuals or entities are subject to taxation in Panama 
on any and all income derived or sourced in Panama. Resident branches and legal entities are all 
considered Panama residents. However, for entities, it is relevant whether they are incorporated 
in Panama or not; they will be subject to tax provided that they receive (and from wherever they 
receive it) taxable income produced within Panama. 
 
Taxes on Income and gain of Corporations 
As indicated above, corporations, partnerships, branches, and any other entity considered as a 
legal entity are subject to tax in Panama provided that they derive income from sources within 
Panama. As a consequence, businesses in Panama organized for the purpose of generating 
income outside of Panama and those companies would not be subject to taxation in Panama. 
Further, Panama has designated some income as not arising from Panama even when the 
activities are carried on Panama in order to encourage some activities. The sectors exempted 
include income from managing outside of a Panama office, activities that take place abroad, as 
well as certain invoicing and re-invoicing activities. 
The general business income tax rate in Panama is 25%. The tax rate is applied on the all the 
entity’s income derived from sources within Panama, and after deducting exempt income and 
deductible expenses and costs. The income tax system is based on an accrual method whereby 
revenues have to be recognized in the year in which they are earned. Panama enacted the 
equivalent of a minimum tax regime for certain entities. In fact, entities with income exceeding a 
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certain threshold specify by law, must pay in taxes, the higher of either the liability arising from 
application of the regular corporate tax rate of 25%, or 4.67% of their total income taxable in 
Panama.258 
 
Capital Gains and Dividends 
Panama tax system designed a special treatment to capital gains income. Pursuant to a policy of 
encouraging investments and promoting economic growth, Panama allows for special tax 
treatment of various kinds of capital gain income. In Panama, capital gains derived from the 
transfers of shares or quotas are subject to capital gains tax if the shares or quotas were issued by 
a company with operations or assets in Panama.259 In 2006, Panama passed a tax legislation to 
regulate and provide more details on the taxation of various kinds of capital gains incomes.260 
Under the 2006 tax law, taxable transfers of shares in Panama are subject to a 10% tax rate. The 
2006 law required that the transferee of the shares withhold 5% tax on the transfer amount and 
remit it to the tax authorities within 10 days of the share transfer. The transferor is responsible 
for the remainder of the tax, if any, on the transfer. It should be noted that the 5% withholding 
tax upon the transfer operates as a credit toward the 10% capital gains tax required overall upon 
the transfer of the shares. The provisions of the 2006 law also apply to the indirect transfer of 
shares deemed economically invested in Panama. 
Similar to the transfer of shares, capital gains derived from the transfer of movable assets as well 
as the sale of real estate are subject to income tax in Panama, at a rate of 10%. However, under 
                                                          
258 In fiscal year 2014, the threshold amount was PAB 1,500,000. Therefore, any Panama taxable entity with 
taxable income over PAB 1,500,000 shall pay the higher of either the liability derived from the application of the 
25% tax rate, or 4.67% of the entity’s total taxable income. 
259 See Section 701(e) of the Panama Tax Code. 
260 See Panama Tax Law N*18, June 19, 2016. 
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Section 1 of Law N*6 of 2005, a transfer tax is imposed on all transfers of real estate in Panama. 
The real estate transfer tax rate of determined at 2% of the higher of either the amount provided 
in the signed public transfer deed, or the cadastral value of the real estate in Panama. Transfers of 
real estate in Panama must be execute by a public notary for their validity, and the notary is 
required to obtain proof of payment of both the capital gains and the real estate transfer tax 
before they can execute the transfer deed. 
Distributions of profits, by corporations, in the form of dividends, are subject to taxation in 
Panama. A newly formed company in Panama obtains a Notice of Operations upon 
incorporation.261 All companies that have the Notice of Operations or that generate income in 
Panama must pay a tax on dividends, at a rate of 10%. Panama recognizes the notion of Bearer 
Shares whereby the shares and therefore the interest in the company is owned by whoever 
possess the physical share certificates. Share certificates of bearer shares do not have names of 
the owners and transfer tax or other fees are applicable upon their transfer. In the event of 
distribution of dividend to holder of bearer shares, Panama requires a dividend withholding tax 
of 20%. It should be noted that Panama imposes a reduced and final withholding tax rate of 5% 
on dividend distribution from foreign source income, income from export activities, and certain 
types of exempt income. Dividends distributed by entities in free-trade zones are also subject to a 
reduced and final withholding tax rate of 5%. Many exceptions apply this general rule, including 




                                                          
261 The Notice of Operations was formerly known as the Commercial License. The Panama Tax Law N*5 of January 
11, 2007 streamlined incorporation in Panama, and specifically, the process of obtaining the Notice of Operations. 
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Tax and Other Investment Incentives 
Similar to many other developing countries and small economies, Panama has enacted many 
forms of tax and other investment incentives to attract investment and promote economic growth. 
Tax incentives make Panama very appealing to investments and the economy has seen various 
forms of direct investments in recent years. The main incentives are the company headquarters 
law and the free trade zones. 
The regulation of MNEs’ headquarters has the main purpose of attracting MNEs to Panama and 
encouraging them to maintain their headquarters there for their regional or global operations. The 
headquarters law created a special incentive for MNEs that establish their headquarters in 
Panama. The law indicates that headquarters of a company are entities engaged in activities such 
as management and services. Headquarters services which must be part of the entity ordinary 
course of business, include technical assistance, financial and accounting services, marketing and 
publicity, or logistic and warehousing. Also, to qualify under the law, the entity must have 
regional or global operations. 
Qualified companies under the headquarters law receive a License to that end from the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry. Licensed MNEs are exempt from income tax for services rendered to 
the entities domiciled abroad that do not generate taxable income in Panama. Licensed MNEs are 
also exempt from VAT on their export of services. The tax benefits are in addition to the non-tax 
advantage of a special immigration regime for management visas. 
Panama has also adopted free-trade zones allowing special benefits to companies established 
therein. The main special free-trade zones include the Colon Free Zone,262 and Panama Pacifico 
Special Economic Zone. From a tax perspective, companies established in the special free-trade 
                                                          
262 The Colon Free Zone is located on the Atlantic side of Panama. 
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zones are exempt from taxation in Panama. In some instances, such companies benefit instead of 
a reduced tax rate.263 
 
Tax Treaty Network 
The territorial nature of the tax system in Panama and the fact that the country does not tax 
foreign income has led the country to not engage in tax treaty negotiations and to deem income 
tax treaties irrelevant to its circumstances. Until recently therefore, Panama had not engaged and 
had not signed many double tax agreements. In 2009, the OECD placed Panama on the “grey 
list” due to its unwillingness to cooperate internationally through tax treaties.264 In an attempt to 
be removed from the ‘grey list’ Panama engaged in a series of tax treaties negotiations 
culminating in its removal from the list in July 2011. Panama has executed bilateral tax treaties 
and exchange of information agreements with many countries including with France (2012), 
Portugal (2012), Singapore (2011), South Korea (2012),  US (2011), Finland (2014), UK (2013), 
Canada (2013), Czech Republic (2013), Israel (2012), or Ireland (2012). 
Panama Tax Treaty negotiations are largely based on the OECD’s Model Tax Convention and 
tend to favor residence based taxation. The Tax Treaties executed by Panama provide 
preferential tax treatment when a Treaty jurisdiction is involved as compared to non-treaty 
jurisdictions. In the absence of a Tax Treaty, Panama subjects interests, dividends, and royalties 
to the 12.5% withholding tax rate. However, in the presence of a Tax Treaty the withholding tax 
rate for the same interests, dividends, or royalties would be subject to withholding tax ranging 
from 0% to a rare maximum of 10%. 
                                                          
263 For example, companies located in the Colon Free Zone are exempt from corporate income tax; however, 
dividends distributions from those companies are subject to 5% tax rate. 
264 See G20 Summit in London in April 2009 where the resolution was to put Panama on a “grey list” as a country 
that is committed but has not substantially implemented the internationally agreed standards of transparency. 




In Panama, transfer pricing is regulated by Law N*33, and the transfer pricing regulations apply 
solely to transactions between related parties. Article 762-C of Law N*33 provides a definition 
of related parties, including both horizontal and vertical relationship situations. Article 762-A of 
Law N*33 requires that all transactions between related parties satisfy the ALS principles. In 
fact, the law requires that such transactions be tested in comparison with similar but independent 
and unrelated transactions. Panama has adopted the following transfer pricing methods: the 
Comparable and Uncontrolled Price method, the Resale Price method, the Cost Plus method, the 
Profit Split method, and the Cost Plus method. 
Law N* 33 does not however, provide guidance on how to search for comparables and the use of 
foreign comparables. The Tax Authority in Panama, the ‘Direccion General de Ingresos’ 
(“AGI”) reports transfer pricing provisions as the most difficult for them to administer and apply. 
Nevertheless, Article 762-D of Law N* 33 establishes the application of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines to any transfer pricing matter that is not expressly addressed in the local law 
in Panama. 
Panama tax authorities are allowed to require extensive documentation in the event of 
transactions within the transfer pricing regulations. Documentation may related to group 
ownership information, description of the transfer pricing policy of the group, identification of 
the related parties, description of the nature, amounts and characteristics of the payments 
involved in the transactions, detailed comparability analysis, or transfer pricing method used and 
the reasons for its use. The taxpayer has the burden of proving that the information provided is 
accurate and the AGI has the ultimate decision on the validity of the transaction from a transfer 
pricing perspective. 
   101 
  
 
The transfer pricing regulations in Panama were limited to related parties in jurisdictions having 
executed a Tax Treaty with Panama. However, in 2012, Panama amended its transfer pricing 
rules to expand their application to all related parties’ transactions, regardless of whether the 
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C. Current International Tax Positions in Asia 
Similar to Africa or South America, any regional stud y of Asia is bound to be imperfect. 
Countries in Asia, similar to North America or Western Europe are highly integrated from an 
economic point of view. Nevertheless, and similar to South America, or Africa, there is a lesser 
degree of homogeneity amongst Asian countries.265 In fact, there are large variations in policies 
across Asian countries. Countries across Asia differentiate on their size, their level of 
development, the political priorities, or their geographical situation. These major differences 
have an impact on major tax policies adopted by the various countries in Asia. When compared 
to other regional studies therefore, the case of Asia is particular, the many differences make 
improbable to get a general and harmonized picture as a whole. An analysis that aims to provide 
a general and complete picture of the tax atmosphere based on two sample countries is therefore 
futile. The differences and variations are too profound and their implication too consequential.  
Still, and in conformity with our previous approach, our choice of two countries aims at 
providing at least two aspects of those many differences, aspects that many countries in Asia 
would easily associate with. For our case study, we have selected two countries on the opposite 
end, a priori, to provide a closer look at the current Asian tax systems. At first, we will focus on 
Malaysia, a smaller country in terms of population266 and a relatively smaller economy. At a 
further end of the spectrum, we will look at Indonesia, a more densely populated country,267 with 
tax policies that carries a heavier impact on the economy, a priori. 
It should be noted that most African countries rely on indirect taxes, specifically Value Added 
Tax (“VAT”) which since its introduction has usually followed an increased trend. The case 
studies below disregard the study of VAT and it specific impact in the selected jurisdictions. 
                                                          
265 See Jorge Martinez-Vasquez, Taxation Asia, Asian Development Bank, ISBN 978-92-9092-337-4 (2011). 
266 The estimated population of Malaysia as of 2014 was of approximately 30 million inhabitants. 
267 The estimated population of Indonesia as of 2014 was of approximately 250 million inhabitants. 
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1) Malaysian Fiscal Environment: A Case Study 
Malaysia is a country located in Southeast Asia bordering Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, and 
Indonesia. As a former colony of England, Malaysia is politically organized as an elective 
monarchy with executive powers resting on the Prime Minister. Malaysia became independent in 
1957 and for decades after independence, the country enjoyed unique economic prosperity.268 
Early from its independence and until the 1970s, the Malaysian economy relied heavily on 
natural resources, the mining sector specifically.269 However, deep in its independence years, 
Malaysia adopted politics to encourage and expand other sectors of the economy and other 
business sectors. In the 1980s, the country’s growth was mostly driven by the industrial sector, 
with large investments. A specific focus was on business sectors related to tourism, Commerce, 
and Science. The economic diversification policies contributed to a stronger Malaysian 
economy, ranking third in the Southeast Asia, and 29th largest economy in the world.270 Today, 
Malaysia is an open economy, oriented toward the industrialized and global market economy. 
The government aims to develop Malaysia as a developed country, and many economic and 
financial experts are optimistic about Malaysia becoming a developed country in a near future.271 
In Malaysia, the state defines macro-economic policies and plans, and there is a notable state 
participation in the economy through various state owned enterprises.272  
                                                          
268 From its independence and up until approximately 2005, Malaysia enjoyed at least a 5% GDP growth per year. 
269 Sachs Jeffrey, and Andrew Warner, The curse of natural resources, 45.4 European economic review 827 (2001). 




(last retrieved 1/07/2015). 
271 See Statements from Credit Suisse Managing Director Wong Wei-Shen, as reported in The Star (7 May 2012), 
"Malaysia got what it takes to be developed nation". 
272 See for example, Malaysian Airline, Patronas, or Agrobank Malaysia. 
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The tax system present in Malaysia today has its roots from the country’s British colonial period. 
In fact, there was no unified tax law applicable all across Malaysia until 1967, with the passage 
of the Income Tax Act,273 which consolidated the various tax laws and created a unified federal 
income tax legislation. The Malaysian Inland Revenue Board (“MIRB”) is responsible of tax 
administration across the country, and is under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. The 
MIRB is highly decentralized with considerable powers and discretion of the administration of 
the tax legislation. The dynamism of the Malaysian economy has led to an expanded tax base 
and ever increasing need for uniquely designed internal as well as international tax policies. 
From and individual income taxation perspective, Malaysia has adopted a territorial system of 
taxation. Residents and non-residents of Malaysia are subject to taxation in Malaysia on all their 
Malaysian sourced income only. One is treated as a resident of Malaysia if they are physically 
present in Malaysia for a period of 182 days or more within a 365-consecutive day period. 
Malaysian tax legislation taxes individuals on various kinds of income including employment 
income, business profits, investment income, pensions and annuities, royalties and interest 
income, or stock options. Individual income tax rates are structured in a progressive structure 
depending on the amount of total taxable income of each individual. Malaysian individual 
income tax rates range from approximately 0 to 26%. Individual income tax rates can be affected 
by the very expansive tax treaty network subscribed by Malaysia, and such treaty network has a 
significant impact on corporate tax system. 
 
                                                          
273 See Laws of Malaysia, Act 53, Malaysia Income Tax Act (1967), available at 
file:///C:/Users/pougaza/Downloads/ASEAN_Malaysia_Income%20Tax%20Act%201967.pdf (last retrieved 
1/07/2015). 
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Taxes on Income and gain of Corporations 
From a corporate tax perspective, Malaysia applies a territorial tax system. The Tax legislation of 
1967 provides that corporations, residents and non-residents, are subject to tax on income 
accrued in or derived from sources within Malaysia. Income from sources outside of Malaysia is 
generally not subject to Malaysian taxation. Under Malaysian tax legislation, place of 
incorporation is irrelevant in determining the residence of a company. A company is a Malaysian 
resident if and only if its place of management and control is Malaysia.274 
Corporate tax rates in Malaysia are based on a set of circumstances and range from 0% to 38%. 
In general, corporations are taxed at a rate of 25% in Malaysia. For specific kinds of income the 
rate may vary significantly from the 25% general corporate tax rate. In fact, in Malaysia, income 
from interest, and royalties is subject to a 15% reduced tax rate.275 As we will see below, such 
rate is subject to further reduction if an income tax treaty applies. Further, income from use of 
movable assets, as well as certain other services in Malaysia is subject to a 10% reduced tax 
rate.276 For businesses the general rate of 25% is reduced to 20% if the paid in capital is less than 
MYR 2,500,000.277 However, for residents and non-residents companies carrying on petroleum 
operations, petroleum income is taxed at the higher rate of 38%.278 
                                                          
274  Id. See also, Mustafa Hajah and Mohd Hanefah, An Evaluation of the Malaysian Tax Administrative System and 
Taxpayers Perceptions Towards Assessment Systems, Tax Law Fairness and Tax Law Complexity, Dissertation 
Universiti Utara Malaysia (1996). 
275 Id. 
276 See taxation of rental income from ships made by Malaysian Companies; or taxation of commissions and 
guarantee fees. 
277 In general, companies with a paid up capital MYR 2,200,000 or less benefit from the 20% tax rate. However, 
such reduction is not applicable when the company with such paid up capital is owned by a company with a higher 
paid up capital amount. 
278 See the Malaysian Petroleum Income Tax Act of 1967, as amended from time to time, imposing a general rate 
of 38% tax on oil and gas income. 
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The general tax year in Malaysia is the calendar year, however, companies may adopt their 
accounting year as their tax year and as a basis for assessment. Tax administration is based on 
the self-assessment methodology and concept.279 Companies my provide an estimate of their 
income and tax liability before entering their tax year, and shall make tax prepayments 
throughout the year with any balance due to be settled and paid at the end of the fiscal year. 
 
Capital Gains and Dividends 
Historically, Malaysia has applied an imputation system for taxing dividends. Under this 
historical system, the ability of a company to pay taxes was dependent on the availability of 
distributive reserves and any cost incurred in production or distribution of the dividend was 
deductible. The distributive capacity, known as the availability of “franking credits” or the 
“section 108 credits” made the distribution of any amounts above the available credits to be 
taxable at the ordinary corporate income tax rate in Malaysia. 
However, in 2008, Malaysia introduced the single tier tax system, effective January 1, 2008. 
Under the single tier system of taxation of dividends in Malaysia, any distributions to 
shareholders as dividends are not subject to taxation in the hands of the shareholders. Income 
properly distributed to shareholders as dividends is exempt income for tax purposes. As a 
consequence, shareholders cannot deduct any expenses incurred in deriving the dividends and 
situations whereby a shareholder may claim a refund no longer exist.280  
                                                          
279 See James Simon and Clinton Alley, Tax compliance, self-assessment and tax administration, (2002). 
280 Under the imputation system, the money distributed as dividend was deemed to already have sustained a 
regular corporate tax rate. However, imputation allowed a shareholder to deduct any further expenses incurred in 
deriving the dividend. As a consequence, some shareholders were entitled to receive a refund upon distribution of 
dividends to them. The new legislation installing the single tier system of taxation for dividends makes the finds in 
the hands of the shareholder exempt income. All tax effects having been accounted for at the corporate level. 
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Under Malaysian tax legislation, dividends paid by resident companies are not subject to 
withholding taxation at source. The absence of withholding tax on dividends paid by Malaysian 
companies are a consequence of the single tier taxation and is in furtherance of Malaysian goals 
of facilitating and encouraging investments in the country. 
In general, Malaysia has no capital gains tax. Gains from sale or exchange of stock for example 
are not subject to taxation as Malaysia does not provide rules for taxation of capital gains as a 
general principle. Nevertheless, Malaysia maintains a real property gains tax. The tax is levied 
on capital gains from the sale of real property located in Malaysia or the disposition of stock in 
closely held corporations with substantial interest is real estate. Depending on the holding period 
in the real property, the tax rate ranges from 0% to 15%.281  Under Malaysian law, purchasers of 
real property located in Malaysia must withhold a rate of 2% on the sale price of the real 
property. The legislation allows for losses incurred in the disposition of real property to be 
carried forward indefinitely to offset future real property gains.282 In 2014, Malaysia proposed a 
rate increase for taxation of gains from disposition of real property. Under the new proposal, 
gains from the sale of real property maybe taxed at a rate of up to 30%. The proposal was seen as 
an attempt by the Malaysian government to curb what they saw as an abuse of the real property 
preferential tax rates. The changes would also apply to the sale of stocks in company having a 
majority of their interest in real property. 
 
 
                                                          
281 If the real property is held for two years or less, the tax rate on the gains from its disposition is 15%. If the real 
property was held for more than two years but less than six years, the tax rate on the gains from its disposition is 
10%. And if the real property was held for six years or more, Malaysian tax law provides for a 0% tax rate on the 
gains, if any, from the disposition of the property. 
282 See Malpezzi Stephen and Stephen Mayo, Getting housing incentives right: a case study of the effects of 
regulation, taxes, and subsidies on housing supply in Malaysia, Land economics 372 (1997). 
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Tax and Other Investment Incentives 
As a developing country, Malaysia does not constitute an exception to the general urge by 
developing economies to implement tax incentives. Malaysia has a wide range of tax incentives 
aim at positioning the country as a regional hub for MNEs, and a hub for research and 
development.283 Malaysia also uses tax incentives to encourage activity in some sectors that the 
country deems desirable to its economy and its society. Throughout history, Malaysia has 
enacted various tax incentives including tax holidays, investment allowances, or reduced tax 
rates for selected industries or sectors. 
The main incentive dates from 1990 when the Malaysian government enacted legislation that 
created a business center on the Island of Labuan with its distinct tax and regulatory regime.284 
The legislation created a very friendly fiscal atmosphere for conducting business in Lubuan. In 
fact and with the exception of companies in the financial sector, companies need no government 
approval to operate in Lubuan. Companies in Lubuan are subject to a reduced tax rate of 3% on 
their business profits from their trading activities, and are authorized to transact business with 
other companies in Malaysia. Further, companies in Lubuan are exempt from the obligation to 
withhold on their payments to non-resident recipients. Lubian companies may also open and 
maintain, in Malaysia or abroad, bank accounts in foreign currency with no restrictions imposed 
on the movement of funds through these accounts. However, companies in Lubuan are free to 
make an election to taxed under the provisions of the Malaysian main tax law of 1967. 
The other notable incentive is the Operational Headquarters Companies provisions. To attract 
more MNEs to locate their regional headquarters in Malaysia, the Operational Headquarters 
                                                          
283 See Siew Chuen Yong, Tax Incentives for Malaysia as a  Regional Hub and for Research and Development, ACCA 
(2011), available at http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/pdf/sa_nov2011_RandD3.pdf (last 
retrieved 1/13/2015). 
284 See the Lubuan Island Act (1990) in Malaysia creating a separate tax and regulatory environment in Lubuan. 
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Company provisions were introduced in 2005 and amended in 2007 to provide for a ten year 
exemption from taxation for income derived from selected activities.285 
Finally, Malaysia provides for research and development (“R&D”) incentives which many 
commentators have argued not sufficiently attractive. In fact Section 34(7) of the Income Tax 
Act of 1967 provides for a single deduction on scientific research. The government regularly 
distributes generous research grants, as well as double deduction for approved R&D,286 or an 
exemption of income for capital expenditures. 
 
Tax Treaty Network 
Malaysia has one of the most expansive tax treaty networks in Southeast Asia. With more than 
sixty bilateral tax treaties executed, Malaysia bases its treaty negotiations on the OECD Model 
Tax Convention. National tax legislations and provisions are preempted when a tax treaty is 
applicable. However, the national law will preempt application of a treaty of the national law 
provides for a more favorable treatment. Tax Treaties executed by Malaysia offer preferential tax 
rates on various kinds of income. For example, all dividends involving a treaty jurisdiction are 
not subject to taxation in Malaysia.287 Also, interest income under the treaty is subject to a tax 
rate as low as 5%.288 Finally royalty income under the treaty is subject to a tax rate as low as 
5%.289 
                                                          
285 See Malaysia PU(A) 307 of 2005 as Amended by PU(A)260 of 2007. 
286 See Section s34A of the Income Tax Act of 1967. The R&D must be approved by the Minister of Finance. 
287 See for example, Article 10 the Double Tax Convention between the United Kingdom and Malaysia (1998), as 
amended from time to time. 
288 See for example, Article 11 the Double Tax Convention between the United Kingdom and Malaysia (1998), as 
amended from time to time. 
289 See for example, the Double Tax Conventions concluded by Malaysia including with South Africa, Singapore, 
Spain, the UK, Namibia, or Sweeden. 
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Malaysia as a state incorporates the island of Lubian. Lubian has adopted several tax policies that 
have prompted some countries to consider qualify the Island as a tax heaven. Some tax treaties 
executed by Malaysia explicitly prohibit their application to Lubian Island. In recent treaties, 
Malaysia has agreed to the exchange of information provisions, including for Lubuan companies. 
The signing of the exchange of information is seen a s step toward non qualification of the 
Lubuan Island as a tax heaven for international tax dealings. 
It should be noted however that the majority of tax treaties executed by Malaysia do not include 
treaty anti shopping provisions that are necessary to curb various forms of treaty abuse. 
 
Transfer Pricing 
Transfer pricing in Malaysia, like in many other parts of the world, is a constantly evolving story 
and structure. The transfer pricing legislation is largely based on the separate accounting and 
arm’s length standard principles. In 2003, Malaysia adopted the Transfer Pricing Guidelines that 
closely mirrored the guidelines among the OECD countries. In January 2009, Malaysia adopted 
specific Arm’s length and Advanced Pricing Agreements (“APA”) provisions to strengthen its 
transfer pricing environment. In May 2012, Malaysia enacted transfer pricing rules and APA 
rules to coordinate in transfer pricing regulations. In July 2012, Malaysia proceeded with a 
revision of its transfer pricing guidelines and enacted new APA guidelines. 
The rules of 2012 placed a greater responsibility on the taxpayer regarding transfer pricing 
compliance. The rules expressed the need to prepare contemporaneous transfer pricing 
documentation to substantiate that transactions involving related parties are carried under the 
arm’s length standard. The guidelines provide a detailed list of information, documentation and 
records that need to be compiled regarding intercompany transactions. The taxpayer, however, is 
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not obligated to submit the above substantiating documentation with its tax return. In fact the 
documentation is only provided to the tax authorities upon request. 
Malaysia enacted thin capitalization rules as well as other anti-base erosion and profit shifting 
measures. 
In August 2010, the first and to date the only transfer pricing case was heard on an appeal to the 
Special Commissioner of Income Tax (“SCIT”).290 The issue posed was in regard to application 
of the arm’s length standard and use of comparables. The SCIT found for the taxpayer and the 
case is currently pending before the Malaysian high court. 
Since enactment of the 2012 rules, companies have seen a spike in transfer pricing audits by 
Malaysian authorities and the difficulties to implement the complexities of arm’s length 
standards have led to various disagreements among taxpayers and tax authorities. There is reason 
to expect even more judicial controversies as the 2012 rules continue to be implemented. 
Indonesia share border with New Guinea, Timor, and Malaysia. 
 
2) Indonesian Fiscal Environment: A Case Study 
Indonesia is a country in Southeast Asia officially known as the Republic of Indonesia, and 
comprising a multitude of Islands. With over 250 million inhabitants, Indonesia is the fourth 
most populated country in the world.291 Indonesia is one of the most diverse countries in the 
world, with more than 300 ethnic group and approximately 700 languages spoken on the 
territory. 
Indonesia has a dynamic economy fueled by both public and private investment. Indonesia is the 
largest economy in Southeast Asia, largely based on the industry and services sectors, along with 
                                                          
290 See the August 2010 first transfer pricing case heard by the Malaysian Special Commission on Income Tax 
(“SCIT”) witnessed by KPMG.  
291 The data bank of Indonesia estimated the population in Indonesia for the year 2015 at 255, 461, 700. See Bank 
of Indonesia, available at http://www.bi.go.id/sdds/series/pop/index_pop.asp (last retrieved 1/14/2015). 
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a non-negligible agricultural sector.292 The World Trade Organization also ranks Indonesia as 
one the biggest exporting countries in the world with the major partners being Japan, Singapore, 
US, and China. Indonesia has various natural resources including oil, natural gas, copper and 
gold. The diverse profile of the country has made taxation in Indonesia an intricate issue of 
concern, with permanent struggles to strike a balance of a tax system that encourages investment 
while supplying enough revenues for the functioning of the government and the provision of 
basic public services to citizens. 
The power to taxation in Indonesia is derived from Article 23A of the country’s Constitution of 
1945.293 The legislative foundation in the area of taxation in Indonesia was further developed by 
the General Provisions and Taxation Procedures of 1983,294 and the Income tax law of 1983.295 
Indonesian tax law adopted the worldwide system of taxation. Indonesian residents are taxed on 
all their income, wherever earned, whereas non-residents are only taxed on their income sourced 
in Indonesia. Indonesia adopts the calendar as the fiscal year, and taxes returns must be settled at 
the end of the year, after, generally, advances are made throughout the year. 
From an individual tax perspective, all residents individual of Indonesia are subject to taxation 
on all their income. Under Indonesian tax law, an individual is a resident of Indonesia if they are 
present in the country for more than 183 days within any 12-month period, or if they resided in 
Indonesia within the calendar year, with intention to stay in Indonesia. The country subjects 
various kinds of income from individuals to taxation including income from employment, from 
                                                          
292 The world bank estimated, in 2012, that 48% of GDP was based on the industry sector, 38% on the services 
sector, and 22% on the Agricultural sector. See World Bank: Indonesia World’s 10th Largest Economy, Jakarta 
Globe (May 2014). 
293 Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945, UUD '45. 
294 See Undang-undang Ketentuan Umum dan Tatacara Perpajakan/UUKUTp, Law No. 6 of 1983 as amended by 
Law No. 16 of 2000. 
295 See Undang-undang Pajak Penghasilan/UU PPh, Law No. 7 of 1983 as amended by Law No. 17 of 2000, and Law 
No. 36 of 2008. 
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other business, or from investment. The individual tax rate structure follows a progressive tax 
rate system. Depending on the income, the tax rates range from 5% to 30%. The progressive 
individual income tax rate structure is unlike the corporate income tax rate flat structure. 
 
 
Taxes on Income and gain of Corporations 
Companies, residents on Indonesia are subject to income tax there, on their worldwide income, A 
company is a resident of Indonesia if it is incorporated or is domiciled there. In the event of 
corporate branches situated in Indonesia, they are only taxed on the amount of income derived in 
the country. In addition, Indonesia has adopted the force of attraction rule whereby income 
accruing from Indonesia to a foreign company having a PE in Indonesia is taxed as income of the 
PE if the business generating the income is of a similar nature to the business of the PE. 
Indonesian resident companies and companies operating in Indonesia through PE are subject to a 
corporate income tax flat rate of 25%. The income tax rate is reduced to 20% for all companies 
with at least 40% of their equity listed on and traded on an Indonesian stock exchange. Small and 
medium size companies (companies with gross turn over not exceeding IDR50 billion) are even 
entitled to a 50% reduction on tax rate. Indonesia imposes a branch profit tax of 20%. The 
branch profit tax is administered through withholding and it is payable regardless of whether the 
profits are actually distributed to parent companies of not. Indonesian tax law provides for an 
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Capital Gains and Dividends 
Indonesia applies a tax on capital gains. For residents, capital gains are included on their 
ordinary taxable income and are subject to the regular income tax rate. Capital gains derived by 
non-residents in Indonesia are subject to a withholding tax determined at 20% of an amount of 
deemed income.296 The Minister of Finance established that the deemed income for sales of 
unlisted shares, on which the 20% withholding tax should be applied, is the equivalent of 25% of 
the gross sale proceeds. All sales or transfer of shares listed on an Indonesia stock market are 
subject to a 0.1% final withholding tax rate. An additional 0.5% tax rate is added in the event of 
a sale or transfer of shares by a founder shareholder. Sellers or transferors of the right to use land 
or buildings are subject to a tax at the rate of 5%.297 
In general, dividends paid to non-residents of Indonesia are subject to a final 20% withholding 
tax rate.298 Dividends paid to an Indonesian resident company are subject to a 15% withholding 
tax rate, which represents an advance payment on the dividend recipient’s tax liability. However, 
if the recipient of the dividend is resident of Indonesia, and owns at least 25% of the equity in the 
distributing entity, the dividend payment is exempt from taxation. If an individual resident of 
Indonesia receives dividends locally, the individual recipient of the dividend is subject to a final 
withholding tax rate, the maximum of which is set at 10%. 
As indicated above, Indonesia adopts as a fiscal year, the calendar year. As a consequence, 
annual corporate income tax returns must be filed by the end of the fourth month following the 
fiscal year end. The government can extend the filing deadline by 2 months. It should be noted 
                                                          
296 Id. 
297 The 5% rate is applied on the higher of either the transfer price or the government estimated value of the real 
property. 
298 The 20% withholding overseas tax rate can be reduced if a tax treaty applies. 
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that companies are required to make monthly installment payments, throughout the fiscal year, of 
their tax liability and the balance is settled in the annual tax return. 
 
Tax and Other Investment Incentives 
Boosting investments and enhancing productivity are the main drivers of Indonesian tax and 
other investment incentive policies. The country aims to meet the competitiveness of the current 
global markets while reducing unemployment and poverty within its borders.  
Indonesia has a long history of tax incentives. Early from the change of a nationalist government 
to an open market economy, Indonesia instituted a New Order in 1967, granting a five years tax 
holiday on foreign investments in the country.299 Very soon, in 1968, the incentive and five year 
tax holiday was expanded to apply to domestic investors as well. However, due to lack of 
concrete empirical evidence of the need for the generous tax incentives for increased investment, 
the whole tax holiday system put in place in 1967 and 1967 was abolished in 1984.300 
Upon termination of the tax holidays in 1984, many pressures amount on the Indonesian 
government to reintroduce the tax incentives or enact new attractive regimes to promote 
investments in the country. The government eventually caved to the pressures in 1994 by 
providing special regimes on oil and gas operations,301 and in 1996, by introducing new tax 
holidays with a different system of administration. In fact, the new tax holiday law was more 
discretionary and the tax holiday was set to apply on a case by case basis and to be administered 
by an intergovernmental organism chaired by the Minister in charge of economic affairs.  
                                                          
299 The tax holiday covered, for 5 years, income tax as well as dividend withholding tax. 
300 See Mohamad Ikhsan, FDI and Tax Incentives in Indonesia, available at http://www.econ.hit-
u.ac.jp/~ap3/apppfdi6/paper/INDONESIA.pdf (last retrieved 2/2/2015). 
301 Exxon Mobile was awarded a special fiscal regime and was no longer subjected to general taxation in Indonesia. 
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The current tax incentives regimes available in Indonesia are largely based on the laws crafted in 
the late 1990s. First, the Tax Allowance Incentive, granted to qualifying resident companies 
provide them with accelerated depreciation and amortization; 10 year extension of tax losses 
carry forwards, a reduced tax rate of 10%, or a reduction of the net income tax by 30%. The 
above incentives only apply to new investments, or expansion of already existing investments in 
Indonesia. Second, Indonesia adopted incentives for certain taxpayers engaged in pioneer 
industry. The pioneer industry law, enacted in 2011, allows the government of Indonesia to 
determine what industries are pioneer for the country. If admitted, the investor in pioneer 
industry benefits from a 5 to 10 years corporate income tax exemption, followed by a 50% 
reduction in corporate income tax for 2 years renewable. The Indonesian government has 
explained the pioneer industries to include those that introduce new technology, provide high 
value added, or have strategic value for the nationwide economy. Third and finally, the 
Indonesian tax law provides for special tax rates as incentives in certain industries. For example, 
the oil and gas industry in generally subjected to a 20% tax rate; foreign drilling companies 
subject to 3.75% corporate income tax rate from their gross drilling income; or construction 
companies subject to a tax rate ranging from 2% to 6% of their contract value.  
 
Tax Treaty Network 
Indonesia has a wide tax treaty network with a number of countries both in the developed and 
developing world. The tax treaties generally provide for a more favorable tax treatment than the 
general tax law in Indonesia.  From an individual tax perspective, tax treaties signed by 
Indonesia provide for relief of double taxation for individuals of treaty countries, deriving 
income in Indonesia. The model generally followed in Indonesian tax treaty negotiations follows 
   117 
  
 
the 1920s consensus whereby active income is taxed at source and passive income taxed at 
residence. 
From a corporate income tax perspective, tax treaties signed by Indonesia provide for reduced 
tax rates for the various forms of income earned in Indonesia by residents of treaty countries. 
Therefore, in the absence of a tax treaty and as seen above, dividend payments to non-residents 
are subject to a final 20% withholding tax rate. However, if a treaty country is involved, the tax 
is reduced, and under the current treaties signed by Indonesia, the tax rate ranges from 5%302 to a 
maximum of 15%.303 Similarly interest and royalty incomes under the treaties signed by 
Indonesia are subject to a tax rate ranging from 0% to 15%, compared to the 20% final 
withholding tax rate applicable from interest in the absence of a tax treaty.  
Indonesia has adopted rigorous anti-treaty abuse rules and has granted the tax administration 
wide powers in the enforcement of tax rules related to treaties. It is therefore not uncommon for 
the Indonesian tax authorities to question and sometimes ignore the provisions of a tax treaty if 
the anti-abuse rules are not satisfied. Such expanded powers are also granted in the area of 
transfer pricing enforcement in Indonesia. 
 
Transfer Pricing 
Until recently, Indonesia was known as lagging in the area of transfer pricing. Compared to its 
neighbors including India and China, Indonesia was known not to be aggressive in its transfer 
pricing regulations and enforcement. In fact, since the tax law of 1984, the Indonesian tax 
authorities were granted power to review transfer pricing but rarely did so in practice. By the 
                                                          
302 See Article 10, Income Tax Treaty between Indonesia and Hong Kong (Signed March 2010), available at 
file:///C:/Users/pougaza/Downloads/ASEAN_Indonesia_Hong%20Kong_DTA.pdf (last retrieved 2/2/2015). 
303 See Article 10, Income Tax Treaty between Indonesia and Russia (Signed March 1999), available at 
file:///C:/Users/pougaza/Downloads/ASEAN_Indonesia_Russia_DTA%20(2).pdf (last retrieved 2/2/2015). 
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year 2010 however, Indonesia was emerging as a mature transfer pricing jurisdiction with robust 
regulations comparable to those in the developed world. To date, Indonesia has contemporaneous 
transfer pricing documentation rules as well as Mutual Agreements Procedures and Advanced 
Pricing Agreements. 
Indonesian tax law provides for the use of five traditional methods in determining the arm’s 
length pricing: the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method; the Resale Price method; the Cost- 
Plus method; the Profit Split method; and the Transactional Net Margin method. 
Indonesian tax legislation requires that related parties transactions be carried at arm’s length and 
in a commercially justifiable way. The tax authorities require that the taxpayer maintain 
documentation to prove arm’s length character of related parties’ transaction for at least 10 years, 
and the burden is on the taxpayer to prove that the transaction was carried at arm’s length. 
Transfer pricing scrutiny has increased in recent years as the government and tax authorities aim 
to counter phenomena of base erosion and profit shifting. Transfer pricing audits have increased, 
and the government is more proactive in issuing Advance Pricing Agreement in transactions 
between related parties in order to mitigate ex post transfer pricing disputes.304 
The analysis above of the current international tax structures in various developing countries 
jurisdictions provide a basis for the argument that most countries, including in the developing 
world, are struggling the question of how to best approach taxation of international income. As 
they deal with the question, developing counties are continuously encountering various problems 
and many tax systems globally, suffer deep ills in their attempts at international income taxation. 
                                                          
304 See Ay-Tjhing Phan anD Ravi Gupta, Transfer Pricing in Indonesia: A Whole New Ball Game, Int’l Tax Rev. (June 
27, 2012), available at http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3052208/Indonesia-Transfer-pricing-in-
Indonesia-A-whole-new-ball-game.html (last retrieved 2/2/2015). 
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Most academics do not like to talk about an “international tax system” because, they argue, it 
really is a set of rules adopted by domestic jurisdictions so they constitute in fact national tax 
systems.305 A look, in this part of the research of the international tax system does not suggest 
that there is an overarching tax structure, above countries, and that govern all countries. In fact, 
the analysis of the international tax system here refers to the way in which different countries and 
some international organizations provide for the taxation of international income. The 
international tax system is therefore the framework put in place, sometimes similar and other 
times dissimilar, amongst the various countries to deal with issues on taxation of international 
income. International tax system will thus refer to the taxation by a country of the income of 
those persons who earned income there without claiming residency, and those persons who are 
residents in said countries but earn income abroad.306 
At the outset, it is important to note that the international tax system, as it currently stands, lives 
and dies with the arm’s length principle. As indicated above, the international tax system was 
created to eliminate instances of double taxation. The mechanics proposed aroused much debate 
but the consensus of taxation of active income as the source jurisdiction and passive income at 
the residence jurisdiction quickly became the universal norm and most countries subscribed to it. 
As the economic activity grew and companies became bigger in an international stage, the 
international tax structure faced significant issued posed by related operations and related 
companies transactions. The question was how to access the true economics of a transaction 
when the parties involved are related and do not possess divergent interests. The solution 
painfully designed and widely accepted was to require the related parties to deal at arm’s lengh. 
The ALS was adopted as a means to look at the transaction, disregarded its related parties 
character and assure that the true economics of the deal, the arm’s length price, are achieved.307 
ALS is the current cornerstone and the relatively beloved bedrock of the international tax system. 
                                                          
305 See Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 Tax L. Rev. 259 (2003). 
306 Id. 
307 See Choe Chongwoo and Charles Hyde, Multinational transfer pricing, tax arbitrage and the arm's length 
principle, 83.263 Economic Record 398 (2007). 
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The success, now admittedly outdated, of the international tax system was because of the 
successes and merits of the ALS.308 The failures, more contemporaneous, of the international tax 
system are because of the shortcomings of the ALS.309 The ills of the current system can 
therefore directly be traced to the shortcomings of the ALS. We will look at the current 
international tax ills on a global scale (A), and then will focus of the specific struggles of 
developing countries with the current system (B), before looking at the current OECD BEPS 















                                                          
308 See Bernard Jensen and Peter Schott, Transfer pricing by US-based multinational firms, 12493 National Bureau 
of Economic Research (2006). 
309 See Sikka Prem and Hugh Willmott, The dark side of transfer pricing: Its role in tax avoidance and wealth 
retentiveness, 21.4 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 342 (2010). 
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A. International Tax Ills Globally 
It is important to clarify at the outset that the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion 
bears a significant merit when it comes to tax enforcement.310 Tax avoidance is legal and consists 
of the use of available laws to minimize one’s tax liability and exposure. Tax evasion however, is 
illegal and consists of the non-application or misapplication of the tax legislation. As deserving 
of attention that the distinction is, our research looks critically at both tax evasion and tax 
avoidance for it has been shown in practice that the line is not that easily drawn.311 Further, any 
attempt to influence policy, we believe, ought to critically look at the legal tax avoidance 
schemes that lead to the discredit of the tax system as a whole. Our analysis shows how broken 
the current international tax system is also through how many and how easily achievable tax 
avoidance schemes are available. 
The outcry is currently global regarding the failures of the international tax system. Developed 
and developing countries, large and small business, civil society, the media, international 
organizations, specialized groups, and various tax observers seem all to agree on one 
proposition: the current system is broken. The system does not seem to work neither for 
governments, nor business. In the meantime, the view in civil society is that taxes are only paid 
by the naïve; world citizens increasingly express their feelings that wealthy individuals are 
corporations not only choose what taxes to pay, if any, they also seem to easily decide where to 
pay the tax.312 The president of the American Chamber of Commerce vociferously lamented that 
                                                          
310 See Cobham Alex, Tax evasion, tax avoidance and development finance, Queen Elizabeth House, Série 
documents de travail 129 (2005). 
311 See Kirchler Maciejovsky and Friedrich Schneider, Everyday representations of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and 
tax flight: Do legal differences matter?, 24.4 Journal of Economic Psychology 535 (2003). 
312 See Houston Jodie and Alfred Tran, A survey of tax evasion using the randomized response technique, 13 
Advances in taxation 69 (2001). 
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US international tax rules were rigged against US MNEs and at the same time, Congress 
indicated that a number of companies, on a global scale paid an effective tax rate shy of 10%. In 
the UK, the company Starbucks was reported to have accumulated about $700 million in sales in 
2012 and paid no taxes.313 Similarly, the company Amazon was reported to have realized 
approximately $4 billion in sales in 2011 in the UK and paid just about $2 million in taxes.314 
For its part, the company Google accumulated about $500 million and paid approximately $7 
million in taxes.315 There is overwhelming amount of evidence that profits appear in countries 
inconsistent with economic motivation. As indicated in Table1,316 a study in location of US 
MNEs profits as of 2005 suggested very little about their economic operations and a lot more 
about their tax rate shopping. Table2317 indicates the percentage of Fortune 500 companies with 





                                                          
313 See Dowling Grahame, The curious case of corporate tax avoidance: Is it socially irresponsible?, 124.1 Journal of 
Business Ethics 173 (2014). 
314 See Fisher Jasmine, Fairer shores: Tax havens, tax avoidance, and corporate social responsibility, 94 BUL Rev. 
337 (2014). 
315 Id. 
316 See Clausing, Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and Tax Policy, 72 Nat’l Tax J. 703 (2009). See also United States 
Government Accountability Office, U.S. Multinational Corporations, Effective Tax Rates Are Correlated with Where 
Income Is Reported, Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, August, 2008; U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, Report to the Congress on Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing and U.S. Income Tax Treaties, November 
2007; Martin A. Sullivan, “Extraordinary Profitability in Low-Tax Countries,” Tax Notes (August. 25, 2008). 
317 Mark P. Keightley, Congressional Research Service, An Analysis of Where American Companies Report Profits: 
Indications of Profit Shifting, 18 January, 2013. 
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 The question is how are companies able to achieve that? How is the current international tax 
system unfit? What are the main areas of weakness within the system? How can one locate 
profits in a jurisdiction in which they have minimum to no operations? Several schemes and 
methods are used by companies and their explanation goes a long way to showing the flawed 
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1. The Transfer Pricing Global Dysfunction 
Transfer pricing is one of the most challenging issues in international taxation for MNEs, tax 
administrators and tax policy makers. The basic transfer pricing situation can exist in the example 
below: imagine a scenario where a US MNE that manufactures Phones in the US, owns valuable 
intangibles related to the know-how and the marketing of the phones. US MNE would like to 
expand its business to Cameroon where intellectual property rights are not properly protected. In 
order to avoid the intellectual property being compromised, US MNE to create a wholly owned 
subsidiary in Cameroon (“Cam Sub”), responsible for selling the US manufactured phones to the 
Cameroonian market. The decision allows US MNE to expand its business to Cameroon while 
avoiding the independent local distributors and minimizing the risk of compromising its 
intellectual property rights. However, the relationship between US MNE and Cam Sub is an intra-
group relationship and US MNE has large discretion on the prices it sales to phones to Cam Sub 
for resale to final customers.  
In fact US MNE can easily use such pricing discretion in its interaction with Cam Sub to implement 
various international tax planning technics. 318 For example if we assume US MNE incurs a cost 
of $25 to manufacture a phone, and Cam Sub incurs $25 to distribute the phone in Cameroon. The 
phone is sold to the final customer for $100. If US and Cameroon were the same tax jurisdiction, 
there would be no issue as US MNE and Cam Sub would file consolidated returns showing a net 
gain of $50 ($100 - $25 - $25). However, since US and Cameroon are two separate tax jurisdictions 
with presumably different tax rates, the allocation of the income between the two jurisdictions will 
                                                          
318 See Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, Congressional Research Service  
(2010), available at 
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=qZnjSGRmYq0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=Failed+international+tax+sy
stem&ots=xFeZubE502&sig=adt9ElnMO_G49yMOrd-rGyirW6A#v=onepage&q&f=false (Last retrieved 2/3/2015). 
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be dependent on the price charged to Cam Sub by US MNE in the their intra group transaction. 
Assuming neither party wants to operate at a loss, the minimum price acceptable by US MNE is 
$25 (equivalent to the amount it incurs to manufacture the phone) and the maximum price 
acceptable by Cam Sub is $75 (representing $25 of its cost and the $50 maximum profit he can get 
from the final consumer). There is therefore, a continuum of possible prices at which US MNE 
can charge the manufactured phone to Cam Sub. 
If we assume that the US has a higher tax rate than Cameroon, US MNE and Cam Sub would 
structure the transaction so as to charge for the phone as low a price as possible. Under this 
scenario, US MNE would be inclined to charge Cam Sub $25 (the minimum US MNE can accept) 
for the manufactured phone. As a consequence and after incurring and additional $25 for 
distribution, Cam Sub would sale the phone to the final customers in Cameroon for $100 realizing 
a profit of $50. Because of the intra-group price, the MNE has managed to locate all its profits 
from the manufacture of the phone to Cameroon, the lower tax jurisdiction. 
If conversely, we assume Cameroon has a higher tax rate than the US, US MNE and Cam Sub 
would structure the transaction so as to charge for the phone, as high a price as possible. Under 
this scenario, US MNE would be inclined to charge Cam Sub $75 (the maximum Cam Sub can 
accept) for the manufactured phone. As a consequence, and after incurring an additional $25 for 
distribution, Cam Sub would sale the phone to the final customers in Cameroon for $100 realizing 
no profit. Because of the intra-group price, the MNE has managed to locate all its profits from the 
manufacture of the phone to the US, the lower tax jurisdiction. 
As seen in the illustration above, the flexibility to determine the price in the related party context 
is unavailable in the circumstance of unrelated independent parties involved in a transaction. The 
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determination of intra-groups prices known as transfer pricing, cause two major problems: first 
and as illustrated above, transfer pricing allows for manipulations on the location of profits and 
defeats the purposes of taxation. In addition, transfer pricing harms competition as it is only 
available to big MNEs and provides a flexibility that local small companies do not possess. The 
net effect of transfer pricing in to increase the after-tax profits of the MNEs as a group. The profits, 
wherever located, belong ultimately to the same shareholders of the group. 
Since the implementation of the first regulations in this area in the UK in 1915, tax legislations 
continue to struggle in their attempts to find ways to police transfer pricing and curb its abuses. 
From these attempts, a regulation emerged, that now enjoys international recognition: the ALS. 
As a basic principle, the ALS attempts to impose to intra-group transactions, the realities of similar 
transactions but amongst unrelated parties. As such, the ALS was conceived a system that requires 
related parties to set the prices of their transaction in similar manner independent parties would set 
the prices in comparable transactions. ALS therefore consists of comparing intra-group 
transactions to open market transactions and taxing them accordingly. Transfer pricing leads to 
various adjustments in the event the intra-group pricing does not agree with the independent 
parties’ open market transactions. At its inception transfer pricing regulations remained unclear as 
to how to assure a reasonable and comparable price leaving courts to use their best judgment as to 
what transfer price was at arm’s length. In 1968, the US adopted regulations that provided for 
methods of enforcing arm’s length. Originally, there were three methods (known as the traditional 
methods) to access the reasonableness of intra-group pricing. The OECD quickly incorporated the 
traditional methods in its transfer pricing guidelines of 1977. However, due to the various 
limitations of the traditional methods observed in practice, policy makers adopted two additional 
methods. We will review the methods consecutively. 
   130 
  
 
The first transfer pricing method (one of three the traditional methods) is the Comparable 
Uncontrolled Price (“CUP”). Under this method, the transaction between the related parties is 
compared to a transaction in the same good or service, in the same market, under similar 
conditions, but between unrelated parties. The CUP method is only useful is the goods or services 
are standard enough that they can be found in the open market. There is a requirement that the 
comparable be close to the actual transaction if not identical to the actual transaction except that it 
is occurring between unrelated parties unlike the actual transaction which is between related 
parties. If such comparable is found, the transfer price is adjusted to the price in the comparable 
transaction and taxed accordingly. The main issue with this method is that it is very hard if not 
impossible nowadays to find transactions as close to the intra-group transactions. It is hard, if not 
impossible to find comparables. MNEs today have grown so large and continue to grow very large 
and distinguish themselves for offering innovative products and services, products that are not 
available in the markets and have no real comparables. The case of patented products is a telling 
example where exact comparables required under the CUP method cannot and are not supposed 
to be found. The CUP method is therefore fundamentally flawed and unfit for current business 
practices of the MNEs world. 
The second transfer pricing method (one of three the traditional methods) is the Cost Plus. The 
cost-plus method compares gross margins of controlled and uncontrolled transactions. Under this 
method, the arm’s length price is measured by adding an appropriate gross profit to the controlled 
taxpayer’s cost of producing the property involved in the controlled transaction. Under Cost Plus, 
the amount needed to produce is added to the prevalent profit margin (from uncontrolled 
transactions) to determine the arm’s length transfer price. The main issue with the Cost-Plus 
method is its limited scope. The method is ordinarily used in cases involving the manufacture, 
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assembly, or other production of goods that are sold to related parties. Cost plus is only useful, like 
CUP is there are comparables, and Cost Plus is most appropriate for the manufacturing and 
assembly industries. Today’s economy is less reliance on brick and mortar and the search for 
comparables remains a lacking endeavor. 
The third transfer pricing method (one of three the traditional methods) is the Resale Price Method 
(“RPM”). The RPM evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled transaction is at arm’s 
length, by reference to the gross margin realized in comparable uncontrolled transactions. Under 
this method, the arm’s length price is measured by subtracting an appropriate gross profit from the 
applicable resale price of the property involved in the controlled transaction. RPM uses 
Comparable profitability, and comparable profitability is determined by calculating the ratio of the 
initial purchase price of comparable tangible goods to their resale price to an unrelated party. This 
ratio (expressed as a percentage) is then used to calculate the value of the goods in a related-party 
transaction. Like the other traditional methods, the RPM relies heavily on the availability of actual 
comparables; however, as we have seen, exact comparables are very difficult if not impossible to 
find. Further the workings of this method gives it a relatively limited scope as the RPM is most 
often used for distributors that resell products without physically altering them or adding 
substantial value to them. Current economies, as indicated above rely as much on intangibles and 
alterations in the chain are common practice. All three traditional methods require a high standard 
of comparability. In practice, however, such comparability has been difficult to establish 
prompting the OECD to amend its transfer pricing guidelines in 1995 in order to add two new 
methods, which arguably require a lesser degree of comparability. 
The fourth transfer pricing method (one of the two additional methods) is the Comparable Profits 
Method (“CPM”) which is also known as the Transactional Net Margin Method (“TNMM”). This 
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method evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled transaction is at arm’s length by 
comparing the profitability of one of the parties to the controlled transaction (the “tested party”) 
to that of companies that are similar to the tested party. The advantage of this method is that it 
draws not from comparables in the same industry; instead, the method uses reasonably similar 
industries. The analysis of the reasonably similar industries would provide a range of prices 
allowing for a curve where the bottom 25% and the top 25% of the curve are excluded. If the 
profits realized on the controlled transaction fall within the middle 50%, no further analysis is 
required. However, if the related parties’ transaction does not fall within the middle 50%, then tax 
authorities are allowed to proceed to adjustments. The main weakness of this method is that is 
requires a tremendous amount of available information in order to examine a wide range of 
reasonably similar transactions for a reliable curve. Tax authorities have difficulties assembling 
this information and big four accounting firms have establish a de facto monopoly for these 
analysis and charge a considerable amount for their services. CPM is therefore not available to 
small companies (since they cannot afford the services of the accounting firms) and tax authorities 
do not have all the necessary information to potentially challenge the position taken by MNEs of 
a transfer price reasonably comparable to the open market price. 
The fifth and last method (the second of the two additional methods) is the Profit Split. This method 
allocates operating profits or losses from controlled transactions in proportion to the relative 
contributions made by each party in creating the combined profits or losses. Relative contributions 
must be determined in a manner that reflects the functions performed, risks assumed, resources 
employed, and costs incurred by each party to the controlled transaction. After the functions of the 
related parties are analyzed and a standard market based return is assigned to them based on 
publicly available data, the residual, if any, is to be assigned and there is disagreement as to who 
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gets assigned any residual of profits. Under US law, the residual, if any, should be assigned to the 
developer of the group’s intangibles due to the presumption that intellectual property is responsible 
for the residual. This view is not shared by the OECD which is yet to determine how the residual 
should be assigned. Many countries, specifically developing countries, are left to guess if and when 
they are skilled enough to get to that point. 
The various transfer pricing methods reveal their imperfect nature and the continued effort to 
designed better technics to curb abusive use of transfer pricing. The global and relentless litigation 
on the issue is testament that transfer pricing is an existential threat to the integrity of the 
international tax regime and might support an extreme view of the complete elimination of its 
necessity, as argued in this dissertation, through the use of Unitary Principles. We will look at the 
case law and transfer pricing litigation in various sample countries. 
In the US, the struggles with transfer pricing and its consequences have a long history. As argued 
by Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah, the history of transfer pricing in the US can be traced along 
with that of the ALS.319 Transfer pricing cases therefore can be traced and tied to the period or 
either rise or fall of the ALS. Before the adoption of use of the ALS by courts, transfer pricing 
disputes were litigated and decided on, on the basis whether there is ‘clear reflection of income’ 
or rather, ‘evasion of taxes’.320 For example, in Seminole Flavor Co. v Commissioner,321 the Tax 
Court indicated that to determine whether the transaction is arm’s length, one should not wonder 
whether unrelated parties would have entered into a similar transaction; instead, the inquiry 
should be as to whether the actual transaction was fair and reasonable. For some Courts in this 
                                                          
319 See Avi-Yonah Reuven, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of US International Taxation, 
15 Va. Tax Rev. 89 (1995). 
320 See e.g. Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 1152 (1935); aff’d 79 F.2d 234 (1935). 
321 See Seminole Flavor Co. v Commissioner, 4 T.C. 1215 (1945). 
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era, the comparison with independent and unrelated parties to determine arm’s length was 
irrelevant and unnecessary.322 On the other hand during the same period, other courts applied the 
ALS in deciding transfer pricing disputes, leaving total uncertainty as to the standard to be 
applied in transfer pricing cases. For example, in Hall v. Commissioner,323 the Tax Court used 
comparables from uncontrolled and unrelated transaction to adjust the otherwise price set at 90% 
to 10%. The Court indicated that gross income has been arbitrarily shifted and the Commissioner 
adjustment ‘reflected Hall’s income as if he had been dealing with unrelated parties.’324 Finally, 
in late 1960s, the legislation attempted to settle the debate by requiring that transfer pricing 
methods and ALS principles relying on comparables be used in examining the cases.325 The 
Courts eventually agreed that for all Section 482 cases, ALS should be mandatorily used to 
determine if an adjustment is necessary.326 This period marked the rise and pinnacle of the ALS 
which soon came to wide scrutiny. 
Early in the 1990s, there was emerging a wide realization that the sacro saint principle 
established in late 1960s, the ALS, did not work in the large majority of cases. Repeatedly, the 
government lost in trial because most situations could not be properly examined under the ALS 
due to the lack of comparables. Various cases prompted this realization and the outrage 
therefrom. In U.S. Steel Corp. v. Commissioner327for example, US Steel owned a Liberian 
subsidiary, Navios which it used to ship steel to the United States. The prices set by Navios were 
set in a way that it would allow a match with the prices of the domestic steel manufactured in the 
                                                          
322 Id., See also Palm Beach Aero Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1169 (1952) (With the court stating a ‘fair 
compensation… reflects arm’s length dealing’). 
323 See Hall v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 390 (1959), aff’d 294 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1961). 
324 Id. 
325 See 1968 regulations to Article 482. (Treas. Reg. 1.482-2). 
326 See United States Gypsum Co. v. Commissioner, 304 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. III. 1969); aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 
452 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1971). See also PPG. Industries Inc. v. Commissioner, 55T.C. 928 (1970).  
327 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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US. Navios which also shipped very minimum amounts of steel for unrelated parties, did so at 
the same price as its intra group pricing. The Tax Court ruled that the internal price was not at 
arm’s length. However, the Court of Appeal reversed and argued that because Navios charged 
the same amount to unrelated albeit negligible parties, the intra-group price was at arm’s length 
in the absence of other comparables. Even the E.I. Dupont de Nemours &Co. v. United State328 
where the government had a sounding and last major victory in transfer pricing litigation in the 
US, many commentators have attributed such victory to the internal damaging memorandum of 
the taxpayer revealed in court, instead of a clear understanding and application of the ALS 
methods. In recent years, many transfer pricing disputes have come through the umbrella of Cost 
Sharing Agreements and continue to show the lacking character of the ALS through resounding 
taxpayer victories at trial.329 
In Germany, the struggle to prevent companies from shifting taxable profits out of or into 
Germany by way of inappropriate transfer pricing arrangements has led to the creation of five 
basic defense mechanisms with respect to adjustment of income and has generated extensive 
litigation. The defense mechanisms are: (1) attribution of assets and income and determination of 
tax base;330 hidden profits distribution;331 hidden capital contribution;332 deduction of corporate 
interest cost;333 and the adjustment of income in the case of business connections abroad.334 All 
five defense mechanisms are designed to curb abusive transactions and allow for appropriate 
adjustment whenever necessary, even though litigation. For example, in 1986, the German 
                                                          
328 See E.I. Dupont de Nemours &Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cl. 1979). 
329 See Xilingx Inc. v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 37 (2005) and subsequent history. See also Veritas Software Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 133 T.C. 14 (2009). 
330 See Section 39 to 42 of the German Fiscal Code (Abgabenordnung). 
331 See Section 8(3) of the German Corporate Tax Act (Korperschaftseuergesetz). 
332 See Section 8(1) of the German Corporate Tax Act (Korperschaftseuergesetz). 
333 See Section 8a of the German Corporate Tax Act (Korperschaftseuergesetz). 
334 See Section 1 of the German Foreign Tax Act (Aubensteuergesetz). 
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Federal Tax Court dealt with the transfer of an operating unit between sister companies without 
compensation for the goodwill involved in Decision IR 150/82.335 The Court found that the 
transfer constituted a hidden distribution of the goodwill to the common parent and a subsequent 
contribution by the common parent to the subsidiary. Also, the Court ruled that substantial losses 
over a three-year period elicit a presumption that the agreed transfer price is inappropriate if the 
transaction is intra-group.336 The presumption, the Court indicated, is rebuttable and taxpayer can 
show that the losses over three years are not due to an inappropriate transfer price. This decision 
caused the German legislator to engage in an overhaul of the regulations concerning taxpayers’ 
documentation and cooperation in the area of transfer pricing.337 It should be noted that transfer 
pricing litigation has increased in Germany in recent years. Further, other methods of resolving 
transfer pricing disputes are used in Germany and are arguably preferred. The other methods 
include technics used though Double Tax Treaties, Mutual Agreement Procedures, Advanced 
Pricing Agreements, and Arbitration. 
In Australia, there has been a long history applying transfer pricing principle and the ALS.338 
The long history of Australia with transfer pricing offers a rather rich jurisprudence, mostly 
made of settled cases. Overall, the Australia Tax Authority (“ATO”) does not hold an impressive 
record of winning transfer pricing cased. Similar to the US, transfer pricing litigation in Australia 
is mostly won by taxpayers. However, the ATO regularly settle cases with taxpayers, leading to 
considerable payouts from taxpayers, mostly due to procedural mishaps from the taxpayer. 
Additionally, there has been an increasing importance afforded to alternative methods of dispute 
                                                          
335 See Bundesfinanzhof, Judgment of 20 August 1986, I R 150/82, bsTBI II 1987, 455. 
336 See Bundesfinanzhof, Judgment of 17 October 2001, I R 103/00, bsTBI II 2004, 171. 
337 See Bundesfinanzhof, Judgment of 17 October 2001, I R 103/00, bsTBI II 2004, 171; resolution of 10May 2001. 
338 Australia adopted a transfer pricing legislation in 1921. See P.A. Harris, Metamorphosis of the Australian income 
Tax: 1866-1922 (Sydney 2002). 
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resolution. Arbitration is very often used in transfer pricing litigation in Australia. Similarly, 
Advance Pricing Agreements and Mutual Agreements Procedures are increasingly used as a way 
to avoid or decrease future disputes between the ATO and taxpayers.  
Current transfer pricing rules in Australia are based on the Income Tax Assessment Act 
(“ITAA”) of 1936,339 and continue to produce ample disputes, specifically on the method used to 
establish transfer prices. One of the main and recent cases decided in the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal of Australia (“AATA”) is the Roche Products v. Commissioner of Taxation litigation.340 
The main question before the court was the appropriate transfer pricing method to be used to 
determine whether prices are arm’s length. The case was initiated because the ATO determined 
that the Australian subsidiary of the Swiss Roche Pharmaceuticals Group was insufficiently 
profitable due to the overpayments made to affiliated group companies located in Switzerland 
and Singapore. Both parties to the litigation both forward a number of experts to examine the 
method used by the group for transfer pricing, but also to establish a possible arm’s length price 
for the transactions. All four expert testimonies were different. Each expert arrived at a different 
conclusion and used slightly different information, methodologies, and adjustments. The tribunal 
and judges had a tremendous amount of difficulties resolving the case due to conflicting expert 
testimony along with very conflicting interpretation of the rules from the ATO and the taxpayer. 
At the end, the tribunal aligned itself with most of the taxpayer’s claims and believed in 
taxpayer’s experts. The ATO lost in all its claims but one. The acknowledged that 
pharmaceutical companies rarely sale their products through independent sellers. Instead they 
use related parties for distribution of the drugs and other products. As a consequence, the tribunal 
                                                          
339 See ITAA, Part III, Division 13, Sections 136AA-136AF (1936). See also Ruling TR 94/16. See also Ruling TR 97/20. 
340 See Roche Products v. Commissioner of Taxation, AATA 639 (2008). 
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reasoned, there is usually no free market in which these products are sold and there are rarely 
comparable markets for such products. This analysis is not only true for pharmaceutical 
companies; it is true for most MNEs in the 21st century. The differences in this case provide an 
explanation as to why most transfer pricing cases are not litigated. 
Another case, SNF (Australia) v Commissioner of Taxation,341 was litigated in the Federal Court 
of Australia and centered on a substantive transfer pricing issue of applicable transfer pricing 
methods in determining the arm’s length price. Again, the court decision was largely unfavorable 
to the ATO which sought to recast sales at a lost to a related party. Similar to the Roche Products 
case, there were remarkable difference amongst the experts who testified and the court ultimately 
indicated that there was no prescribed transfer pricing method that a taxpayer shall use, but rather 
it was up to the courts to decide whether the one used by the taxpayer was accurate in 
establishing the transfer price. The court held, on first instance, that the prices paid by SNF 
(Australia) were equal in some cases, to prices paid by unrelated parties; rejecting the ATO’s 
TNMM approach establishing otherwise. The ATO appealed the decision to the full Federal 
Court.342 On appeal, the Federal Court, after acknowledging some mistake in the first instance, 
nevertheless upheld the decision and rejected the ATO’s appeal; another resounding victory in a 
major transfer pricing case in Australia. 
In Brazil, the rules and legislative structure around transfer pricing are relatively recent. In fact, 
the 1990s saw Brazil switch from a territorial tax system to a worldwide tax system;343 and it is 
only in 1996 that Brazil enacted its transfer pricing legislation.344 Since then however, Brazil has 
                                                          
341 See SNF (Australia) v Commissioner of Taxation, FCA 635 (2010). 
342 See Commissioner of Taxation v SNF (Australia), FCAFC 74 (2011). 
343 See Law N* 9.249/95 of 1995. 
344 See Law N* 9.430/96 of 1996. 
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known rapid developments in the area of transfer pricing through the changes in its legislation, 
the judicial actions and the measure taken by the tax authorities. The study of transfer pricing in 
Brazil is of particular interest because the country does not necessarily align with the 
internationally known principle of ALS. In the original transfer pricing legislation of 1996, the 
legislator in Brazil indicated its intent to adopt and comply with the internationally accepted 
ALS. However, in the making of the law, Brazil endeavored to incorporate the necessary and 
practical limitations to the ALS. Aware of the compliance and enforcement cost that are 
necessary with the ALS, the legislator in Brazil aimed to adopt a transfer pricing legislation 
efficient enough to mitigate those costs, albeit at the behest of completely embracing the ALS. 
The law in fact establishes a presumption for acceptable prices and charges.345 The presumptions 
allow the tax authorities in Brazil to decide on a case without having to go through the lengthy 
and uncertain procedure of determining the accurate price through comparables. The legislator 
basically established workable parameters, which do not totally align with the exigencies of the 
ALS. The Brazilian system relies of legislative benchmark for its comparability analysis, and 
uses the presumption in determining the arm’s length price of related parties’ transactions. 
Although this is a departure from the internationally accepted ALS driven by the OECD, it is 
worth nothing that Brazil is not a member of the OECD and OECD guidelines and rules are 
regularly referred to by Brazilian judges as secondary laws, laws with secondary authority. 
Nevertheless, the law recognizes the three traditional transfer pricing methods in arriving at the 
arm’s length price through application of the legislative benchmarks. 
                                                          
345 In Brazil the presumptions are referred to as iuris tantum a recognition by the law of how much should be 
charged, unless proven otherwise. 
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In 2005, the Administrative Taxpayers’ Council reached a decision clarifying Brazilian transfer 
pricing rules.346 In this case, the tax authorities prohibited a taxpayer, a pharmaceutical company, 
from using the RPM in applying the legislative benchmarks and establishing the arm’s length 
price. The tax authorities reasoned that the RPM could not apply to imported goods where the 
goods are further manufactured in Brazil before their ultimate sale. The judge in first instance 
agreed with the tax authorities and upheld the tax authorities’ decision to not apply RPM for 
imported goods that are further manufactured locally before sale. On appeal, the Administrative 
Taxpayers’ Council reversed the decision. The appeal judges indicated that the law allows 
taxpayers to use any of the three traditional transfer pricing methods to establish the arm’s length 
price and that the tax authorities had no power to exclude that. The appeal judges underlined that 
even though the OECD guidelines would preclude the use of the RPM in similar situation, 
OECD is merely secondary law in Brazil, and cannot override the express provisions of the 
Brazilian tax legislation which allows taxpayers to choose any of the three pricing methods. This 
decision is very important in many regards. One of the aspects that this decision clarifies is that if 
the transfer pricing rules in Brazil are in contradiction with the internationally accepted ALS, or 
if they are contrary to the OECD guidelines, there is direct and unquestionable primacy of the 
local transfer pricing provisions.347 Facing the growing transfer pricing disputes, the Brazilian 
government continues to encourage alternative methods of dispute resolution and encourage 
taxpayers to dialogue with tax authorities, a premise that was set early on, in Article 21 of the 
1996 founding transfer pricing tax legislation. The 2010 law that revisits the 1996 law and 
                                                          
346 See Decision N* 101-94-888 (2005). 
347 Id., But see Decision N* 103-21.859 (2005) (where the courts recognized that a binding tax treaty signed by 
Brazil would overrule domestic rules in case of contradiction. 
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reshapes the use of benchmarks emphasizes the need for a dialog between taxpayers and the tax 
authorities to minimize transfer pricing disputes.348  
In Chile, transfer pricing rules were not adopted until the late 1990s.  Up until then, Chile 
approached transfer pricing transactions with the general tax provisions and the notion of ‘fair 
value’.349  In the past two decades however, Chile has engaged in an effort to increase its 
participation in the global markets by actively seeking to reduce barriers to outbound 
investments, while providing incentives for inbound direct investments from foreign companies. 
For that end, Chile joined the OECD and signed dozens of bilateral tax treaties.350 Effective 
January 1, 1998, the Chilean government enacted transfer pricing legislation and regulations and 
formally introduced the ALS to the Chilean system.351 Although the regulations are largely based 
on the OECD concepts and ALS foundation, there are slight details and practical adaptations as 
to how the ALS should be applied.352 Further, there has not been enough detailed legislation on 
the application of the Chilean transfer pricing documentation above and beyond the general 
provisions. For example, Chile allows several transfer pricing methods to be used in arriving at 
the arm’s length price. One of the methods is the ‘reasonable profitability’ method for which the 
law does not attach a specific meaning.353 The law only states that arm’s length price should be 
arrived at through comparison of the controlled transaction with the uncontrolled similar 
transactions, however no mechanisms as to how the comparability analysis should be done or 
how the adjustments should be made are provided in the law or the regulations. There is 
                                                          
348 See Law N* 12.249/10 (2010). 
349 See for example, Art. 64 of Decree Law N* 830 (1974). 
350 Chile has signed more than 20 bilateral tax treaties in the past twenty years (including with the US, New Zealand 
or Belgium), and several more are currently in negotiation. 
351 See 1998 Amend., Art 38 of Decree Law N* 824, Official Gazette (Dec. 31 1974). 
352 See Circular N*3, issued 1/6/1998, available at http://www.sii.cl/documentos/circulares/1998/circu03.htm (last 
retrieved 2/17/2015). 
     353 See Art. 3, N*4 of Decree Law N* 830 (1974). 
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therefore an uncertainty as to how the transfer pricing rules in Chile would apply. The lack of 
guidance, whether legislative or regulatory, leads to an atmosphere of uncertainty as to the 
Chilean transfer pricing regulatory environment. As a member of the OECD, it is arguable that 
Chile would subscribe to the methods and guideline endorsed by the OECD. However, in an 
unofficial opinion, the Chilean authorities indicated that the OECD commentaries only have a 
secondary value and can be used as complementary methods. In addition, the fact that Chile just 
recently joined the OECD begs the question as to whether its legislative, regulatory and judicial 
systems have been able to digest, and understand the OECD guidelines as to be able to use them 
when facing difficulties with local legislations. 
Notwithstanding the lack of regulatory guidance and the uncertainty in the Chilean transfer 
pricing environment, transfer pricing disputes in Chile remain rather embryonic and timid. The 
most activity has been observed in the arena of transfer pricing audits that have been intensified 
by the Chilean Internal Revenue Service. The low but increasing level of transfer pricing audits 
and disputes generates hopes that the judicial system will help in developing a set of clear rules if 
possible, around transfer pricing in Chile. In the meantime, Chile has positioned itself as one of 
the fastest growing small economies in the world. Foreign direct investment continues to flow at 
an exponential rate and Chile is recognized as one of the most ‘attractive’ countries to date.354 
The question is whether MNEs are getting a free pass at to their transfer pricing transactions, or 
are abiding in a satisfactory way, with the general rules of transfer pricing currently applicable in 
Chile. And even in the hope of an active judicial system, and further details on the application of 
the ALS, it is safe to predict that taxpayers would be pre-dominant in ligation because any 
system based on comparability, as seen for other countries, seems bound to fail tax 
                                                          
354 See the World Competitiveness Yearbook (“WCY”) of the Institute for Management Development (“IMD”). 
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administrations and optimum tax collection. Chile also adopted alternative methods of dispute 
resolution as well as preventative methods such as Mutual Agreement Procedures or Advance 
Pricing Agreement (mostly through the ruling request procedure). The recent changes, in 2012, 
aim at providing more guidance on the application of the Chilean transfer pricing rules, and the 
compliance requirements on taxpayers.355 
In South Africa, transfer pricing regulations came as a necessity as the country realized the 
magnitude of revenues being eroded from its tax base through questionable pricing in inter-
company transactions. With the opening of South Africa to the world in early 1990s and the 
exponential growth of transnational transactions both in terms of foreign direct investment and 
exports, the country realized the need to protect its tax base and prevent abusive tax structuring 
transactions. Sparked by the revelations by Rustomjee, in 1991, that South African capital 
outflows were approximately double the amount of the country’s foreign debt of the time by 
1991.356 The South African Minister of Finance, in 1994, appointed a special commission, 
chaired by Judge Katz, to inquire into the matter of capital flight and offer recommendations. 
The main recommendations of the Commission were the establishment of solid mechanisms to 
counter tax avoidance; the need for protective measures against abuse of transfer pricing.357 The 
Commission recommended several methods to counter capital flight but explicitly encouraged 
the South African Government to adopt the procedures and methodologies put in place by the 
OECD to prevent tax avoidance. The transfer pricing rules were consequently introduced in 
1995, following an amendment to the South African Income Tax Act of 1962.358 Section 31 that 
                                                          
355 See Law 20. 630, published in the Official Gazette (9/27/2012). 
356 See Ristomjee (1991). 
357 See Katz Commission, Report (1997). 
358 See Income Tax Act N*58 Section 31 (1962), as Amended in 1995. 
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emerged from the amendment and introduced transfer pricing rules, also discusses thin 
capitalization measures. Transfer pricing rules, following the recommendations of the 1994 
Commission have largely embraced the OECD ALS and the OECD guidelines to transfer 
pricing. The specifically indicates that the rules only apply in a cross border sphere, when 
transactions involved related parties. Further, the law indicates that the arm’s length price must 
be arrived at from the comparison with similar transactions between unrelated parties. 
Since its introduction in 1995, transfer pricing legislation in South Africa has continued to 
emerge, and ameliorate. The South African Tax Authority continues to issue notices and 
guidelines on the application of the transfer pricing rules in the South African Context. In one of 
the Notices, in 1999, the Tax Authority clarified the procedures to be followed in South Africa 
and under local countries circumstances, to determine the arm’s length price.359 In 2010, South 
Africa initiated changes to its transfer pricing legislation in order to better align with the OECD 
provisions, specifically with provisions of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. The 
law change in 2010 specifically aimed to widen the scope of application of the South African 
transfer pricing rules. Another major change of 2010 is the reversal, in the burden of proof, from 
the government to the taxpayer in transfer pricing litigation. The taxpayer must establish its 
transfer pricing method, and show that the method accurately reflects the arm’ length price in its 
inter-company transactions.  
Transfer pricing litigation in South Africa, like most developing countries, is rather embryonic. 
There are no major cases that been litigated in the area of transfer pricing. A typical transfer 
pricing controversy in South Africa goes through the following channel: the review of the tax 
                                                          
359 See South African Revenue Service, Practice Note 7 (1999). 
   145 
  
 
returns provided by taxpayer; if transfer pricing risk is identified, the case is referred to a transfer 
pricing audit specialist. The auditor reviews and weighs the risk, if credible; the transfer pricing 
auditor can issue a questionnaire to the taxpayer for further information of the covered 
transactions. The auditor then presents its findings to a panel in charge of determining whether 
the transfer pricing risks identified are material to bring the dispute forward. If the panel, after 
transfer pricing review, decides to audit the matter, the taxpayer is issued a Letter of Findings 
outlining the review from the audit and the proposed transfer pricing adjustments. If the taxpayer 
objects the position of the tax authority, the matter may go to settlement or alternative dispute 
resolution. Most cases are settled and the procedure stops here. However, if an agreement cannot 
be found, the matter is then prone for litigation. South Africa, like many other countries, has 
increased its scrutiny of potential transfer pricing abusive transactions. The number of transfer 
pricing audits has increased significantly in recent years. South Africa also provides procedures 
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2. Earning Stripping Through Debt Allocation 
One method of shifting profits from a high tax jurisdiction to a low tax jurisdiction is to borrow 
more in the high tax jurisdiction and less in the low tax jurisdiction. When the borrowings are 
coming from a low tax jurisdiction to a high tax one, the subsequent interest payments generate 
interest deductions in the high tax jurisdiction providing more income, interest income, in the 
low tax jurisdiction. A more common use of this strategy is known as the earning stripping 
technique whereby debt whether with related or unrelated party does not give rise to tax payment 
from the interest recipient. For example, a technique commonly used was for a foreign parent in 
a jurisdiction where interest income is low or not taxed, to grant a loan to its US Subsidiary with 
the effect that the interest payments on the loan would wipe out all the US earnings of the 
Subsidiary in the form of interest deductions, minimizing or eliminating US taxation. The related 
character of modern MNEs makes this shifting of debt achievable without a change in the overall 
debt profile and exposure of the company as a whole.360 It is well accepted that tax planning has 
a significant effect on the distribution and location of taxable profits of MNEs.361  
Many countries, specifically developed countries have adopted tax legislation aiming to curb to 
use of debt and interest to shift profits.362 The US for example has adopted rules related to 
interest allocation and earning stripping.363 Tax authorities in the developed world have designed 
                                                          
360 See Ghoshal Sumantra and Christopher Bartlett, The multinational corporation as an interorganizational 
network, 15.4 Academy of management review 603 (1990). 
361 See Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Hines and Rice, 1994; or Huizinga and Laeven, 2008. 
362 See Jog, Vijay, and Jianmin Tang, Tax Reforms, Debt Shifting and Tax Revenues: Multinational Corporations in 
Canada, International Tax and Public Finance 8 (1), 5–25 (2001); See also Kraus, Alan, and Robert H. Litzenberger, A 
State-Preference Model of Optimal Financial Leverage,  Journal of Finance 28 (4), 911–922 (1973); See also Mintz, 
Jack M., and Alfons J. Weichenrieder, Taxation and the Financial Structure of German Outbound FDI, CESifo 
Working Paper No. 1612 (2005); See also Piltz, Detlev J., General Report, International Aspects of Thin 
Capitalization, Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International 81b, 83–140 (1996). 
363 See IRC §163(j). 
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and continue to thrive to implement rules to curb MNEs ability to us debt and financing to shift 
income to low/no tax jurisdictions.364 In the developing countries however, the struggle is more 
pronounced. Most developing countries struggle to adopt policies that encourage investment 
while aiming to generate enough national revenues in order to provide basic social services for 
their people. Enactment of arguably generous tax policies related to interest deduction, 
specifically on foreign investments, or the non-taxation of interest income from local entities are 
common practice. MMEs operating in these jurisdictions regularly use them to maximum their 
overall tax exposure as a group. Many developing countries have enacted US style rules to avoid 
shifting of income through the use of debt and interest. Nevertheless, those countries face 
tremendous difficulties in enforcing such rules. Difficulties faced include the lack of appropriate 
human resources to comprehend the complex rules related to complex strategies that aim and 
curbing earning stripping for example.365 Developing countries have imported most of the 
developed world complex tax mechanisms design to respond to complex structuring of tax 
transactions.  The level of expertise needed is to equal the level of expertise afforded major 
MNEs. The issue however is that in developing countries, institutions, including tax institutions 
are not necessarily ran by experts, most appointment and positions are still dictated by family 
relations and various political affiliation. The issue is not that the expertise to enforce complex 
rules is inexistent, the reality that the expertise is not used in an appropriate manner, if at all. For 
example, one technique used to reduce profit shifting through the use of debt is the interest 
allocation scheme designed by tax authorities in order to get to the true economics of MNEs 
transactions and tax them accordingly. Interest allocation technic requires application of very 
sophisticated formulas and requires a wealth of information on the MNEs. On the one hand, the 
                                                          
364 See H.R. 3970, introduced in 2007. 
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importing developing country of the allocation of interest technic must assure that it has 
dominium on the formula to be applied. Secondly, the importing developing country must have 
access to the required information for the technic to be effective. Access to MNEs’ global 
operations information is a major issue in taxation in developing countries, an issue that manifest 
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3. The Distortive Effect of Hybrid Entities 
As discussed above, the past decades have seen a tremendous growth in highly sophisticated tax 
planning in the international arena. International tax professionals have specifically used 
differences in tax systems to exercise, at time, questionable tax arbitrages. The commonly known 
as the hybrid mismatch arrangements and their proliferation is a testament to the ever growing 
distortion of intended tax effects on the face of internationalization and globalization of commerce. 
A hybrid mismatch arrangement is an arrangement that exploits differences in national tax 
treatment of an instrument, an entity or a transfer between two or more countries. The 
arrangements usually lead to income being tax in neither of the involved jurisdictions (double non 
taxation), or lead to tax deferrals which is sustained for a long term, have a similar effect as double 
non-taxation. In the international tax arena, the most widely used form of hybrid mismatch is a 
planning scheme that focuses on tax treatment of different entities in different taxing jurisdictions. 
The same economic operation can be characterized as a taxable person in the US, for example, 
while not being a taxable person in the Netherlands. A payment might be taxable in the 
Netherlands, for example, while not being taxable in the US. Hybrid mismatch regularly distort 
the working of tax systems and produce consequences that neither taxing authority anticipated. 
Hybrid mismatch arrangements require a hybrid entity (entities that are treated as transparent for 
tax purposes in one country and not transparent in another); dual residency (entities resident in at 
least two different countries). Hybrid mismatch arrangements generally produce the same results 
including double deduction (each country involved allows a deductions);366 deduction and no 
                                                          
366 For example, a parent company in country A (“A Co”) indirectly holds an operating company in country B (“B 
Co”). Inserted between A Co and B Co is an entity (“Hybrid Entity”) that is treated as transparent or disregarded for 
country A tax purposes and as non-transparent for country B tax purposes. A Co holds all or almost all equity 
interest in Hybrid Entity which in turn holds all or almost all equity interests in B Co. Hybrid Entity borrows from a 
third party and uses the loan amount to inject it as equity into B Co (or to buy the shares in B Co from either 
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corresponding inclusion (taxpayer is allowed a deduction in one country and is not required a 
corresponding inclusion in the other country);367 or foreign tax credit generation (arrangements 
that allow for tax credits that would not have been allowed outside of such arrangements).368 
In general therefore, hybrid mismatch arrangements, though seemingly in compliance with the 
letter of the law of each country involved, result in non-taxation for all countries involved which 
is a result neither country intended in adopting its tax policy. The reality of hybrid mismatch 
arrangements can be analyzed from at least four different policy perspectives: their impact on tax 
revenues (the goal of hybrid mismatch arrangements is always the lowering of the taxpayer’s 
overall tax burden, draining the tax revenues of one or all the countries involved); their impact on 
competition (hybrid mismatch arrangements are only available to MNEs, companies that have 
operations in at least two countries. The tax advantages those MNEs may derive from hybrid 
mismatch transactions are not available to smaller companies, making them unable to effectively 
compete); their impact on transparency (hybrid mismatch benefit more often than not, on their 
secret character, the general public would usually be unaware of the low effective tax rate that the 
MNE enjoys, and if the public is aware, they generally don’t fully appreciate the hybrid mismatch 
                                                          
another company of the same group or from an unrelated third party). Hybrid Entity pays interest on the loan. 
Apart from the interest, Hybrid Entity does not claim any other significant deductions and does not have any 
significant income. The effect of the scheme is thus two deductions for the same contractual obligation in two 
different countries. Similar effects can also be achieved through different schemes, for instance through the use of 
a dual resident company instead of a hybrid entity where such a dual resident company has a loss and it can 
benefit from group relief / tax consolidation systems in both countries. 
367 For example, a company resident in country B (“B Co”) is funded by a company resident in country A (“A Co”) 
with an instrument that qualifies as equity in country A but as debt in country B. If current payments are made 
under the instrument, they are deductible interest expenses for B Co under country B tax law. The corresponding 
receipts are treated as exempt dividends for country A tax purposes. As a result, a net deduction arises in country 
B without a corresponding income inclusion in country A. 
368 One of the typical schemes to generate a foreign tax credit uses a hybrid transfer of an equity instrument. The 
most common way to create a hybrid transfer of an equity instrument is with a sale and repurchase agreement 
concerning shares, where the transaction is treated as a sale and a repurchase of the shares in one country, while 
in the other country it is treated as a loan with the shares serving as collateral. 
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transactions as being at the root of such low effective tax rates); and their impact on fairness (only 
certain tax persons, MNEs, are able to implement hybrid mismatch arrangements and enjoy the 
tax benefits therefrom, a situation that denotes the unfair character of preferable rules applicable 
only to a group). Hybrid mismatch opportunities were further developed after the adoption in the 
US of the so-called Check the Box Election rules (“CTB”).369 Originally envisioned to established 
simplicity and clarity in the classification of entities and the tax treatment therefrom, CTB elections 
quickly became the prime medium of achieving hybrid mismatch arrangements. If there is an 
opportunity whereby a partnership or a disregarded entity is treated more favorably than a 
corporation in a jurisdiction in which MNEs operate, the simple solution is the ‘check’ the entity 
in a form that yields mismatch tax advantages while not altering the economic reality of the entity 
and its operations. 
The amount of lost revenue to governments from hybrid mismatch transactions is significant and 
many governments have become more aggressive in identifying and negating the effects of those 
arrangements. Many rules have been implemented to prevent hybrid mismatch transactions and 
tax authorities enjoy a rather successful scorecard from hybrid mismatch arrangements litigation. 
In the US for example, the amount involved in the hybrid mismatch transactions was estimated at 
approximately $3.5 billion through the foreign tax credits generated by such arrangements.370 New 
Zealand settled, in 2009, cases involving hybrid mismatch arrangements with the taxpayer 
remitting approximately $1.5 billion to the tax authorities. In Italy, a number of cases involving 
hybrid mismatch arrangements settled for approximately $2 billion. The noted success of tax 
administrations in these proceedings, even though the taxpayers arguably respect the letter of the 
                                                          
369 See 26 CFR 301.7701. 
370 See Letter from Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to the Honorable Charles Grassley, Chairman, 
Senate Committee on Finance (May 2006), In 2006 Tax Notes Today 114-21 (June 14, 2006). 
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law, is due to the fact that the hybrid mismatch arrangements clearly violate the intent of the letter 
law, and the government would usually have an upper hand in these disputes. By speculation 
therefore, we can forecast that any initiative to limit and/or eliminate these arrangements could 
easily gather an impressive international coalition and maybe met by a reduced resistance from 
MNEs. The speculative and simplistic view however, remains questionable as we continue to 
witness more, not less hybrid mismatch arrangements by MNEs in their international operations.  
The international tax system and countries globally continue to face serious risk as to tax revenues, 
tax sovereignty, and tax fairness. The issues presented generally rotate around tax base erosion 
through profits shifting. There are many aspects to the problems faced by international taxation 
but one of the main once is transfer pricing and how easily MNEs seem to be able decide how 
much taxes to pay, if at all, and where to pay it at. The vast majority of rules currently governing 
international tax transactions still are based on tax policy considerations founded on the 
majoritarily territorial nature of taxation in early days. Globalization is not new but, the pace of 
inter-connectedness and intra-group activities at the global level has never been more pronounced. 
The internationalization of business activities has never been more accentuated and international 
tax planning structures have never been at the center of the global debate with such urgency. From 
the standpoint of MNEs, no transactions is seriously considered unless it global consequences are 
analyzed. The international dimension and perspective dictates all actions of modern MNEs. 
Nevertheless, the responses of tax authorities remain largely territorial and local, showing a major 
disconnect between tax policy and economic reality. The major global of international taxation is 
the public perception that only the naïve pay taxes, and that is just too easy, for a certain class of 
taxpayers, to avoid taxation. The global ills of international taxation are made apparent through 
various tax planning technics including transfer pricing, debt allocation, or hybrid mismatch 
   153 
  
 
arrangements. The global outcry proves that a consensus is forming as to the characterization of 
the international tax system as a globally failed system. The question now, is how the international 
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B. Ills Specific to Developing Countries 
Above and beyond the global ills of international taxation, the ways in which the international 
taxation is failing globally, there are specific circumstances and specific areas in which the failures 
are sui generis to developing countries. The importance of effective taxation and the ability of the 
country to effectively tax economic activities within its borders are of central importance in the 
developing world. Effective corporate taxation is even of higher importance in the developing 
world as they rely more heavily on revenues from corporate taxation as compared to the developed 
world.371 Increasing number of MNEs continue to expand their operations in the developing 
markets, making international tax policy and rule-making in those markets ever more relevant and 
important. The corporate taxation, if ineffective at an international level, would make the entire 
system a failure and would result in inability to raise the adequate tax revenues. Historically 
however, developing countries have not been proactive in designing international tax rules that 
take their individual practical situations into account. Instead, most developing countries have 
incorporated, throughout time, the international tax rules, policies and doctrines adopted by 
developed countries. The resulting international tax system applicable in these developing 
countries has shown to be a total disaster in many fronts. 
First, there is a difference in the nature of cross border transactions between the developed and 
developing world and they should not be addressed in a similar fashion. Historically, highly 
sophisticated tax planning was less prevalent in the developing countries. Developing countries 
had basic international tax rules and mere basic international tax planning suffixed to achieve 
sought results in these jurisdictions. The lack of appropriate rules had the door open to basic tax 
                                                          
371 It is estimated that developed countries raise approximately 10% of their revenues through corporate tax, while 
developing countries raise approximately 20% of their revenues through corporate taxation. 
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planning and the irregularity of tax audit did very little to discourage more aggressive tax planning. 
The basic rules are now in need of more sophistication as MNEs are cramping up their international 
tax planning sophistication in those jurisdictions. The current international tax structures in 
developing countries have shown, at times, not sophisticated enough to govern highly complex 
transactions. Much legislation in these countries is still incomplete. In several circumstances, the 
rules can be and have easily been circumvented by taxpayers specifically MNEs. For example a 
law that prevents the use of transfer pricing to realize profit shifting would have very limited effect 
in the overall situation of the taxpayer and the tax authorities if similar measures are not adopted 
to prevent excessive leverage and the use of debt in the country. The result, in either situation, is 
the erosion of the countries tax base. The closure of the transfer pricing route without a 
corresponding closure of the excessive indebtedness route can only have limited effect on the 
overall goal of reducing and or eliminating gamesmanship. 
Second, the general issue raised by each developing country tax administration is the difficulty to 
obtain information necessary to apply most of the international tax law provisions.  Developing 
countries are unable to obtain from MNEs the information they need to understand their global 
transactions, and assess the risks involved.372 For example, many developing countries tax 
administrations report having constant difficulties obtaining information about MNEs foreign 
operations. The foreign operation information is vastly important in fully understanding the risk 
of tax losses of the operations in the local country. The inability to access MNEs information in 
developing countries can be attributed many variables including the following. First, the 
information issue is due to the lack of effective information gathering rules in developing 
countries. In the developed world, there are strict rules regarding information gathering for 
                                                          
372 See Supra, at 89. 
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taxpayers, specifically MNEs. In the US for example, MNEs are required to provide, by law 
various types of information on their operation. In fact, such information is also usually received 
from third parties upon whom the US imposes a legal duty to provide the information. In many 
instances, the US authorities have not relied on third parties to obtain such information; the US 
authorities have mandated such entities to provide the information. Moreover, the US has found 
proactive and innovative ways, and working through the applicable rules, to obtain the required 
information. On an international perspective, the US has expanded its reach and its ability to get 
information on foreign operations.373 Initially, the US led a coalition that continues to advocate for 
information exchange between governments. Additionally, the US now requires certain foreign 
institutions to provide information on foreign possessions or operations of US persons. The recent 
legislative enactment, known as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”)374 is an 
information gathering law requiring foreign financial institutions to provide information to the US 
tax authorities about their US account owners (or the US policyholders or insurers as the case may 
be).375 However, in the developing world, there is a blatant lack of effective information gathering 
rules. Second, there is poor compliance with whatever structure is in place for disclosure and 
information gathering, and developing countries tax authorities have limited capacity to enforce 
those rules. Many developing countries have incorporated some rules, albeit ineffectively, 
regarding disclosures and information gathering. In practice however, it is noted that taxpayers do 
not comply with these requirements and the inability of tax authorities to enforce such 
requirements is apparent. Many tax legislations in the developing world require that taxpayers 
disclose information on their foreign operations for example. But, not many taxpayers satisfy such 
                                                          
373 See Gregory Crinion, Information Gathering on Tax Evasion in Tax Heaven Countries, available at 
http://www.cdrlegal.com/assets/crinion-information-gathering-on-tax-evasion.pdf (last retrieved 2/24/2015). 
374 See I.R.C. §§ 1471-1474. Most of the operative rules are in Treasury Regulations issued under the statute. 
375 See Karundia Ashish, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act–An Overview, Available at SSRN 2565752 (2015). 
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disclosures in fact. The dispute system is weak in these countries, leading to a relatively scarce 
enforcement of such disclosure requirements. In developing countries, audits are not widespread, 
and international tax litigation is almost inexistent. Finally, developing countries lack adequate 
tools for obtainment of the required information and their analysis. Very few developing countries 
have sophisticated e-filling system able to absorb and arguably accurately analyze the massive 
amounts of taxpayers’ information. The information is still mostly provided in a rudimentary 
manner, to be processed individually by human resources in a widely ineffective manner and 
leading to misunderstanding of the global tax picture of the taxpayer with foreign operations.  
Third, developing countries face a significant lack of expertise in applying complex international 
tax rules.376 In many cases, developing countries transplanted rules that were applicable in the 
developed world to counter tax abuse within their jurisdiction. However, it is worth noting that for 
most these rules, the level of complexity is so significant, requiring a highly informed and 
profoundly specialized workforce. This expertise is lacking in most developing countries, and even 
when it is available, the government is not a competitive enough employer that the expertise 
generally finds itself in the private sector, arming it best, at times, to realized highly sophisticated 
tax planning technics that continue to erode the tax base in these jurisdictions. The insufficiency 
of man power and the scarcity of skilled staff are chief impediments to the application of rather 
complex rules of international tax aimed at curbing erosion of tax base in the developing world. 
The asymmetry between tax authorities in the developing world and well advised MNEs predict 
the outcome of MNEs mostly getting their way in the face of impotent and not enough qualified 
tax authorities. Additionally, developing countries have not set up adequate alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms. For developed countries, the complex and fact intensive native of 
                                                          
376 See Supra, at 89. 
   158 
  
 
international tax dispute constantly lead to the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to 
achieve acceptable settlements. In developing countries, there is no structure for alternative dispute 
resolution to encourage and lead to acceptable settlements. Furthermore, a granting of discretion 
to tax authorities to settle large disputes may lead to increased widespread corruption. In fact, many 
observers have argued that the rather limited number of tax audit and other disputes in international 
tax for MNEs in developing countries is also attributable to the corrupt nature of the tax 
administration who generally negotiate personal ‘deal’ with taxpayers and let them off the hook 
when their personal needs are satisfied.377 The lack of expertise, combined with a weak alternative 
dispute resolution structure, leads to rather major failures for international tax in developing 
countries. 
Finally, developing countries have to deal with a tricky balance of adopting aggressive enough 
rules to curb tax avoidance while not being viewed as anti-investments. For many countries in the 
developing world, encouraging investment and attracting foreign investment specifically is a 
central of policy making.378 Many developing countries still have weak economies and 
conventional wisdom instructs them not to do anything that might be perceived as a 
discouragement to investments. The debate over the effects of tax policy on investment and 
specifically foreign direct investment is still brewing. A multitude of empirical evidence seems to 
indicate that at best, the impact of certain tax policy measure on investments is relative. For 
example, many developing countries have adopted various forms of tax incentives to attract 
investment, specifically direct foreign investment. Empirical evidence has overwhelmingly 
                                                          
377 See Ghura Dhaneshwar, Tax revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa: effects of economic policies and corruption, 1-25 
(1998). 
378 See Zee Janet and Eduardo Ley, Tax incentives for business investment: a primer for policy makers in developing 
countries, 30.9 World development 1497 (2002). 
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indicated that tax incentives have no direct impact on investment, and foreign direct investment 
specifically.379 Nevertheless, tax incentives continue to flourish in the developing world on the 
very same and overwhelmingly disproven argument that they increase investment. The struggle 
for developing countries is that they are afraid to provide an impression of being investments 
adverse jurisdictions. Since one country has such incentives, other developing countries continue 
to implement them, regardless of whether they actually of themselves increase investments. At 
least, the existence of the incentives in the legislative structure is an antidote to the impression of 
investment adversity within the jurisdiction. In the area of international tax rules, many developing 
countries continue to witness the constant erosion of their tax base and are reluctant implement 
aggressive rules as they would provide that very same impression of investment adversity so feared 
within the developing world. For developing countries, the market, the customer base, the reliable 
judicial system, and the relatively coherent legislative structure are enough to attract investments 
and developed countries are not overly worried about establishing an investment adverse 
atmosphere when adopting common sense rules to curb tax avoidance. In fact, the level of potential 
coordination in the developed world leads to the very same aggressive scheme being collectively 
applied leaving taxpayers with few places to escape in the developed world. The US and/or the 
EU can easily adopt more aggressive rules to combat tax avoidance without overly worrying about 
businesses not being able to locate there. In fact, developed countries are confident in their markets 
and labor force and know MNEs will want to locate there notwithstanding. The reality in the 
developing world is different. Economies are weak, customer base arguably negligible, and no 
overall coordination. Any tax policy consideration shall pass the muster of its impact on attraction 
of investments, and least from the perspective of other developing countries having adopted such 
                                                          
379 See Easson Alex, Tax incentives for foreign direct investment part I: Recent trends and countertrends, 55.7 
Bulletin for international taxation 266 (2001). 
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measure. Many developing countries may have turned a blind eye on abusive tax practices for the 
sake of encouraging investments and development within their borders. As developing countries 
continue to be more aggressive toward MNEs abusive tax practices, the question remains as to 
whether the relatively lack of aggression in the developed world is due to the lack of information, 
the lack of efficient rules, appropriate expertise, the struggle to find a balance between curbing 
abusive tax practices and encouraging investments. The answer seems to us, is all of the above, 
but whatever the explanation, the failures of international tax in developing countries are profound 
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C. The BEPS Project: a Case Study 
The OECD base erosion and profit shifting ("BEPS") project is the most significant multilateral 
effort to date to change the taxation of corporate cross-border income. The initiative comes after 
the most significant financial market turmoil since the Great Depression and high levels of 
unemployment and government deficits within developed countries. As countries look to balance 
their budgets, MNEs have come under scrutiny on their tax affairs not only from tax authorities, 
but also from government and non-governmental bodies and the media. There is also an 
acknowledgement that corporate taxation has not kept pace with the changes in the global 
economy, particularly the growth in e-commerce, the growth of outsourcing and contract 
manufacturing, and the changes to global supply chains. 
The speed with which the OECD BEPS project has moved has been quite remarkable. The 
impetus for the project came from the G20 finance ministers meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico, in 
June 2012,380 and the ensuing 24-month period has seen a flurry of activity. In January 2013, the 
OECD published a report titled "Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting" ("the Report").381 
The Report was presented to the G20 finance ministers meeting in Moscow on February 2013, 
expressing the urgent need to deal with BEPS in a multilateral and coordinated manner. 
According to the Report, action was required because BEPS presented an urgent risk to "tax 
revenues, tax sovereignty and tax fairness for OECD member countries and non-members alike." 
The OECD indicated that the international tax rules have not kept up with the realities of doing 
business in a globalized world, and that gap between domestic tax systems, combined with 
                                                          
380 The G20 Finance Ministers held a Summit in Los Cabos, Mexico (June 18–19, 2012). Official Communiqué at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=CTPA/ CFA(2012)56&docLanguage=En  
381 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting , January 2013, available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-
reports.htm (last retrieved 6/20/2014).  
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economic incentives and legal accounting practices, have all given rise to avenues of double non-
taxation, allowing some MNCs to pay little to no corporate tax at all. The Report received full 
endorsement from the G20 finance ministers in Moscow, invited the OECD to move forward and 
develop an action plan. In July 2013, the OECD released the Action Plan on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting ("Action Plan"),382 identifying actions needed to address BEPS, setting deadlines 
to develop these actions, and identifying the resources needed and methodology to implement 
these actions. 
The Action Plan lists 15 Action Items and their timelines for finalization: 
1. Address tax challenges of the digital economy (September 2014). 
2. Neutralize the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements (September 2014). 
3. Strengthen Controlled Foreign Company ("CFC") rules (September 2015). 
4. Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments (September 2015). 
5. Counter harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into account transparency and 
substance (September 2014/September 2015/December 2015). 
6. Prevent treaty abuse (September 2014). 
7. Prevent the artificial avoidance of Permanent Establishment ("PE") status (September 2015). 
8. Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation – Intangibles (September 
2014/September 2015). 
9. Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation – Risk and Capital 
(September 2015). 
10. Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation – Other high risk 
transactions (September 2015). 
                                                          
382 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf 
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11. Establish methodologies to collect and analyze data on BEPS and the actions to address it 
(September 2015). 
12. Require taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning arrangements (September 2015). 
13. Re-examine transfer pricing documentation (September 2014). 
14. Make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective (September 2015). 
15. Develop multilateral instruments (September 2014/December 2015). 
 
There have been many Action Item Discussion Drafts released. These include Action 1 on 
addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy; Action 2 on neutralizing the effects of 
hybrid mismatch arrangements (two Discussion Drafts released); Action 6 on preventing treaty 
abuse; and Action 13 on transfer-pricing documentation. Each of these Action Items had a 
September 2014 report-out date. A Discussion Draft on intangibles was released prior to the 
Action Plan with a revised Discussion Draft issued on July 30, 2013, which leveraged off the 
prior work undertaken by the OECD. The Discussion Drafts provide suggested changes to both 
domestic law and to the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty to be implemented by OECD 
members in an agreed manner. The Discussion Drafts acknowledged that they are in "early 
stage," do not reflect any consensus view, and were designed to elicit comments and be later 
refined. Even though the comment period for each of the action items was brief, they attracted a 
large number of comments from practitioners, trade associations, non-governmental agencies, 
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Action Item 1: E-commerce 
 
On March 24, 2014, the OECD released a Discussion Draft "BEPS Action 1: Address the Tax 
Challenges of the Digital Economy" (the "E-commerce Draft"). 12 The draft contains a lengthy 
discussion of the key features and business models in a digital economy, the opportunities for 
BEPS that can arise in a digital economy, and potential options to address the tax challenges 
raised by the digital economy. The E-commerce Draft notes the changes in the modern economy 
and the expansion of direct to- customer sales vs. the traditional manufacturer distributor- 
customer model. This change allows companies to make cross-border sales without a physical in-
country presence, which results in local countries suffering a loss of in-country sales and 
distribution revenues and income becoming more difficult to trace. The E-commerce Draft is 
organized into six substantive sections that roughly align with focus areas identified in Action 1 
of the OECD BEPS Action Plan: Information and Communication Technology and Its Impact on 
the Economy (Section II); The Digital Economy, Its Key Features, and the Emergence of New 
Business Models (Section III); Identifying Opportunities for BEPS in the Digital Economy 
(Section IV); Tackling BEPS in the 
Digital Economy (Section V); Broader Tax Challenges Raised by the Digital Economy (Section 
VI); and Potential Options to Address the Broader Tax Challenges raised by the Digital 
Economy (Section VII). Section VII provides an overview of four possible options presented to 
the task force to address the challenges of taxing the digital economy. Though these options are 
not task force recommendations and are still under development, they have attracted significant 
attention from commentators, in fact more attention than the other five sections combined, as 
they would represent a significant departure from existing tax rules. 
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The first potential option would modify the exemptions to PE status under paragraph 4 of Article 
5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention ("the Convention").383 The Ecommerce Draft states that 
several variations of this option are possible. One approach would eliminate paragraph 4 of 
Article 5 entirely. Another variation would eliminate just the enumerated exceptions of 
paragraphs (a)–(d) of Article 5(4) or make them subject to the overall condition that the character 
of the activity conducted be preparatory or auxiliary in nature, rather than a core activity, thus 
making such exceptions unavailable to businesses if such activities constitute one of their core 
activities or functions. 
The second option, a variation on alternative PE thresholds, would establish an alternative nexus 
based on a significant digital presence to address situations in which business is conducted 
wholly digitally. An enterprise engaged in certain "fully de-materialized digital activities" would 
have a PE if it maintained a "significant digital presence" in another country's economy. The 
third option includes three broad alternatives: (1) a "virtual fixed place of business PE" (when the 
enterprise maintains a website on a server of another enterprise located in a jurisdiction and 
carries on business through that website); (2) a "virtual agency PE" (extension of the dependent 
agent PE concept of contracts habitually concluded with persons located in the jurisdiction 
through technological means); and (3) an "on-site business presence PE". The fourth option 
would impose a final withholding tax on certain payments for digital goods or services. 
                                                          
383 See OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Art. 5, ¶ 4 (2010) as follows: "Notwithstanding the 
preceding provisions of this Article, the term 'permanent establishment' shall be deemed not to include: 
a) the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods or merchandise belonging to 
the enterprise; 
b) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the purpose of 
storage, display or delivery; 
c) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the purpose of 
processing by another enterprise; 
d) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or merchandise or of 
collecting information, for the enterprise; 
e) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the enterprise, any other 
activity of a preparatory or auxiliary character; 
f) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in subparagraphs 
a) to e), provided that the overall activity of the fixed place of business resulting from this combination is of a 
preparatory or auxiliary character." 
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Action 2: Neutralize the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements 
The Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements Discussion Draft was issued on March 19, 2014. The draft 
is in two parts, with the first part (First Discussion Draft) making recommendations on changes 
to domestic law, and the second (Second Discussion 
Draft) discussing the impact of new domestic rules of the Convention and recommended changes 
to the Convention.384 
The draft defines hybrid mismatch arrangements generally as arrangements that use hybrid 
elements in the tax treatment of an entity or instrument under the laws of two or more tax 
jurisdictions to produce a mismatch in tax outcomes. It specifically identifies the key elements of 
a hybrid mismatch as (1) an arrangement that results in a mismatch of the tax treatment, (2) an 
arrangement that contains a hybrid element, and (3) the hybrid element causes a mismatch in tax 
outcomes. The First Discussion Draft identifies two types of mismatch results: (1) payments that 
are deductible in one jurisdiction but not picked up in another (so-called deduction/no inclusion 
D/NI outcome), (2) payments that give rise to duplicate deductions on the same expense (so-
called deduction/deduction D/D outcome). The draft discusses how to approach hybrid 
mismatches and states that any hybrid mismatch rules should "meet the criteria for good rule 
design," which would include clarity, transparency, ease of administration and compliance for 
both companies and tax authorities, and workability. 
The preliminary recommendations target three categories of hybrid mismatch arrangements:  
 
                                                          
384 See OECD, BEPS Action 2: Neutralize the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements , March 19, 2014, available 
at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/hybrid-mismatch-arrangementsdiscussion-draftdomestic-laws-
recommendations-march-2014.pdf (last retrieved  3/3/2015). 
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 Hybrid financial instruments for which a deductible payment made on a financial 
instrument is not treated as deductible income in the payee's jurisdiction; 
 Hybrid entity payments for which differences in the characterization of the hybrid payer 
results in a deductible payment being disregarded or triggering a second deduction in the 
second jurisdiction; and  
 Reverse hybrid and imported mismatches which cover payments made to intermediate 
payees. 
Preliminary conclusions of the draft include changes to domestic law and linking rules that base 
the tax treatment of a hybrid arrangement on tax treatment in the other state and result in either a 
denial of a deduction on the payment or a requirement that the payment be included in income. 
There is a linking rule that applies if the domestic law fails to address the mismatch. The linking 
rule contains both a "primary response" and a defensive rule. Primary responses generally focus 
on the payor or investor jurisdiction, and defensive rules focus generally on the payee or 
subsidiary jurisdiction. For example, for a hybrid instrument that would be treated as a debt 
instrument in the payer jurisdiction and as equity in the payee jurisdiction, the firs discussion 
draft recommends that domestic law be amended so that no dividend exemption is available for 
deductible payments. If domestic law did not capture this, the linking rule would then kick in, 
first applying the primary rule – denying a deduction, and then applying the secondary rule – 
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Action Item 6: Treaties 
On March 14, 2014, the OECD released BEPS Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty 
Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances (the "Treaty Draft"). 385 The Treaty Draft is divided into 
three sections corresponding to the specific areas identified in Action Item 6. 
First, the Treaty Draft discusses the development of model treaty provisions and outlines 
recommendations regarding the design of domestic rules to prevent the granting of treaty 
benefits in inappropriate circumstances. The Treaty Draft makes several recommendations to 
prevent treaty abuse and treaty shopping, including the inclusion of an anti-abuse rule based on 
the limitation-on-benefits provision found in most US income tax treaties, and the inclusion of a 
more general anti-abuse rule (main purpose rule) designed to address other forms of treaty abuse 
that would not be covered by the specific limitation-on-benefits provision. Second, the Treaty 
Draft clarifies that tax treaties are not intended to be used to generate double non-taxation and 
recommends the amendment of the Convention to state clearly that the prevention of tax evasion 
and avoidance is a purpose of tax treaties. Additionally, the Treaty Draft indicates that the 
Convention should include a preamble expressly providing that the states that enter into a tax 
treaty intend to eliminate double-taxation without creating opportunities for tax avoidance. 
Third, the Treaty Draft discusses the identification of the tax policy considerations that countries 
should take into account before deciding to enter into a tax treaty with another country. The 
Treaty Draft states that the clearer articulation of the policy considerations that countries should 
take into account prior to entering into a tax treaty may limit the number of tax treaties executed 
with low/ no-tax jurisdictions. 
                                                          
385 OECD, BEPS Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances (March 14, 
2014) Available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/treaty-abuse-discussion-draft-march-2014.pdf (last retrieved 
3/3/2015). 
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Many commentators welcomed the Treaty Draft's effort to deal with treaty shopping and other 
treaty abuse situations. There is general agreement from commentators that the entitlement to the 


















                                                          
386 See OECD, Comments Received on Public Discussion Draft BEPS action 6, preventing the granting of treaty 
benefits in inappropriate circumstances (April 11, 2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/ 
comments-action-6-prevent-treaty-abuse.pdf (last retrieved 3/24/2015). 
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Action Item 8: Intangibles 
On June 6, 2012, the OECD published a Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Intangibles.38751 The OECD requested public comments on the draft, and a public consultation 
was held in November 2012. On the basis of the comments received and in light of the 
subsequent launch of the BEPS project, the OECD prepared a revised version of the draft on 
transfer pricing aspects of intangibles ("Intangibles Draft") adopting the process under Action 
Item 8. 52 Action Item 8 specifically aims at developing rules to prevent BEPS from moving 
intangibles among group members. This will involve: (i) adopting a broad and clearly delineated 
definition of intangibles; (ii) ensuring that profits associated with the transfer and use of 
intangibles are appropriately allocated in accordance with (rather than divorced from) value 
creation; (iii) developing transfer pricing rules or special measures for transfers of hard-to-value 
intangibles; and (iv) updating the guidance on cost contribution arrangements. The Intangibles 
Draft is a work in process, and some of the issues identified will be dealt with in other BEPS 
Action Items. The Intangibles Draft outlines the OECD's view on how comparability factors 
such as location savings, workforce-in-place and group company benefits should be treated for 
transfer pricing purposes and proposes changes to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The 
Intangibles Draft states these factors are not intangibles but can involve intangible assets, e.g., a 
movement of a workforce can involve the transfer of knowhow. Section A of the Intangibles 
Draft also provides a broad definition of an intangible asset and a definition of unique and 
valuable intangibles.388 Section B of the Intangibles Draft provides guidance on when entities in 
                                                          
387 See OECD, Revised Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing of Intangibles (July, 2013) available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/revised-discussiondraft-intangibles.pdf (last retrieved 3/22/2015). 
388 Intangibles assets are defined in the Intangibles Draft as "something that is not a physical or financial asset and 
which is capable of being owned or controlled for use in commercial activities and whose use or transfer would be 
compensated had it occurred in a transaction between independent parties in comparable situations." Unique and 
valuable intangibles are defined as those intangibles "(i) that are not comparable to intangibles used by or available 
   171 
  
 
a multinational group should be entitled to the economic profits from exploiting intangibles, with 
a focus on the importance of functions performed, assets used and risks assumed in the 
development and protection of intangibles. Here the focus is on contribution, not economic or 
legal ownership. The Intangibles Draft clarifies that an entity can outsource intangible functions 
but must control the provider, and also notes that the return to an entity that merely funds 
intangible development should be reduced vs. an entity that performs these functions. 
Section C covers transactions involving the use or transfer of intangibles, while Section D 
provides guidance on determining arm's length values for intangibles. Most commentators 
acknowledged the difficulties posed by the complex transfer pricing structures of intangibles. 
Several commentators expressed concerns about the definition of intangibles; the OECD 
approach to defining intangibles was to adopt a broad understanding of the notion of intangibles 
while requiring specific identification of intangibles.389 The OECD specifically included 
goodwill and going concern as intangibles while excluding workforce or group synergies. The 
Intangible Draft also received general push-back on its tight timing. Many commentators argued 
that the issues to be addressed are too complex to be considered, even with bifurcated delivery 
dates of September 2014 and September 2015 (for special measures on hard to- value 
intangibles).390 
                                                          
to parties in potentially comparable transactions and (ii) whose use in business is expected to yield greater future 
benefits that would be expected in the absence of the intangible." OECD Intangibles Draft, Section A.1. 
389 See OECD public comments received on the Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing aspects of intangibles, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/comments-intangibles discussion-draft.htm (last 
retrieved March 28, 2015) 
390 Id. 
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On 5 October 2015, the OECD released final reports on all 15 focus areas in its Action Plan on 
BEPS.391 In an accompanying explanatory statement,392 the OECD described the next steps in its 
work on BEPS, including additional work on technical matters and plans for monitoring with 
respect to the implementation of the BEPS recommendations. In conjunction with the release of 
the reports, the OECD held a press conference followed by a technical briefing, both by webcast, 
to provide an overview of the final BEPS output. 
The OECD described the final BEPS packages as containing recommendations that fall in 
several different categories: 
 Agreed minimum standards: the recommendations on harmful tax practices (Action 5), 
treaty abuse (Action 6), country-by-country reporting (Action 13) and dispute resolution 
(Action 14) 
 Reinforced international standards: the revised OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
(Actions 8-10) and the revised OECD Model Tax Convention (including Action 7 on 
permanent establishment status) 
 Common approaches and best practices for domestic law: hybrid mismatch arrangements 
(Action 2), controlled foreign company rules (Action 3), interest limitations (Action 4) 
and disclosure of aggressive tax planning (Action 12) 
 Analytical reports: tax challenges of the digital economy (Action 1), data and analysis 
with respect to BEPS (Action 11) and the multilateral instrument for implementing treaty 
based recommendations (Action 15).393 
                                                          
391 See OECD Press Release, Oct.5, 2015, available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/oecd-presents-outputs-of-oecd-
g20-beps-project-for-discussion-at-g20-finance-ministers-meeting.htm (last retrieved Oct 12, 2015). 
392 See OECD BEPS Explanatory Statement on 2015 Final Reports, Oct 5, 2015, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf (last retrieved 10/12/2015). 
393 Id. 
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The OECD also briefly discussed the “post-BEPS environment,” stressing the importance of 
focusing on implementation of the BEPS recommendations in a consistent and coherent manner, 
monitoring the impact on both double non-taxation and double taxation. The explanatory 
statement indicates that OECD and G20 countries have agreed to continue to work together on 
BEPS until 2020. The intention is to develop a more inclusive framework to support and monitor 

















                                                          
394 Id. 
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Item 1 – Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy 
The final report on Action 1, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, 395 largely 
follows the initial Action 1 deliverable on the digital economy released by the OECD in 
September 2014 . Like the 2014 report, the final report provides conclusions regarding the digital 
economy and recommended next steps to address the tax challenges presented by the evolving 
digital economy. The final report acknowledges that special rules designed exclusively for the 
digital economy would prove unworkable, broadly stating that the digital economy “cannot be 
ring-fenced as it is increasingly the economy itself.” The final report summarizes key features of 
evolving digital business models that the OECD considers relevant for the overall 
BEPS analysis; in addition, the final report considers broader direct and indirect tax challenges 
raised by the digital economy. As an update to the 2014 report, the final report recommends: (i) 
modification of the list of exceptions to the definition of Permanent Establishment (PE) 
regarding preparatory or auxiliary activities as they relate to a digital environment and 
introduction of new anti-fragmentation rules to deny benefits from these exceptions through 
fragmentation of certain business activities; (ii) modification of the definition of a PE to address 
artificial arrangements through certain “conclusion of contracts” arrangements (See Action 7); 
(iii) a correlative update to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (see Actions 8-10); and (iv) 
changes to controlled foreign company (CFC) rules to address identified challenges of the digital 
economy. The final report also addresses the indirect tax treatment of certain digital transactions, 
recommending that countries should apply the principles of the OECD’s International Value-
added Tax/ Goods and Services Tax (VAT/GST) Guidelines and should consider introduction of 
                                                          
395 See OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 - 2015 Final Report, oct. 5, 2015, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/addressing-the-tax-challenges-of-the-digital-economy-action-1-2015-final-
report-9789264241046-en.htm (last retrieved 10/12/2015). 
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the collection mechanisms included therein. Future work in the area of Action 1 will be 
conducted in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders, and on the basis of a detailed 
mandate to be developed by the OECD during 2016 in the context of designing an inclusive post-
BEPS monitoring process. A supplementary report reflecting the outcome of continued work on 
the overall taxation of the digital economy should be released by 2020. The OECD also intends 
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Action 2 – Neutralizing the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements 
The final report on Action 2, Neutralizing the Effect of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements,396 
supersedes the interim report that was released in September 2014. Similar to the 2014 report, 
the final report consists of two parts with detailed recommendations to address hybrid mismatch 
arrangements and reflects the consensus achieved on these issues. Part I contains 
recommendations on domestic law rules to address hybrid mismatch arrangements. Part II 
contains recommended changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
The recommendations in Part I include “Specific Recommendations” and “Hybrid Mismatch 
Rules.” The Specific Recommendations are modifications to provisions of domestic law aimed at 
avoiding hybrid mismatches and achieving alignment between those laws and their intended tax 
policy outcomes (e.g., by not applying a dividend exemption at the level of the payee for 
payments that are deductible at the level of the payer). The Hybrid Mismatch Rules are linking 
rules aimed at neutralizing one of the following three mismatches in tax outcomes arising out of 
certain hybrid mismatch arrangements: 
 Payments that give rise to a deduction with no taxable inclusion arising from a hybrid 
financial instrument (including a hybrid transfer), a disregarded payment made by a 
hybrid entity or a payment made to a reverse hybrid 
 Payments that give rise to a double deduction arising from a deductible payment made by 
a hybrid entity or a dual resident 
 Payments that give rise to an indirect deduction with no inclusion arising from an 
imported mismatch 
                                                          
396 See OECD,  Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2- 2015 Final Report, oct. 5, 2015, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/neutralising-the-effects-of-hybrid-mismatch-arrangements-action-2-2015-
final-report-9789264241138-en.htm (last retrieved 10/12/2015) 
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The Hybrid Mismatch Rules are divided into a primary response and, where applicable, a 
secondary or defensive rule. The defensive rule only applies where there is no Hybrid Mismatch 
Rule in the counterparty jurisdiction or where the rule is not applied to the particular entity or 
arrangement. Furthermore, each of the Hybrid Mismatch Rules has its own scope of application.  
In a significant expansion from the 2014 report, the recommendations in Part I of the final report 
have been supplemented with further guidance and a wide array of detailed examples to explain 
the operation of the rules. Some outstanding issues that were identified in the 2014 report are 
addressed, such as the treatment of stock lending and sale and repurchase transactions, the 
treatment of non-interest bearing loans and the treatment of branch structures within the hybrid 
mismatch arrangement category for hybrid financial instruments. Furthermore, there is detailed 
guidance on how to treat a payment that is included under a CFC regime. Significant new 
guidance on the operation of the imported mismatch rule is provided as well, which includes 
three tracing and priority rules to determine the extent to which a payment should be treated as 
set-off against a deduction under an imported mismatch arrangement. 
The recommendations in Part II with respect to the OECD Model Tax Convention are similar to 
those included in the 2014 Report, namely: (i) a change to Article 4 of the Model Tax 
Convention to deal with dual resident entities; (ii) a new provision in Article 1 and changes to 
the Commentary to address fiscally transparent entities; and (iii) various proposed changes to 
address treaty issues that may arise from the recommended domestic law changes.  
The final report recommends that every jurisdiction should introduce all the rules contained in 
the report and that jurisdictions should cooperate on measures to ensure these rules are 
implemented and applied consistently and effectively. 
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Action 3 – Strengthening CFC rules 
The final report on Action 3, Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules,397 
provides recommendations in the form of building blocks with respect to the constituent 
elements that are necessary for effective CFC rules. The final report notes that the 
recommendations are not minimum standards, but instead are designed to ensure that 
jurisdictions that choose to implement them will have rules that effectively prevent taxpayers 
from shifting income into foreign subsidiaries. The report indicates that the recommended 
building blocks would allow countries without CFC rules to implement recommended rules 
directly and countries with existing CFC rules to modify their rules to align more closely with 
the recommendations. 
The six building blocks for the design of effective CFC rules are: 
 Definition of a CFC (including the definition of control) 
 CFC exemptions and threshold requirements 
 Definition of CFC income 
 Computation of income 
 Attribution of income 
 Prevention and elimination of double taxation 
The final report recognizes that there are shared policy considerations for jurisdictions in the 
context of Action 3 (e.g., providing a backstop to transfer pricing and balancing effectiveness 
with compliance burden and with avoidance of double taxation), as well as different policy 
objectives that relate to the overall domestic tax systems of individual jurisdictions. Thus, 
                                                          
397 See OECD,  Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules, Action 3 - 2015 Final Report, oct. 5, 2015, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/designing-effective-controlled-foreign-company-rules-action-3-2015-final-
report-9789264241152-en.htm (last retrieved 10/12/2015). 
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because each country prioritizes specific policy objectives differently (e.g., the balance between 
taxing foreign income and maintaining competitiveness), the recommendations provide 
flexibility to implement CFC rules in a manner consistent with the policy objectives of the 
overall tax system and the international legal obligations of the specific country concerned. In 
particular, with respect to the definition of CFC income, the final report recognizes that countries 
should be allowed flexibility in the design of CFC rules that are consistent with their domestic 
policy frameworks. As a result, similar to the Action 3 discussion draft, Strengthening CFC 
rules, released in April 2015, the final report sets out a non-exhaustive list of approaches that 
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Action 4 – Limiting base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments 
The final report on Action 4, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other 
Financial Payments,398 recommends that countries implement a “fixed ratio” rule that would 
limit net interest deductions claimed by an entity (or a group of entities operating in the same 
country) to a fixed percentage of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA). The final report provides that this ratio should be somewhere between 10% and 30% 
of applicable EBITDA, levels that are described as having been designed to provide meaningful 
caps on net (not gross) interest expense, while still allowing most multinationals to deduct all 
their third-party interest. 
The final report further recommends that countries adopt a “group ratio” rule to supplement (but 
not replace) the fixed ratio rule, and to provide additional flexibility for highly-leveraged groups 
or industry sectors. Under the group ratio rule, for example, an entity with net interest expense 
above a country’s fixed ratio could deduct such interest expense up to the level of the net third-
party interest/ EBITDA ratio of the worldwide group to which it belongs. Countries could also 
apply an uplift of up to 10% to the group’s net third party interest expense to prevent double 
taxation. An alternative group ratio rule also could be considered such as an “equity escape” rule, 
which would allow interest expense so long as an entity’s debt-to-equity ratio does not exceed 
that of its worldwide group. 
Beyond this basic framework, the final report recommends that countries consider the following: 
(i) using an average of EBITDA for the current year and prior years, to minimize the impact of 
earnings volatility on interest deductions; (iii) providing for carryforward and/or carryback of 
                                                          
398 See OECD,  Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Action 4 - 2015 
Final Report, oct. 5, 2015, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/limiting-base-erosion-involving-interest-
deductions-and-other-financial-payments-action-4-2015-final-report-9789264241176-en.htm (last retrieved 
10/12/2015). 
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disallowed interest expense and/or unused interest capacity, within limits; (iv) providing for 
exclusions for interest paid to third party lenders on loans used to fund public-benefit 
(infrastructure) projects and for entities with net interest expense below de minimis thresholds; 
and (v) providing targeted rules that would close down any remaining BEPS opportunities. 
The final report indicates that limitations on interest deductions arising under hybrid mismatch 
arrangements as described in Action 2 should be applied before the interest limitations under 
Action 4, and the final report suggests that other limitations on interest expense, such as those 
arising under a country’s application of the arm’s-length principle or thin capitalization rules, 
also should be applied first. Moreover, interest disallowed under Action 4 should be subject to 
withholding tax. 
The final report reflects the choices made by the OECD, having considered the pros and cons of 
the various alternatives discussed in the discussion draft, BEPS Action 4: Interest Deductions 
and Other Financial Payments, released in December 2014. In particular, the final report 
elevates the fixed ratio rule above the group ratio rule. However, while the final report provides 
clear direction on the basic framework for limiting net interest expense deductions, a number of 
questions remain. Many of these relate to implementation of the group ratio rule. For example, 
the final report does not conclude on whether group EBITDA should include tax-advantaged 
income such as dividend income that is either exempt or sheltered from home country tax due to 
foreign tax credits, or how to accommodate groups that have members with losses rather than 
positive EBITDA. In addition, no concrete suggestions are provided for applying the limitations 
on net interest expense to banks and insurance companies, which the report indicates have 
specific features that must be taken into account. These remaining items are to be addressed in 
work to be completed in 2016. Beyond that, the final report leaves open the timetable for 
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adopting the new rules, but recommends that countries introducing the fixed ratio rule and group 
ratio rule should give taxpayers reasonable time to restructure existing financing arrangements, 
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Action 5 – Countering harmful tax practices 
The final report on Action 5, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into 
Account Transparency and Substance,399 covers two main areas, (i) defining a “substantial 
activity” criterion to be applied when determining whether tax regimes are harmful; and (ii) 
improving transparency. In doing so, it touches on a wide variety of topics, including substance 
requirements for intellectual property (IP) and other regimes, the determination of which IP 
regimes are allowable and which need to be phased out, what constitutes a harmful preferential 
regime, which ruling information is to be mandatorily exchanged and to whom, what qualifies as 
a “ruling” and best practices for cross-border rulings (process of granting rulings, terms, 
publication). 
In the first instance, the final report defines the substantial activity requirement in relation to IP 
regimes by presenting the “nexus approach” as the agreed approach. Under this approach, the 
application of an IP regime should be dependent on the level of research and development 
(R&D) activities carried out by the taxpayer itself. In addition, IP regimes should essentially be 
limited to patents (under a broad definition) and copyrighted software. Sixteen existing IP 
regimes were reviewed and found not to meet the nexus approach. No new entrants should be 
permitted to these regimes (or any other IP regime that does not meet the substantial activity 
requirement) after 30 June 2016 (or the effective date of a new regime consistent with the nexus 
approach if this is introduced before that date). The grandfather period may not be longer than 
five years after the date the regime is closed to new entrants. Enhanced transparency 
requirements will apply to new entrants into an IP regime after 6 February 2015 and the benefits 
                                                          
399 See OECD,  Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and 
Substance, Action 5- 2015 Final Report, oct. 5, 2015, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/countering-harmful-
tax-practices-more-effectively-taking-into-account-transparency-and-substance-action-5-2015-final-report-
9789264241190-en.htm (last retrieved 10/12/2015). 
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of an IP regime should not be granted in respect of IP acquired directly or indirectly from related 
parties after 1 January 2016 ( except in cases of acquisitions as a result of a domestic or 
international business restructuring). 
When applying the nexus approach to activities other than IP, there would also need to be a link 
between the income qualifying for benefits and the core activities necessary to earn the income. 
The final report lists types of core activities that are necessary to earn the income under different 
types of regimes focused on financial and other service activities, such as headquarters regimes, 
distribution and service centers, financing or leasing, fund management, banking and insurance 
and shipping. With respect to holding activities, the final report states that there may not in fact 
be much substance required but many of the concerns raised by holding regimes may be dealt 
with through existing factors that indicate a regime is harmful or through the recommendations 
under other aspects of the BEPS project (e.g., through the recommendations under Actions 2 and 
6). 
The second priority area is improving transparency through a framework for the compulsory 
spontaneous exchange of information on certain rulings. 
This framework will apply to taxpayer-specific rulings that are (i) rulings on preferential 
regimes, (ii) unilateral Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) or other cross border unilateral 
rulings in respect of transfer pricing, (iii) cross-border rulings providing for a downward 
adjustment of taxable profits (in particular excess profit and informal capital rulings), (iv) PE 
rulings or (v) related party conduit rulings. The framework may be expanded to other types of 
ruling in the future. The information exchange requirement would not relate to the ruling itself, 
but to certain information with respect to the ruling as contained in a template included in the 
final report. The framework also deals with questions such as time limits, legal basis, 
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confidentiality and the countries with which such information would have to be exchanged. 
Information exchange is to apply not only to future rulings, but also to rulings that were issued 
on or after 1 January 2010 and were still in effect as from 1 January 2014. An ongoing 
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Action 6 – Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances 
The final report on Action 6, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate 
Circumstances,400 which supersedes the interim version issued in September 2014, contains 
changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention and related changes to the Model Commentary to 
address the inappropriate granting of treaty benefits and other potential treaty abuse scenarios. 
The final report notes that a number of changes have been made to the report that was issued in 
September 2014 and that further work will be required with respect to certain provisions, 
including the limitation on benefits (LOB) rule. 
The final report is organized in three sections. Section A includes anti-abuse provisions that 
provide safeguards against the abuse of treaty provisions and offers flexibility in implementation. 
In this regard, the final report notes that countries have committed to a “minimum standard” to 
provide a minimum level of protection against treaty shopping. Under the minimum standard, 
countries would implement: (i) the combined approach of a principal purpose test (PPT) rule and 
LOB rule; (ii) a PPT rule alone; or, (iii) an LOB rule, supplemented by specific rules targeting 
conduit financing arrangements. In cases where a county decides to use a combination of the 
PPT and LOB rules, the final report includes a variation on the LOB rules referred to as the 
“simplified version,” details of which are outlined in the Model Commentary. In addition to the 
minimum standard, the final report includes targeted rules to be included in tax treaties that 
would address other forms of treaty abuse, including situations of dual resident entities, and rules 
that apply to permanent establishments situated in third states. 
                                                          
400 See OECD,  Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6- 2015 Final 
Report, oct. 5, 2015, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/preventing-the-granting-of-treaty-benefits-in-
inappropriate-circumstances-action-6-2015-final-report-9789264241695-en.htm (last retrieved 10/12/2015). 
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Section B of the final report contains revisions to the title and preamble of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention so that it is clear that the intention is to eliminate double taxation without creating 
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion and avoidance, including 
through treaty shopping arrangements. Section C identifies tax policy considerations relevant to 
the decision to enter into a tax treaty with another country, which would also be relevant in 
determining whether to modify (or ultimately terminate) a treaty if there has been a change in 
circumstances. 
Finally, as indicated above, the final report outlines further work that will be required under 
Action 6. In particular, the final report refers to the proposals by the United States to modify the 
LOB rule in the US Model Treaty. It is noted that the LOB rule, and Commentary related thereto, 
contained in the final report should be considered as draft and subject to change pending further 
review that will take into account the finalization of the proposed revisions to the LOB rule in 
the US Model Treaty. Final versions of the LOB rule and Commentary are expected to be 
completed in the first part of 2016. In addition, the final report specifies that further work is 
needed with respect to the treaty entitlement of non-collective investment vehicles (non-CIVs) 
and pension funds and indicates that such work would benefit from consultation with 
stakeholders. Further work would need to be completed in the first part of 2016 in order to be 
relevant for the negotiation of the multilateral instrument under Action 15, which is expected to 
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Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of PE status 
The final report on Action 7, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment 
Status,401 proposes changes to the PE definition in Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
to prevent the use of the following arrangements and strategies that are considered to enable a 
foreign enterprise to operate in another country without creating a PE: 
 Commissionaire arrangements and similar strategies 
 The use of specific preparatory or auxiliary activity exemptions, including the artificial 
fragmentation of so-called “cohesive” business activities into several smaller operations 
such that each part is able to benefit from the use of such specific activity exemptions 
The final report also proposes the use of the PPT rule that will be included in the OECD Model 
Tax Convention under Action 6 to deal with strategies involving the splitting-up of contracts 
between closely related enterprises in the context of construction contracts, and an alternative 
provision in the Commentary consisting of an automatic rule requiring the aggregation of time 
spent by closely related enterprises at the same building site or construction or installation 
project to calculate the 12 month threshold. 
The final report, compared to the revised discussion draft, BEPS Action 7: Preventing Artificial 
Avoidance of PE Status, issued in May 2015, contains no major changes in terms of the position 
taken by the OECD on the perceived BEPS abuses arising from the artificial avoidance of PE 
status. However, the final report reflects some refinements to the proposed amendments to 
Article 5(5) as well as Article 5(6). Currently, Article 5(5) requires a person (other than an 
independent agent) acting on behalf of a foreign enterprise to have the “authority to conclude 
                                                          
401 See OECD,  Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7 - 2015 Final Report, 
oct. 5, 2015, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/preventing-the-artificial-avoidance-of-permanent-
establishment-status-action-7-2015-final-report-9789264241220-en.htm (last retrieved 10/12/2015). 
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contracts in the name of the enterprise” in order to create a PE. The final Action 7 report would 
refer to persons (other than an independent agent) that habitually conclude contracts or 
“habitually play the principal role leading to the conclusion of contracts that are routinely 
concluded without material modification by the enterprise,” while the discussion draft referred to 
“persons that habitually concluded contracts or negotiated the material elements of contracts.” 
Changes also were made to the proposed wording to tighten the definition of independent agent 
in Article 5(6) by replacing the concept of “connected parties” with “closely related enterprises;” 
the final report now includes for this purpose cases where a person possesses directly or 
indirectly more than 50% of the beneficial interest in the other or, if a company, more than 50% 
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Actions 8-10 – Transfer pricing aspects 
The OECD has included its updated transfer pricing guidance in one report under Actions 8-
10,402 covering:  
 Amended guidance on applying the arm’s length principle (revisions to section D of 
chapter I of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines), notably providing guidance on the 
identification of the actual transaction undertaken, on what is meant by control of a risk, 
and on the circumstances in which the actual transaction undertaken may be disregarded 
for transfer pricing purposes 
 Guidance on comparability factors in transfer pricing, including location savings, 
assembled workforce, and MNE group synergies (additions to chapter I of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines). This guidance remains unchanged from the guidance issued 
as part of the 2014 report on transfer pricing for intangibles 
 New guidance on transfer pricing for commodity transactions (additions to chapter II of 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines) 
 A new version of chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines addressing 
intangibles, including new guidance on the return to funding activities and on hard-to-
value intangibles 
 New guidance on low-value adding intragroup services (revisions to chapter VII of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines) 
 An entirely new version of chapter VIII of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
covering cost contribution arrangements 
                                                          
402 See OECD,  Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10 - 2015 Final Report, oct. 5, 
2015, available http://www.oecd.org/tax/aligning-transfer-pricing-outcomes-with-value-creation-actions-8-10-
2015-final-reports-9789264241244-en.htm (last retrieved 10/12/2015). 
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In addition, the Actions 8-10 package describes additional work to be conducted by the OECD to 
produce new guidance on the application of the transactional profit split method. The aim is to 
produce a discussion draft in 2016 and final guidance during the first half of 2017. 
Intangibles 
The intangibles final report consists of a new version of chapter VI, which builds on the version 
issued in September 2014. The structure of the final report is the same, containing four sections 
providing guidance on: (i) identifying intangibles for transfer pricing purposes, including a 
definition of intangibles for transfer pricing purposes; (ii) identifying and characterizing 
transactions involving intangibles, including the determination which entity or entities should 
share in the costs and risks of intangible development and the economic returns from the 
intangibles; (iii) identifying types of transactions involving intangibles; and (iv) determining 
arm’s length conditions and pricing in cases involving intangibles, in particular addressing 
intangible valuation, and arm’s length conditions for hard-to-value intangibles. 
The key features of the final report, and key differences from earlier reports on intangibles, are: 
 Guidance on which entity or entities are entitled to share in the economic return from 
exploiting intangibles. The final report clarifies and confirms previous work, stating that 
mere legal ownership of an intangible does not confer any right to the return from its 
exploitation. Instead, the economic return from intangibles will accrue to the entities that 
perform the important value-creating functions of developing, enhancing, maintaining, 
protecting and exploiting the intangible, and that assume and manage the risk associated 
with those functions. 
 New guidance on determining the arm’s length return for providing funding for 
intangible development. Where the entity providing the funding exercises control over 
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the financial risk assumed, that entity is entitled to an expected rate of return 
commensurate with the risk (for example, based on the rate of return that might be 
achieved by investing in comparable alternative investments). Where the entity does not 
exercise control over the financial risk, it is entitled to (no more than) a risk-free return 
only. 
 Guidance on valuation methods. The final report confirms that database comparables are 
seldom appropriate for pricing intangible transactions, and provides guidance on the use 
of other valuation techniques that may be more applicable. 
 Guidance on hard-to-value intangibles. Where intangibles are transferred or licensed in 
development or where their value is highly uncertain, the tax administration is entitled to 
use the ex post evidence about financial outcomes to inform the determination of the 
arm’s length pricing arrangements, including any contingent pricing arrangements, that 
would have been made between independent enterprises at the time of the transaction. 
The taxpayer can prove the original pricing was based on reasonable forecasts taking into 
account all reasonably foreseeable eventualities. There are some similarities with the US 
“Commensurate with Income” standard. 
The guidance on intangibles is effectively final, although one small section within part D on the 
application of the transactional profit split method for pricing intangibles transactions is likely to 
be revised when the OECD completes its new guidance on this transfer pricing method. 
Cost contribution arrangements 
The section on cost contribution arrangements (CCAs) replaces existing chapter VIII of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in its entirety. The objective of the final report is to align the 
guidance on CCAs with the new guidance elsewhere in the final report on control of risk and on 
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intangibles transactions. The guidance contained in the final report is similar to the guidance in 
the discussion draft issued in April 2015, although some aspects have been refined in light of the 
OECD consultations with business representatives. 
The key points contained in the final report are: 
 CCAs are contractual arrangements among business enterprises for sharing contributions 
and risks associated with the joint development, production or obtaining of intangibles, 
tangible assets or services, in the expectation of mutual benefit from the pooling of 
resources and skills. 
 The expectation of mutual benefit is a pre-requisite for participating in a CCA. 
Participants must expect to benefit from the output of the CCA, for example by being 
able to exploit the rights acquired or services developed in their own businesses. 
 Control is a pre-requisite to be considered as a participant in a CCA. Participants must 
have the functional capacity to exercise control over the risks taken in the CCA. This 
means they must be capable of making the decision to take on the initial financial risk of 
participation in the CCA, and must have the ongoing decision-making capacity to decide 
on whether or how to respond to the risks associated with the CCA. 
 The value of the contributions made by CCA participants must be in proportion to their 
reasonably anticipated benefits from the CCA. Where contributions are not in proportion 
to reasonably anticipated benefits, true-up payments may be required. 
 The value of each participant’s contribution should be determined in line with the value 
that would be placed on it by independent enterprises in comparable circumstances. 
 While contributions should be measured based on value, the final report recognizes that it 
may be more practical for taxpayers to compensate current contributions at cost. 
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However, this approach may not be appropriate where the contribution of different 
participants differ in nature (for instance, where some participants contribute services and 
others provide intangibles or other assets). 
Hard to value intangibles 
The final report contains a specific transfer pricing approach with respect to hard-to-value 
intangibles (HTVI). The guidance finalizes an earlier discussion draft released 
June 2015. HTVI are defined as intangibles or rights in intangibles for which, at the time of their 
transfer between associated enterprises, (i) n reliable comparables exist; and (ii) at the time the 
transactions was entered into, the projections of future cash flows or income expected to be 
derived from the transferred intangible, or the assumptions used in valuing the intangible are 
highly uncertain, making it difficult to predict the level of ultimate success of the intangible at 
the time of the transfer. The approach is intended to ensure that tax administrations can 
determine in which situations the pricing arrangements with respect to a HTVI as set by the 
taxpayers are at arm’s length and are based on an appropriate weighting of the foreseeable 
developments or events that are relevant for the valuation of certain HTVI and in which 
situations this is not the case. Under this approach, ex post evidence provides presumptive 
evidence as to the existence of uncertainties at the time of the transaction, whether the taxpayer 
appropriately took into account reasonably foreseeable developments or events at the time of the 
transaction, and the reliability of the information used ex ante in determining the transfer price 
for the transfer of such intangibles or rights in intangibles. Such presumptive evidence may be 
subject to rebuttal if it can be demonstrated that it does not affect the accurate determination of 
the arm’s length price. Compared to the discussion draft, the final report provides more detailed 
exemptions and safe harbors when a transfer does not fall within the rules on HTVI. 
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Risk & Capital 
The final report also contains revisions to Section D of Chapter I of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines following the work under Action 9 (transferring risks or allocating excessive capital) 
and Action 10 (clarifying circumstances to re-characterize transactions). More specifically, the 
revisions include the following main guidance to consider in conducting a transfer pricing 
analysis: 
 The importance of accurately delineating the actual transactions between associated 
enterprises through analyzing the contractual relations between the parties together with 
evidence of the actual conduct of the parties. 
 Detailed guidance on analyzing risks as part of a functional analysis, including a six-step 
analytical framework. This framework considers the identification of the economically 
significant risks with specificity, the determination of contractual allocation of these risks 
and the functions relating to these risks. For transfer pricing purposes, the associated 
enterprise assuming a risk should control the risk and have the financial capacity to 
assume the risk. 
 A capital-rich MNE group member without any other relevant economic activities (a 
“cash box”) that provides funding, but cannot control financial risks in relation to the 
funding, will attain no more than a risk-free return, or less if the transaction is 
commercially irrational. 
 In exceptional circumstances of commercial irrationality, a tax administration may 
disregard the actual transaction. The main question is whether the actual transaction has 
the commercial rationality of arrangements that would be agreed between unrelated 
parties under comparable economic circumstances. 
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With respect to risk and re-characterization, the final report contains significant changes 
compared to the discussion draft in December 2014, including the inclusion of guidance on risk 
as an integral part of a functional analysis, the new six-step analytical framework to analyze risk, 
the inclusion of a materiality threshold by considering economically significant risks with 
specificity, the importance of financial capacity to assume risk, which was generally ignored in 
the discussion draft, and elimination of the moral hazard concept. 
Low value added services 
The guidance on low value adding services under Action 10 finalizes an earlier discussion draft 
released in November 2014. It takes the form of a rewrite of chapter VII of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines on services. The updated guidance has the stated aim of 
achieving a balance between appropriate charges for low value adding services and head office 
expenses and the need to protect the tax base of payor countries. 
Key features of the proposed guidance include: 
 A standard definition of low value-adding intra-group services as being supportive in 
nature, not being part of the MNE’s core business, not requiring or creating valuable 
intangibles and not involving significant risks. 
 A list of services that would typically meet the definition. In essence the services listed 
are back-office services. 
 An elective simplified approach to determine arm’s length charges for low value-adding 
services: 
• A process for determining the costs associated with low value adding services 
• Allowing general allocation keys 
• A simplified benefits test 
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• A standard 5% mark-up 
 Prescriptive guidance on documentation and reporting that should be prepared for the 
MNE to be able to apply the simplified approach. 
 The ability for tax administrations to include a threshold above which the simplified 
approach may be denied. Further work on the threshold will be performed as part of step 
two mentioned below. 
Implementation will take place in two steps. As step one, a large group of countries has agreed to 
endorse the elective simplified mechanism by 2018. The second step looks to provide comfort to 
other countries that the elective simplified mechanism will not lead to base-eroding payments. It 
will entail further work in relation to a potential threshold above which the elective simplified 
mechanism will not apply and other implementation issues. 
Finally, the revised guidance encourages tax administrations to limit any withholding taxes on 
low value-adding services to the profit element in the charge only. 
Profit split 
One of the objectives of Action 10 was to prepare transfer pricing rules or special measures to 
clarify the application of transfer pricing methods, in particular profit splits, in the context of 
global value chains. In order to determine for which matters additional clarification would be 
useful, the OECD released a discussion draft in December 2014. That discussion draft did not 
include revised guidance. The final report released in respect of Actions 8-10 includes a “scope 
of work for guidance on the transactional profit split method” which explains, among others, that 
the revised and improved guidance should: 
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 Clarify the circumstances in which transactional profit splits are the most appropriate 
method for a particular case and describe what approaches can be taken to split profits in 
a reliable way 
 Take into account changes to the transfer pricing guidance in pursuit of other BEPS 
actions and take into account the conclusions of the Report on Addressing the Tax 
Challenges of the Digital Economy, developed in relation to BEPS Action 1 
 Reflect further work being undertaken to develop approaches to transfer pricing in 
situations where the availability of comparables is limited, for example due to the specific 
features of a controlled transaction, and clarify how in such cases, the most appropriate 
method should be selected. 
This scope of work as included in the final report will form the basis for draft guidance to be 
developed by the OECD during 2016 and expected to be finalized in the first half of 2017. A 
discussion draft will be released for public comments and a public consultation will be held in 
May 2016. 
Commodities 
The new guidance on commodity transactions under Action 10 finalizes an earlier discussion 
draft released in December 201416 and includes additional paragraphs to be inserted 
immediately following paragraph 2.16 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The stated aim 
is an improved framework for the analysis of commodity transactions from a transfer pricing 
perspective which should lead to greater consistency in the way that tax administrations and 
taxpayers determine the arm’s length price for commodity transactions and should ensure that 
pricing reflects value creation. The key features of the released guidance on commodity 
transactions include: 
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 Clarification of the existing guidance on the application of the comparable uncontrolled 
price (CUP) method to commodity transactions and the use of publicly quoted prices to 
apply the CUP. 
 Recommendation that taxpayers document their price-setting policy for commodity 
transactions to assist tax authorities in conducting informed examinations. 
 Guidance regarding the adoption of a deemed pricing date for controlled commodity 
transactions in the absence of evidence of the actual pricing date agreed by the parties to 
the transactions. 
Compared to the discussion draft, the final guidance has minor changes, including a more 
specific list of the types of adjustments applicable when using a CUP method and clarification 
that the functions performed, assets used and risk assumed by other entities in the supply chain 
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Action 11 – Collecting and analyzing data on BEPS 
Action 11 is different from the other BEPS Actions because it is concerned with measuring 
BEPS activity rather than addressing it. Action 11 is intended to estimate the size of BEPS, 
identify indicators of BEPS, and provide recommendations for improving the measurement of 
BEPS. The final report on Action 11, Measuring and Monitoring BEPS,403 estimates that global 
corporate income tax revenue is reduced by 4% to 10% (i.e., US$100 billion to US$240 billion 
annually). 
The six indicators of BEPS identified in the final report are: (i) the concentration of foreign 
direct investment in low tax countries; (ii) the profit rates of MNE affiliates in low tax countries 
compared to those in high tax countries; (iii) the profit rates of MNE affiliates in low tax 
countries compared with the profit rate of their own global groups; (iv) the effective tax rates of 
MNEs compared to those of domestic-only enterprises; (v) the separation of intangible assets 
from the location of their production; and (vi) the concentration of debt in 
MNE affiliates located in higher-tax rate countries. 
The final report recommends greater cooperation between the OECD and taxing authorities in 
the collection and sharing of data. It also identifies several additional measures of BEPS that will 





                                                          
403 See OECD,  Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11 - 2015 Final Report, oct. 5, 2015, available 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/measuring-and-monitoring-beps-action-11-2015-final-report-9789264241343-en.htm 
(last retrieved 10/12/2015). 
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Action 12 – Disclosing aggressive tax planning arrangements 
The final report on Action 12, Mandatory Disclosure Rules,404 makes a series of 
recommendations about the design of mandatory disclosure regimes. The objectives of such a 
regime are to increase transparency through providing early information to tax authorities, deter 
the implementation of potentially aggressive schemes and early identification of promoters and 
taxpayers associated with abusive schemes which are considered to pose BEPS-related tax risks. 
Countries are free to choose whether or not to adopt a mandatory disclosure regime and the 
recommendations set out within the Action 12 final report do not constitute a minimum standard. 
Countries can elect whether to place the primary responsibility for disclosure either on the 
promoter or on both the promoter and the taxpayer. To the extent a promoter has the primary 
obligation to disclose a reportable scheme or transaction, the OECD suggests that the burden to 
disclose switches to the taxpayer in situations where the promoter is offshore, there is no 
promoter, or the promoter has legal privilege. A promoter should disclose a scheme at the time it 
is made available to the taxpayer; whereas if the onus for disclosure rests with the taxpayer, the 
taxpayer should disclose at the time of implementation of the scheme.405 
Hallmarks are used to test what types of arrangements should be disclosed, with the 
recommendation being that a mixture of generic (e.g., confidentiality, premium fee) and specific 
(to target specific transactions such as loss schemes or leasing transactions) hallmarks are used, 
although just one hallmark needs to be met to trigger a disclosure obligation. In order to reduce 
the burden of compliance, the final report recommends that certain thresholds are introduced 
                                                          
404 See OECD, Mandatory Disclosure Rules, Action 12 - 2015 Final Report, oct. 5, 2015, available 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/mandatory-disclosure-rules-action-12-2015-final-report-9789264241442-en.htm (last 
retrieved 10/12/2015). 
405 See Gary Hufbauer, et al. The OECD’s “Action Plan” to Raise Taxes on Multinational Corporations, Working 
Paper No. 15-14 (2015). 
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(i.e., a main benefit test and/or a de minimis filter). It should only be necessary to consider the 
hallmarks if such an initial threshold is exceeded.406 
The main amendments to the final report compared to the discussion draft issued in March 2015 
relate to how the mandatory disclosure regimes should be implemented in order to capture 
international tax schemes which have a material tax revenue risk in the reporting jurisdiction. 
The final report emphasizes that the hallmarks introduced in relation to such schemes should 
focus on BEPS-related risks in particular (as opposed to general tax planning risks as stated in 
the discussion draft). The OECD recommends that these schemes should require disclosure 
where the domestic taxpayer (or the taxpayer’s adviser) could reasonably have expected to have 
been aware of the cross-border outcome of an arrangement, and they should make reasonable 
inquiries at the time of entering into such arrangements to determine whether they include cross-











                                                          
406 See Philip Baker, The BEPS Project: Disclosure of Aggressive Tax Planning Schemes, 43.1 Intertax 85 (2015). 
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Action 13 – Guidance on transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting 
The final report on Action 13, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting,407 sets out a three-tiered standardized approach to transfer pricing documentation and 
country-by-country (“CbC”) reporting, in line with the report issued in September 2014. This 
standardized approach consists of: 
 A “master file” that provides tax administrations with high level information regarding a 
multinational enterprise’s (MNE’s) global business operations and transfer pricing 
policies 
 A specific “local file” that provides a local tax administration with information regarding 
material related party transactions, the amounts involved, and the company’s analysis of 
the transfer pricing determinations they have made with regard to those transactions 
 A CbC reporting template that requires large MNEs to report the amount of revenue 
(related and unrelated party), profits, income tax paid and taxes accrued, employees, 
stated capital and retained earnings, and tangible assets annually for each tax jurisdiction 
in which they do business. In addition, MNEs are required to identify each entity within 
the group doing business in a particular tax jurisdiction and to provide an indication of 
the business activities each entity conducts 
The master file and the local file are to be delivered directly to local tax administrations. CbC 
reports should be filed in the jurisdiction of tax residence of the ultimate parent entity and shared 
between jurisdictions through automatic exchange of information, pursuant to government to 
                                                          
407 See OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, 
oct. 5, 2015, available http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing-documentation-and-country-by-country-
reporting-action-13-2015-final-report-9789264241480-en.htm (last retrieved 10/12/2015). 
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government mechanisms under the multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance 
in Tax Matters, bilateral tax treaties or tax information exchange agreements. 
The new CbC reporting requirements are to be implemented for fiscal years beginning on or after 
1 January 2016 and apply to MNEs with annual consolidated group revenue equal to or 
exceeding €750 million. 
In order to facilitate the implementation of the new reporting standards, an implementation 
package has been developed consisting of model legislation, which could be used by countries to 
require MNE groups to file the CbC report and competent authority agreements that are to be 
used to facilitate implementation of the exchange of those reports among tax administrations. As 
a next step, it is intended that an XML Schema and a related User Guide will be developed by 
the end of 2015 with a view to accommodating the electronic exchange of CbC reports. 
The OECD states it is mandated that countries participating in the BEPS project carefully 
monitor the implementation of these new standards and reassess no later than the end of 2020 
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Action 14 – Making dispute resolution mechanisms more effective 
The final report on Action 14, Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective,408 
reflects the commitment of participating countries to implement substantial changes in their 
approach to dispute resolution. The final report contains measures aimed at strengthening the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the mutual agreement procedure (MAP) mechanism, such as 
specific actions to be taken by countries, suggested changes to legislation and administrative 
practices, and changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention and its Commentary. The main 
objectives of the measures are (i) to allow taxpayers access to the MAP process when the 
requirements for taxpayers to access the MAP process are met; (ii) to ensure that domestic 
administrative procedures don’t block access to the MAP process; and (iii) to ensure that 
countries implement Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention in good faith. 
A number of these measures constitute a minimum standard on treaty-based dispute resolution to 
which all OECD BEPS and G20 countries have agreed to adhere. Compliance with this standard 
will be subject to peer based monitoring that will be executed through the Forum on Tax 
Administration’s MAP Forum. The minimum standard is complemented with additional 
measures designated as best practices to which only some of the OECD BEPS and G20 countries 
were willing to commit. Finally, the report lists 20 countries that have agreed to implement 
mandatory binding MAP arbitration in their bilateral tax treaties. According to the OECD, the 
countries that have made that commitment were involved in more than 90% of the outstanding 
MAP cases at the end of 2013. 
 
                                                          
408 See OECD, Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, Action 14- 2015 Final Report, oct. 5, 2015, 
available http://www.oecd.org/tax/making-dispute-resolution-mechanisms-more-effective-action-14-2015-final-
report-9789264241633-en.htm (last retrieved 10/12/2015). 
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Action 15 – Developing a multilateral instrument to modify bilateral tax treaties 
Action 15 explores the technical feasibility of a multilateral instrument to implement the treaty 
related measures developed during the course of the BEPS project and to amend bilateral tax 
treaties. The final report on Action 15, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral 
Tax Treaties,409 provides an overview of the current status of this multilateral instrument and 
mainly reproduces the report issued in September 2014 (the 2014 report). 
Drawing on the expertise of public international law and tax experts, the report explores the 
technical feasibility and desirability of a multilateral instrument and its consequences on the 
current tax system. This report considered that such an instrument is desirable as it would 
achieve swift and consistent implementation of the measures developed during the course of 
BEPS by avoiding the need to individually renegotiate existing bilateral tax treaties. The report 
also identifies several obstacles to a multilateral instrument from a technical (public international 
law and international tax law) and political perspective. Drawing from numerous examples of 
multilateral treaties in areas other than tax, it describes that these obstacles can nevertheless be 
overcome, thereby concluding that a multilateral instrument also appears feasible. The report 
suggests that the scope of such a multilateral instrument should initially only include the treaty 
based measures of the BEPS project once finalized (e.g., multilateral mutual agreement 
procedure, provisions on dual residence structures, hybrid mismatch arrangements, triangular 
cases involving PEs in third states and treaty abuse). 
                                                          
409 See OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties, Action 15- 2015 Final Report, 
oct. 5, 2015, available http://www.oecd.org/tax/developing-a-multilateral-instrument-to-modify-bilateral-tax-
treaties-action-15-2015-final-report-9789264241688-en.htm (last retrieved 10/12/2015). 
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Based on the analysis in the 2014 report, a mandate for the formation of an ad hoc Group to 
develop the multilateral instrument was approved by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs and 
endorsed by the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in February 
2015. This Mandate also was reproduced in the final report on Action 15.410 The Group is open 
to all interested countries, including non-OECD or G20 members, with all participating on an 
equal basis. The Group began its work in May 2015 with the aim to finalize the multilateral 
instrument and to open it for signature by 31 December 2016. To date, approximately 90 
countries are participating. Participation in the development of the multilateral instrument is 
voluntary and does not require any commitments to sign such instrument, once it has been 
finalized. 
These final reports represent the culmination of work on the BEPS project. These reports include 
recommendations for significant changes in key elements of the international tax architecture. 
Such changes are reflected in revisions to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the OECD 
Model Tax Convention and in recommended domestic law provisions. Participating in the 
discussions that led to these consensus recommendations were all OECD and G20 countries and 
about a dozen developing countries. 
With the release of the OECD final reports, attention turned to countries to determine whether, 
when and how to implement the various recommendations. Countries had already begun taking 
action in anticipation of the OECD recommendations, and there has been significant BEPS-
driven legislative and tax administration activity around the world since the OECD issued its 
Action Plan on BEPS in July 2013. Moreover, the G20 Finance Ministers have asked the OECD 
to develop an inclusive framework for monitoring the implementation by countries of the BEPS 
                                                          
410 Id. 
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recommendations. That framework is to be developed by early 2016. At the same time, the 
OECD will be completing follow-on technical work related to several of the BEPS focus areas, 
including interest limitations under Action 4, treaty abuse under Action 6, permanent 
establishment under Action 7 and transfer pricing under Actions 8-10. Companies are to evaluate 
the implications of the recommendations contained in the final reports for their business models 
and operating structures. Companies also need to closely monitor legislative and tax 
administrative developments in the countries where they operate or are considering investing. 
The release of the final reports ushered in a time for companies to prepare for significant 
potential changes in the international tax environment. 
 
In conclusion, the BEPS Project has moved very fast, and generated enormous interest and 
comments from both the public and private sectors. The Project has shown a quasi universal 
agreement that there is a need for a fundamental review of the international tax system. The 
ambitious timetable assigned to each of the Action Items was a testimony to the urgency of the 
matter. The urgency is further developed by the worldwide media attention of the perceived tax 
inequities and the need to provide tax authorities broad enough rules that they could use as they 
see fit to combat international tax problems causing base erosion and profits shifting. The BEPS 
has come to terms with the need for global solutions to the international tax problems. Many of 
the solutions offered mirror the formulary apportionment method and satisfy many tenets of a 
unitary taxation even though the authors of such measures publicly deny that very fact.411 Ideas 
of combined reporting, the multilateral global treaty model or the coordination with all interested 
parties are in conformity with the requirements of a unitary taxation system. It's clear that several 
                                                          
411 See Durst Michael, Beyond BEPS: A Tax Policy Agenda for Developing Countries, (2014). 
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OECD stakeholders want the broadest rules possible to use against taxpayers; however, this 
means companies will be walking on egg shells with more subjective rules and uncertainty. The 
likely increase in taxpayer disputes then gets thrown back into an already stretched competent 
authority network. In the absent a proactive approach and a revamp of the system, solutions and 
recommendations offered by the BEPS project are mostly bound for failure, and in the process, 
will generate unnecessary and overwhelming complexity. The need for a new order, based on UT 
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As seen above, there is not much disagreement on the fact the current international tax system is 
broken. The issue however, is the deep disagreement on how to solve it, how to move forward.  
The idea of a UT at an international level has been floated around but has not attracted much of a 
thorough research and comprehensive work as to its viability and merits or lack thereof. In many 
cases, opponents of a global UT have rushed to show how it lacking without measuring from the 
standpoint of the current ALS system.412 In this research, we believe that UT has to be 
understood and appreciate in comparison with the current ALS system. We agree that UT is not a 
perfect system and does not provide a flawless solution to each and all the problems faced in 
international taxation. UT, we acknowledge, is not perfect. Nevertheless, it is our belief that a 
better understanding of the principles around UT would lead any reasonable observer to the 
conclusion that UT is a far much better system than the current ALS system. Like every rose, the 
UT has its thorns, but no reasonable person should deny the fact that it remains a rose; at least 
when compared to current failed system. The goal for this research is not to argue that the UT is 
a perfect system; one would never find a perfect system. The goal instead, is to revisit and 
explain what a UT is, provide a better comprehension about its tenets and its functioning, and 
then opine that in all respects, the UT is a better system that the ALS. We believe that an 
explanation of what a UT is, and an understanding of its functioning would lead a reasonable 
reader and observer to conclude that UT is dramatically better than the current ALS. This second 
part of the research starts with an analysis of what a UT really is, what it entails and how it 
functions. Then, we will refute the ordinary arguments that are casually levelled against adoption 
of a UT. Also, we will advocate and outline the major areas in which we believe UT is better 
than the current ALS. And finally, we will mock a reform proposal based on UT principles. 
                                                          
412 For a thorough recent overview of the problems of UT&FA see David Spencer, Formulary Apportionment is Not 
a Panacea, Journal of Int’l Taxation 35 (May, 2014). 
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Any idea of a UT comprises and must comprise at least three main tenets: a unitary business 
combined reporting, and formulary apportionment. We will look at each in turn. 
 
A. The Unitary Business 
To have a UT, there is a need for a unitary business. Whether a unitary business exists depends, 
as it should, on economic realities. It is therefore important to examine what a unitary business 
is. This notion is so important that success of any UT will depend on a careful construction and 
delicate definition of the notion of a unitary business. In the United States for example, the 
Supreme Court stated in the Mobil case that “the linchpin of apportionability… is the unitary 
business principle”,413 and there is rather extensive case law in the U.S. regarding the definition 
of the unitary business as it applies to state taxation within the federation.414 On a cross border 
level however, it is important to conduct an in-depth analysis and examine what definition would 
be more appropriate. The appropriateness or not of an approach to a unitary system would 
depend on its impact on the international arena. Questions to be answered include whether the 
notion should be construed narrowly, or rather widely. What would a narrow or wide 
construction of the notion of unitary business mean to the international tax system? What would 
it mean to multinational companies? What would it mean to tax authorities and developing 
countries tax authorities in particular? What would be its impact on attempts to promote a wide 
adoption of the unitary tax system across the globe? Do we need a de minimis provision? 
 
                                                          
413 See 445 U.S. at 437.   
414 The cases decided during the Court's 1980 and 1982 sessions are Mobil Oil Corp. v Comm of Taxes, 14145 US. 
425, 10.0 S. Ct. '1223 (1980); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Rev, 14147 U.S. 207, 100 S. Ct. 2109 (1980); F. W. 
Woolworth Co. v. Tax’n and Rev Dept. of the State of New Mexico, _U.S., 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982); and ASARCO Inc. 
v. Idaho State Tax Comm. _U.S., 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982). See also Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board 
(U.S. No. 81-523, Oct. 1982).   
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On a very superficial perspective, businesses would be considered unitary if activities of one in 
one country are “inseparable” with activities of the other in another country.415 There are 
currently two approaches to the notion of unitary business. On the one hand a three-prong test, 
and on the other hand, the so-called alternative approach. 
The three-prong test aims at combining at least two factors out of three in order to declare a 
business unitary. First, there is a need for “common ownership”.416 Under this test, businesses 
have to be owned by the same person. This includes both vertical ownership as well as brother 
sister corporations’ situations. This element can be approached from a wholly legalistic point of 
view. For instance, one could define the ownership to be certain percentage of stock holding in 
the corporation. Under this view, any corporation owning for example 50% of another would 
form a unitary business with that corporation. Such legal ownership could be reduced or 
increased to some other percentage that could be judged appropriate in view of the circumstances 
and legal realities and concerns. Likewise, ownership can be approached from a wholly 
economic point of view. This approach therefore could give less weight to the legal ownership 
percentage of stock, but rather the substance of the economic relationship between the entities.417 
                                                          
415 See Keesling and Warren; McLure, Jr., Defining a Unitary Business: An Economist's View, in THE STATE 
CORPORATION INCOME TAX: ISSUES IN WORLDWIDE UNITARY COMBINATION 89-112 (C. McLure, Jr. ed. 1984). 
Also,  In Floyd, The ‘Unitary’ Business in State Taxation: Confusion at the Supreme Court?, 82 B.Y.U.L.REV. 465 
(1982), the author distinguished three relevant applications of the unitary business principle. In the first type of 
case, the issue is ‘whether various business activities of a taxpayer corporation constitute a single, interrelated 
business—i.e., a unitary business—or two (or more) separate, discrete unitary businesses.’ Floyd, supra, at 469. In 
the second type of case, the issue is ‘whether a group of affiliated corporations form a part of a single, unitary 
business and thus can be ‘combined’ . . . so that the net income can be determined . . . as if the unitary business 
were conducted by a single corporation.' Id. at 470. In addition, ‘[b]ecause the combined report situation pierces 
the corporate veil and treats two legally separate entities as one, . . . the court [must] consider both the degree of 
ownership and management control and the functional integration of the activities of the various affiliated 
corporations.’ Id. In the third type of case, the issue is ‘whether a particular item of income (or deduction) is 
unitary business income, or is income generated by an investment or activity which lies outside the unitary 
business.’ Id. Practically every major case on the unitary business concept can be seen to reflect one of the above 
categorizations.   
416 See Taxation of the Multistate Business: The Ownership Requirement of the Unitary Concept, 14 CALIF.W.L.REV. 
92 (1978) (challenging application of test to unitary business determination).   
417  See for example, 293 U.S. 465 developing the Substance over form doctrine in the court’s reasoning.   
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Under this first element, there need to be an agreeable construction of ownership able to trigger 
unitary business qualification. There is a need for common ownership, but maybe most 
importantly, common control, whether the control is arrived at through legal ownership 
percentage or economic substance of the relationship.418 Our position is that the common 
ownership prong be measured using all available tools. As a consequence, it is our position that 
legal ownership at a set percentage should constitute unitary business. However, any such rule 
should be accompanied by the possibility of including within a unitary business, entities that may 
not have legal required ownership but for which the economic ownership is determinable. A 
legal threshold along with an economic reevaluation is a workable standard for establishing a 
unitary business. 
The second element under the three-prong test is the need for a unity of operation.419 Under this 
element, the operations of the different business, though in separate geographical areas, must be 
very related and dependent. Here, the other business would not be able to operate for itself but 
for the constant interaction with other businesses. All the business must have very close and 
dependent operations, and the business of one should be reasonably tied to the other or others. 
Under this element, the frequency of interaction between the businesses could be helpful. Factors 
as to whether the costs are shared within the business entities are also helpful. Unity of operation 
as evidenced by central purchasing, advertising, accounting and management divisions. As 
indicated by Olivia Klein, the regularity of transactions between the entities as well as their 
constant use of transfer pricing and the potential for transfer pricing rules manipulation are 
                                                          
418 See for example, Container Corp of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 103 S.CT 2933 (1983).   
419 See Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 10 Cal.App.3d 496, 502-04, 95 Cal.Rptr. 805, 808-09, cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 961 (1970); see also Hellerstein (discussing restrictive and broad interpretations of unitary 
business tests).   
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helpful indicators. This element emphasizes the unity of operation and indicates that if the 
operations tie the entities together, then such entities may eligible for unitary business treatment.  
The last element of this test is the unity of use prong, centralized executive force and general 
system of operation.420 This element emphasizes the use in the business, whether the entities 
commingle assets, whether assets used by one business are put in use by the other. The unity of 
use focuses on the use element and factors such as the industry in which the entities operate and 
the specificities of their use and practices are helpful. 
The three-prong test is an analysis of element by element in determining whether a business is 
unitary. It should be noted that most actors agree that at least two of the element should be met in 
order to qualify as a unitary business. In the United States, the reading of the Supreme Court 
cases suggests that the common ownership element should always be met, combined with either 
the unity of operation or unity of use element. 
Aside from the three-prong test, there has been developed a more generalized approach called 
the “dependency test”.421 The inquiry under this approach is as to whether the business 
operations of an entity in a jurisdiction contribute or depend in any way on the business 
operations outside that jurisdiction. The inquiry here is focused on the contribution and 
dependency between activities of various affiliated businesses, or parts thereof. Areas of inquiry 
include: whether the there is a centralized decision making authority; is there outside control; 
whether risks are shared. This test looks at a unitary business as a functional integration, 
centralization of management, and economies of scale marked by a flow of value among the 
affiliated entities. Here, the term “unitary business” means that the taxpayer to which it is applied 
                                                          
420 See Rudy, The California Unitary Tax Concept as Applied to Worldwide Activities of Foreign Corporations: A 
Modern Commerce Clause Analysis, 15 U.S.F.L.REV. 371, 375 (1981).   
421 See Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal.2d 472, 475, 183 P.2d 16, 21 (1947).   
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is carrying on a business, the component parts of which are too closely connected and necessary 
to each other to justify division or separate consideration as independent units.422 
This is the very first step is designing a unitary tax system and this step is very important because 
the credibility, promotion, and enforceability of such a unitary system would also depend on a 
careful construction of what constitute a unitary business. This task goes beyond the mere need 
to provide a definition but lies in the heart of whether there could be a widely adoptable unitary 
tax system. Further, the definition whether large or narrow, could determine whether a unitary 
tax system is successful. This part of the research will require in depth analysis and a construct of 
an approach to the notion of unitary business, an approach that will be consistent with our overall 
goal of designing a system fair to multinational companies and fair to all tax administrations and 
those in developing countries specifically. Our analysis will also strive to come as close as 
possible to the economic reality of business transactions reducing the potential for 
gamesmanship by multinational companies, specifically.  
Once a Unitary business is established, the next step is to require a combined income report for 









                                                          
422 See John I. Haas, Inc. v. Comm'n, 227 Or. 170, 361 P2d 820, 822 (1961).   
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B. Combined Reporting 
UT requires that items of income be reported on a combined basis. Under combined reporting, 
the separate accounting would be mitigated as the global entity would be required to account for 
their operations and items of income globally. One of the preliminary issues to arbitrate here is 
whether the combine reporting is a combine reporting of income, or a combine reporting of net 
income.423 This as much an accountings issue that it is a tax law issue. There are two major 
accounting procedures in the world: the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP),424 
and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).425 An adequate application of 
combined reporting would be more enhanced if either one of these accounting systems is applied 
uniformly and globally, or if both systems are abandoned for the benefit of a new system that 
could enjoy global consensus. 
A requirement of a combined reporting of gross income would carry specific mechanical 
specification and would lead to burdensome consequences. Under a global combined reporting 
of gross income, the unitary business as a whole, would report all of its revenues. At a local 
level, members of the unitary business would not take deductions, would not account for 
expenses. The unitary business will in fact report the equivalent of its global revenues under a 
combined reporting of gross income system. Under this system, expenses and deductions will be 
taken into account at the global level, at the level of the global unitary business. This approach 
will render the system cumbersome and might not be practical. The first issue under this 
approach is the tax base problem that is a very country specific item. A combined reporting of 
gross income would require a harmonization of accounting standards. All countries will need 
                                                          
423 Manzon Gil and George Plesko, Relation between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of Income, 55 Tax L. 
Rev. 175 (2001). 
424 Pacter Paul, Convergence of IFRS and US GAAP, 73.3 The CPA Journal 67 (2003). 
425 Id. 
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similar accounting mechanisms in getting to their tax base. The other issue with a combined 
reporting of gross income is the ineffectiveness of various country specific incentives and 
economic booster measures. Under the combined reporting of gross income, deductions are not 
allowed at the local level, making all country specific incentives inoperative. The combined 
reporting of gross income is therefore not desirable as it would engender dysfunction and 
confusion in various respects including the definition of the tax bases, as well as operation of 
country specific economic booster measures. 
A requirement of a combined reporting of net income, on the other hand, will have its 
operational mechanisms and would yield to more desirable consequences. First, global combined 
reporting of net income would require that each local country member of the unitary business 
takes into account its expenses and deductions locally. This will allow for application of each 
local country accounting principles and a respect of each countries definition and understanding 
of the notion of tax base. Each member of the unitary business will calculate, locally the amount 
of its net income by taking into account local deductions and other deductible expenses, and 
other costs that the local country allows as an offset to gross income and in arriving at taxable 
income. Second, a global combined reporting of net income would allow for local measures of 
economic enticement to be effective. For example, under the global reporting of net income, 
many measures of tax incentives, applicable in various developing countries, would still be 
effective in achieving the desired encouragement to economic growth. Local members of a 
unitary business would be able to take the various incentives into account in arriving at their net 
income that is then communicated the global unitary business. Further, the global combined 
reporting of net income offers various advantages as regards to simplicity and efficiency. Once 
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the global unitary business reports its global net income, the application of apportionment 
formula would be more appropriate.  
It is also important, as a preliminary matter, to distinguish the combined reporting with the 
consolidated return. The consolidated return is a notion that exists in most if not all tax 
legislations.426 Under the consolidated return, the rules usually pertain to ownership of the 
corporate entity. As a matter of fact, most tax legislations require consolidated returns to be filed 
when stockholding in a corporate entity reaches a certain percentage point, usually eighty percent 
ownership.427 As a consequence, consolidated returns are not based on the business activities of 
the consolidated corporate entities. In fact a parent company could conduct business in truck 
manufacturing and file consolidated returns with its wholly owned subsidiary conducting 
business in a totally unrelated business enterprise. On the other hand however, combined 
reporting is required when there is a unitary business, and unitary business will usually exist 
when several corporate entities conduct a common business enterprise.428 The careful 
construction of the notion of unitary business, as discussed above, would take these 
considerations into account. In addition, consolidated return would usually require a higher 
percentage ownership, while a unitary business hence the combined reporting could exist with a 
more relaxed percentage ownership.429 
The philosophy behind combined reporting is the belief, legitimately so, that the income earned 
by a related group of corporations engaged in a common enterprise is, in fact, the income of the 
enterprise as a whole and not that of the various members of the group that have sometimes been 
                                                          
426 See for example, IRC Section 1504. 
427 Id. For the 80% ownership requirement. 
428 For example, Coca Cola International, dealing in the beverages industry. 
429  For example, a 50% ownership for combined reporting (and 80% ownership for consolidation). 
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established solely for intergroup reasons.430 Combined reporting therefore reinforces the basic 
tenet of unitary taxation: approaching multiple but connected entities as a single enterprise and 
single entity for tax purposes. In the case of multinational companies, combined reporting 
effectively treats the parent and most or all of its subsidiaries as a single corporation for a 
country’s income tax purposes. There is a requirement that the profits of the parent and most or 
all of the subsidiaries be added together in the calculation of the corporation’s profit in a 
particular country. The country then taxes a share of the combined profit using an apportionment 
formula. As indicated by Michael Mazerov, combined reporting thus unitary tax is a powerful 
tool for fighting tax evasion and other tax avoidance schemes.431 
Practically, combined reporting would be heavily oriented on companies accounting 
departments. Large companies would be required to provide the overall income of their entire 
group that meets the criteria of the unitary business. Some have argued that combined reporting 
would add compliance cost to large companies. However, this argument is not based on 
economic reality of accounting practices of multinational companies. In fact, multinational 
companies possess data for all their operations worldwide; they know the performance of each of 
their permanent establishment or subsidiaries on a regular basis.432 Combined reporting would 
provide such an antidote to various scheme of tax evasion and would allow adequate taxation by 
developing countries. The reporting would provide all countries in which the unitary business 
exists with the necessary information in order for it to apply its taxes, if any. This is specifically 
advantageous for developing countries because unlike the Arm’s Length Standard which 
compels them to use the resources they do not have to obtain information the accuracy of which 
                                                          
430 Michael J. McIntyre, The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation States, Tax Notes International (2006). 
431 Michael Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelpters and the Need for Combined Reporting, Center on budget and 
Policy Priorities (2007). 
432 Quarterly or annual reporting is rather common in practice for multinational companies. 
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they are not sure, combined reporting would shift the obligation to multinational companies in 
order for them to report their global income (and preferably net income) that would be separately 
and non-cumulatively subject to tax in their different locations. Even though this sounds like an 
added compliance burden upon MNEs, in practice we notice that most MNEs already have this 
information. One could think that the UT would require further efforts from MNEs to find, 
compile and provide the combined reporting, but this is not accurate as most MNEs already 
house this information and regularly compile items of income on their global operations. 
Combined reporting is arguably not an added transaction and compliance cost to MNEs, it is 
therefore just a matter of compelling MNEs to turn in the information they already have, and 
have grown accustomed to compiling on their global operations. As indicated above, combined 
reporting of net income would safeguard the countries’ ability to provide incentives, tax 
incentives, and would not result in an unreasonable added compliance cost for MNEs. Combined 
reporting provides a necessary look at the group’s overall performance, after taking into account 
the country specific requirements for taxability of income, and the overall look for a reasonable 
economic basis for application of a formula. 
Combined reporting will help treat MNEs as a single business entity. Such multinational 
companies would be under the obligation, to the extent they qualify as unitary business, to 
provide tax authorities with a combined report of their global income. At this point, the tax 
authority is left with a simple but very consequential task of applying an adequate formula to 
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C.  Formulary Taxation 
Throughout the history of the current international tax regime, complaints about tax avoidance 
have mostly stem from the fact that foreign corporations are able to manipulate the rules of 
transfer pricing based on a legal fiction of separate entities to shift income from high tax 
jurisdictions to low or no tax jurisdictions. Tax authorities across the globe have constantly tried 
to design ways to avoid or at least diminish foreign corporations’ ability to manipulate the rules. 
But recent developments have shown that governments have mostly failed in their efforts to 
adequately tax income earned within their borders. The primary cause of this failure is the 
government’s inability to design effective and proactive methods of taxing income of foreign 
corporations earned in their jurisdictions. The ease with which foreign corporations use transfer 
pricing rules to pay taxes, if at all, in the jurisdiction of their choosing is perplexing.433 This 
situation which causes much concern to developed countries is a real threat to developing 
countries which rely heavily on corporate income tax to finance their operations because much 
too often, income earned in such countries ends up in tax heavens. It is hard to imagine how the 
income tax can survive as an effective revenue raising device for countries in general and 
developing countries in particular unless they design an effective method of taxing income of 
MNEs specifically. Such system is urgently needed to save the income tax as a whole because 
the perception that foreign companies do not pay tax could (and probably already does) affect 
domestic companies’ voluntary tax compliance; after all, it would be politically difficult to 
sustain a harsher tax regime for domestic corporations. Worse, most domestic companies could 
pursue merging with international affiliates to rip tax benefits. 
                                                          
433 Julie Roin,Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 Geo. L.J. 543, 560 
(2001). 
   224 
  
 
UT, through formulary apportionment, emerges as the solid alternative to the current system, and 
a response to the current problems of the international tax regime. This system relies heavily on a 
formula to reconcile economic realities. In fact, much of the debate and writing about unitary 
taxation has been around formulary apportionment.434 Proponents of the unitary tax system have 
advanced the idea of formulary apportionment as a curb to income shifting while opponents of 
the system have raised legal and economic downfalls of formulary methods.435 Impossibility, in 
their view, to find a formula that countries around the world could adopt remains the main 
concern of opponents of the Unitary Tax system. The major task at the heart of each analysis of a 
UT is therefore to design a formula that could be acceptable to tax authorities across the globe. 
Such formula design work, in order to be attractive, should keep in mind the necessity to design 
an effective yet simple enough formula as to assure that it would not require undue 
administration cost to tax authorities. The goal shall be to design a formula that would contribute 
to realign international tax rules with global economic reality of MNEs specifically. The formula 
would be a mathematical combination based on “real economics” of operations, a method that 
would apply to the combined reporting to basically render the separate entities Arm’s Length 
Standard irrelevant. As a matter of fact, income will be reported globally through the combined 
                                                          
434 A detailed proposal recently was issued under the auspices of The Hamilton Project, sponsored by the 
Brookings Institution. Kimberly A. Clausing & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global 
Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment (Brookings Inst. 2007), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/06corporatetaxes_ clausing.aspx. But similar suggestions have been 
made in the past. See, e.g., Joann Martens-Weiner, Company Tax Reform in the European Union: Guidance from 
the United States and Canada on Implementing FormularyApportionment in the EU 9 (2006); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 Va. Tax Rev. 89, 159 
(1995); R.M. Bird & D.J.S. Brean, The Interjurisdictional Allocation of Income and the Unitary Taxation Debate, 34 
Can. Tax J. 1377, 1412 (1986); Marcel Gerard, Reforming the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe, 
A Tentative Appraisal (CESifo Working Paper No. 1795, 2006), available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract=935009; 
Walter Hellerstein & Charles E. McLure, Jr., The European Commission's Report on Company Income Taxation: 
What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States, 11 Int'l Tax & Pub. Fin. 199, 218 (2004); Paul R. 
McDaniel, Formulary Taxation in the North American Free Trade Zone, 49 Tax L. Rev. 691, 738 (1994). 
435 Steven J. Gombinski, The Cure that Failed: The Fatal Flaw With Remedial Unitary Combination, Journal of 
Multistate Taxation and Incentives (1993). 
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reporting system by the unitary global business, and each country will blindly apply its adopted 
formula to such income to assess a fraction of the global income that is taxable in its jurisdiction 
because representing the economic reality of the income earned in that jurisdiction. While the 
definition of the unitary business and the combined reporting are important aspects of the 
Unitary Tax system, designing a formula is the most daunting and consequential aspect in the 
advocacy for such a system.436 Finding a formula that is acceptable to developing as well as 
developed countries, not to mention multinational companies sounds very difficult, and some 
would argue improbable on its face.437 Most writing in the area has stonewalled at this 
conclusion. This explains the current lack of a complete Unitary Tax system proposed as an 
alternative for the current system. There is a need to fill that gap. Design of formula remains 
deeply an endeavor of economists. We will discuss several formula proposals that exist as well 
as the formulas currently applied by US States. In the presentation of a sample reform proposal, 
we will present a tentative formula that we would have concluded is a viable solution under this 
research. However, this research does not supplement the need for economists to develop a 
complete formula, credible enough to cause global buy-in, and complete enough to serve as the 
foundation of a complete unitary system capable of replacing the current international tax 
system. Although such formula proposal would not constitute an insurance policy for universal 
acceptability, it should result from serious research in the area and offer arguments for as much 
able to cause consensus as possible. It is also important to note at this point that economists 
should be guided in the design of this formula by the need to optimize the revenue raising 
                                                          
436 The Clausing and Avi-Yonah project is, technically speaking, a proposal for the reform of the U.S. rules for the 
taxation of international income, but its authors clearly believe that if the U.S. adopted their proposal, other 
countries would soon follow suit. Clausing and Avi-Yonah, note 7, at 21 (arguing that U.S. unilateral adoption of a 
formulary apportionment system would be a powerful incentive for other countries to adopt it). 
437 Julie Roin, Can Income from Capital Be Taxed? An International Perspective, in Taxing Capital Income, 233-34 
(Henry J. Aaron, Leonard E. Burman & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2007); see text accompanying notes 202-05. 
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capacities in the developing world specifically. The guiding philosophy should therefore be to 
structure a formula that is most suited to developing countries while not alienating developed 
countries and MNEs. While all countries are suffering from the current manipulation of transfer 
pricing rules and would benefit from a well-crafted alternative, it is clear that developing 
countries with limited resources yet deep reliance on income taxes have the most to lose under 
the current system and their survival and ability to meet their most basic responsibilities to their 
people depend on such well-crafted alternative to the current system. It is rarely disputed, as seen 
above, that a potential unitary tax system would provide much needed simplicity in the 
international tax arena.  
Unlike the current system where compliance with the rules of international tax is just as 
expensive if not more as paying the tax itself, unitary tax would basically eliminate undue 
compliance costs to MNEs and administrative burden to tax authorities. The rules would be 
simpler and their application easier. Many acknowledge that a unitary tax system would provide 
much needed revenues for developing and developed countries.438 The complaint however, is 
that MNEs would have to pay more taxes. I intend to show in this research that this is not 
necessarily true. The simplification that would accompany a unitary tax system would exempt 
multinational companies from paying tremendous amounts of compliance costs. Rerouting such 
payments to actual tax payment could in fact lead to MNEs reporting less overall tax and tax 
related expenses. 
The idea of a unitary tax system and formulary approach is not entirely new. As indicated above, 
writing and proposals exist in the area, however, there is not proposal embodying a detailed and 
complete system to totally replace the current international tax regime. Further, there is no major 
                                                          
438 See Avi-Yonah Reuven, Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1301 
(1995). 
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research as to how a switch to unitary system would affect developing countries and what 
formula design would be more appropriate to them. 
There are currently two separate institutional reform proposals for formulary taxation. One 
published under the auspices of the Brookings Institution’s Hamilton Project and aiming at 
reforming U.S. international tax rules and drawing inspiration from the U.S. states’ experience 
with formulary apportionment.439 The second, coming from the E.U. is part of the works in the 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).440 Both proposals suggest a departure 
from the current and failed Arm’s Length Standard and adoption of the formulary approach. It is 
therefore important to draw from the experience of the unitary taxation and formulary approach 
in the U.S.441 for example in designing a formula with developing countries in mind. Any design 
of a formula would have to come from an in-depth analysis of the use of formula by the states in 
the U.S. The experience of the U.S. states however is not a symbol of uniformity. Each state has 
historically used its constitutional power to design a formula that best represented its interests.442 
                                                          
439 A detailed proposal recently was issued under the auspices of The Hamilton Project, sponsored by the 
Brookings Institution. Kimberly A. Clausing & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global 
Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment (Brookings Inst. 2007), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/06corporatetaxes_ clausing.aspx. But similar suggestions have been 
made in the past. See, e.g., Joann Martens-Weiner, Company Tax Reform in the European Union: Guidance from 
the United States and Canada on Implementing Formulary Apportionment in the EU 9 (2006); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 Va. Tax Rev. 89, 159 
(1995); R.M. Bird & D.J.S. Brean, The Interjurisdictional Allocation of Income and the Unitary Taxation Debate, 34 
Can. Tax J. 1377, 1412 (1986); Marcel Gerard, Reforming the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe, 
A Tentative Appraisal (CESifo Working Paper No. 1795, 2006), available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract=935009; 
Walter Hellerstein & Charles E. McLure, Jr., The European Commission's Report on Company Income Taxation: 
What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States, 11 Int'l Tax & Pub. Fin. 199, 218 (2004); Paul R. 
McDaniel, Formulary Taxation in the North American Free Trade Zone, 49 Tax L. Rev. 691, 738 (1994). 
440 in 2001 and again in 2003, the European Commission proposed replacing the current rules for the taxation of 
EU source income of multinational companies with a formulary system operating on a commonly defined, 
consolidated income base. See European Comm'n, An Internal Market Without Company Tax Obstacles--
Achievements, Ongoing Initiatives and Remaining Challenges, COM (2003) 726 final (Nov. 24, 2003). 
441 Anand Bharat and Richard Sensing, The weighting game: formula apportionment as an instrument of public 
policy, 183 National Tax Journal 199 (2000). 
442 In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a state may levy 
a tax on interstate activities as long as the state could show (1) a “substantial nexus” between the state and the 
activity being taxed, (2) the tax is fairly apportioned to the activities carried out in the state, (3) the tax does not 
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There has been a growing trend throughout history, however, to encourage uniformity of 
methods between the different states.443 Although the difference of formulas between states 
could make the description difficult, it is the ideal situation in order to examine the effects of the 
various formulas from experience. Most states have approached formulary taxation through the 
so called “Massachusetts Formula” advocated by the American National Tax Association and 
calling for equal weight of three factors: Assets, Payroll, and Sales. The idea is to allocate one-
third of the total income to jurisdiction where the assets are allocated, one third to the jurisdiction 
of the payroll, and the last third to the jurisdiction of the sales.444 This aims at making sure that 
the income is allocated and taxed in every jurisdiction where the business has a taxable presence. 
It is important to examine these factors separately. 
                                                          
discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) the amount of the tax is fairly related to services provided by the 
state. 
443 A committee of the National Tax Association, an organization comprised of state tax officials, designed a model 
multistate business income tax in 1922, and, in 1933, the organization recommended that the states adopt the 
Massachusetts apportionment formula, which equally weighted property, payroll, and sales factors. See Joann M. 
Weiner, Using the Experience in the U.S. States to Evaluate Issues in Implementing Formula Apportionment at the 
International Level 9-10 (U.S. Treas. Dep't, OTA Paper 83, Apr. 1999), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ota83.pdf. In 1957, the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws, a nonprofit, unincorporated association that has drafted uniform laws for adoption by 
state legislatures since 1892, see http:// www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=11, 
drafted the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDIPTA). UDIPTA was intended to serve as the model 
for state corporation income tax laws. See Weiner, supra, at 10. Of the forty-four states with broad-based 
corporate income taxes, twenty-one have adopted UDIPTA and most of the others have similar statutory schemes. 
Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation: Cases and Materials 596 (8th ed. 2005). In 
addition, in 1967, responding to the threat of federal legislation, the states created the Multistate Tax Compact 
and the Multistate Tax Commission to encourage states to adopt uniform state tax laws and regulations, as well as 
to provide both a vehicle for suggesting legislative and regulatory changes and a forum for conducting joint audits 
and resolving disputes. Id. at 605. Forty-four of the fifty states participate in the Multistate Tax Commission 
although only twenty are members of the Multistate Tax Compact, which incorporates UDIPTA. 
444 For example, suppose X Corporation has $1,000 of Illinois sales and $9,000 of sales in other states, $200 in 
Illinois payroll and $200 payroll in other states, and $750 of Illinois property and no other property, and $3,000 of 
apportionable income. Of that $3,000 in income, $1,600 would be apportioned to Illinois under the Massachusetts 
formula. This result would be reached whether one allocated $1,000 by the sales factor ($100), $1,000 by the 
payroll factor ($500) and $1,000 by the property factor ($1,000), or by allocating the full $3,000 by the average of 
the three factor ratios (16/30ths). 
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First, the asset factor derives from the assumption that the presence of significant assets shows 
real economic activity. Assets show an economic presence, a taxable economic presence. Under 
this factor, income would be apportioned to a tax jurisdiction depending on the number of assets 
held in that jurisdiction as compared to the group. For example, company X dealing in the 
manufacture of computer bags, operates in the U.S. and Cameroon. Company X owns 2 assets: 
one is a manufacturing plant located in Cameroon and worth 80% of the company’s total assets; 
and the second is an office building located in the U.S. and worth 20% of the company’s total 
assets. If a UT is adopted with a formulary apportionment based on the sole one factor assets 
formula, any income earned by the company as a unitary business would be taxed 80% in 
Cameroon and 20% in the U.S. The single factor assets formula is easy to apply provided an 
adequate asset valuation. The asset factor is very applicable to the brick and mortar, the so called 
‘old economy’. In fact, a company’s worth used to be measured by the amount of tangible assets 
it held. The application of the asset factor to assess the true economic reality of transactions and 
the true MNEs presence leads to respectable results in the old economy context. 
The asset factor, though still used in some U.S. States, has very much been criticized as easily 
subject to manipulation. The asset factor is lacking because it can easily be manipulated by 
companies. Companies can decide to make massive physical investments in low or no tax 
countries while maintaining the minimum assets in the country of operations. In example above, 
it would be rather easy for Company X to locate the manufacturing plant in a low to no tax 
jurisdiction, channeling most of its income there even though the sales might occur in a different 
jurisdiction.  
Further, the asset factor does not seem appropriate for the current economy and the phenomena 
of intangible assets. Most of the current corporate assets are in the form of intangibles, hard to 
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value and easy to relocate. The modern economy relies heavily on intangible assets and the 
current international tax system continues to struggle in determining their location. With the 
phenomenon known as the cloud, location of intangible assets has not been more difficult 
ascertain.445 To the location issue, adds the evaluation problem. How to evaluate, for tax 
purposes, intangible assets? The asset factor will only be effective in revealing the true 
economics of transactions if the assets involved are adequately valuated. The difficulty is more 
pronounced when the taxpayer’s valuation is different from a potential valuation from the tax 
authorities. Litigation does not provide any help in this area as the courts are usually left with 
fundamentally competing expert testimony as to the value of the assets at a specific time.446 The 
difficulty of valuing assets is shown in the current international tax system where taxation of 
intangibles often operates on a presumptive value basis.447 For intangible assets, time of 
valuation is very important as those assets fluctuate in value on a daily basis. 
The use of the asset factor should find a way to incorporate intangible assets and deal with the 
fact that such assets are very easy to manipulate or relocate. While physical investment simply 
for tax advantages could be cumbersome for corporations, intangible assets are very easy to 
move around and relocate; a well-crafted formula should be mindful of this fact due the growing 
importance of intangible assets in the MNEs’ world. An estimated 70% of the value of the top 
150 U.S. companies is in the form of intangibles.448 If the asset factor is used alone, most of the 
income would go to the low or no tax countries because of the heavy physical investment 
                                                          
445 Gil Savir, Cloud IT and Tax IT, Mich Law (2014). 
446 See Andriessen Daniel, Making sense of intellectual capital: designing a method for the valuation of intangibles, 
Routledge (2004). 
447 In the US for example, IRC 179, settling on the contentious issue of useful life of an intangible, decided the 
provide a fixed 15 year depreciation period for qualified intangibles. 
448 Sebastian Mallaby, Powerful Brand Carries Worth Far Beyond a Familiar Name, The Times Union (Albany), (Aug. 
13, 2006). 
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therein, or the easily rellocable intangible assets there. As a consequence, an undue weight 
should not be given to this factor even though it clearly constitutes a valid indication of 
economic activity. 
Second the payroll factor is based on the idea that salaries reflect the location of the real income 
producing activity. The payroll factor is an important factor as it tracks the remuneration that is 
arguably associated with productivity. It tracks employees of the company and could present a 
good indication of what income was produced, and where. There is a need to adopt a wide 
definition of payroll in order to anticipate attempts for creative compensation arrangements 
unable to meet the payroll factor. The payroll factor will require that the unitary group be taxed 
at local levels depending on the amount of salaries that are attributable to the specific jurisdiction 
as compared to the group as a whole. In our example above, if we assume that salaries paid to 
employees in the U.S. represent 80% of the total salaries of the group, and salaries in Cameroon 
represent 20% of the total salaries of the group, under a single payroll factor of a UT, 80% of the 
income of global company X would be taxed in the US and 20% in Cameroon. 
Adoption of a payroll factor requires a wide definition of the notion of payroll. Under this factor, 
payroll will include salaries and wages, as well as all other forms of compensation and friend 
benefits to employees. 
However, providing for an adequate definition of payroll is not the only challenge of this factor. 
In fact, the economic substance of allocating income according to payroll can be manipulated. If 
this factor were to be taken alone, developing countries would suffer unless there are methods of 
evaluation and other various adjustments of salary brackets. It is known that the cost of labor in 
the developing countries is far less that of the developed countries. In including this factor, it will 
be important to design an adjustment method that would not entirely rely on the volume of the 
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salary, but also on what it means in the national context of the country’s operations. In addition, 
there will be a need to address potential manipulation of the payroll factor by locating most 
employees in the low or no tax jurisdiction location with any otherwise business impact.449 A 
well-crafted payroll factor would therefore contemplate the possibility of linking the location of 
the payroll to the relevant economic activity in that location. 
Third, the sales factor is based on the idea that income must be allocated according to the 
location of sales. This is a theory of consumption whereby the company derives its profits from 
its consumers and hence should be taxed at the location of its consumers, the location of sales. 
The sales factor is an important factor in that it strives to track the source of the income. At an 
age where the determination of the source of income is more and more difficult, the sale factor 
provides a method to tax the income by sourcing it to its consumers. The U.S. experience shows 
a growing preference for the sales factor which has shown rather effective at sourcing and raising 
revenues.450 The Majority of US States now have opted to provide double weight to the sale 
factor as compared to the other two factors.451 Many commentators, in the US, continue to 
predict that all the US States will have to adopt, at some point in the future, a single factor 
formula based on sales.452The sales factor seems to better track the real economic activity and 
shows not as subject to manipulation as the other factors. In the U.S., many States including 
Iowa and New York moved to adopt a single factor formula based on the sales factor. This factor 
                                                          
449 For example, a company can decide to locate all their in house legal department in a tax heaven, most of the 
income under the payroll factor would be allocated to that tax heaven even though the legal department in fact is 
entirely assisting the corporation in the high tax jurisdiction. 
450 Kirk J. Stark, The Quiet Revolution in U.S. Subnational Corporate Income Taxation, Int'l Bur. of Fisc. Doc. 523, 528 
(2001). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the single factor, sales-based apportionment formula 
in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978). 
451 States giving greater weight to sales include New York, California, Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois, Michigan, or 
the District of Columbia. 
452 See Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, Corporate Income Tax Apportionment and the “Single Sales 
Factor”, August 2012, available at http://www.itep.org/pdf/pb11ssf.pdf (last retrieved 3/30/2015). 
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assures that the tax authority (and for our purposes the country) from which the money is earned 
through sales, gets to tax it. In addition, proponents of the sale factor argue that a single sale 
factor would in fact be beneficial to the tax jurisdiction as it would encourage companies to 
locate property and payroll in the jurisdiction, thereby creating employment and wealth. If assets 
and payroll are no longer used to determine tax liability, one would argue that location of payroll 
and assets would be more beneficial to certain jurisdictions.  
On the one hand, the sales factor can be characterized as beneficial to developing countries. The 
developing world is and will continue to be, arguably, a consumer heavy world. Many 
companies in the developed world continue to expand into developing countries and continue to 
strengthen their efforts in selling their products in these countries. With the projected explosion 
in the developing countries population and the ensuing increase in the consumer headcount, a 
sales factor can be seen as beneficial to developing countries tax authorities. For example, the 
United Nations project that by year 2050, population in the developing world would 
approximately 80% of the total world population.453 Major companies including General Motors, 
Apple or Microsoft are all currently refining their strategies to be more aggressive in reaching 
the developing countries markets with their products. As the customer base continues to grow in 
the developing world, the sale factor can show very important for developing countries tax 
authorities. 
On the other hand, nevertheless, many developing countries are building their economies by 
serving as factories where products are made and sold to the larger market, specifically in the 
developed world.454 Developing countries’ economies are currently relatively small and many 
                                                          
453 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects: 
The 2012 Revision.  
454 The early case of Wal-Mart in China. 
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countries have provided the workforce necessary for the making of goods for the purpose of 
selling abroad. This reality does not negate the importance of the sales factor to the developing 
countries; however, it does put into question the use of developing countries as factories for 
purposes of selling to the developed world. A single sale factor would have all those products 
made in the developing world and sold to the developed market, not taxed by developing 
countries tax administrations. For example, if assets and payroll factors are disregarded for the 
benefit of the sales factor alone, Apple would have the ability to install countless plants in India, 
manufacture iPhones there and sale all of them in the US and Europe. India would not be entitled 
to tax any of the income from the sale of the iPhones manufactured within its territory. For major 
MNEs currently, only a small proportion of the goods manufactured in their developing countries 
factories are in fact sold in the developing world. Most of the products made in the developing 
world, at least some relatively luxurious products, are sold in the US and Europe, not in Africa, 
Asia or South America for the most part. 
In addition, the sale factor is not totally immune from manipulation and attempts thereof. The 
main issue with the sales factor is the location of the sale. To determine the location of the sale, 
the main factor used is the location of the customer. One must determine where the purchaser of 
the goods is located. In practice, the address of the shipment or the physical place of delivery 
would determine the location of the customer hence the location of the sale. The issue however, 
is that such location can be manipulated. One can determine for the goods to be shipped at a 
place where the sale factor may not be implemented or may be loosely implemented. How to 
assure that the customer, when ordering goods for shipment, provides the address of his actual 
location? How to assure that the company, when invoicing customers, provides a place of 
delivery that is exactly the location of the customer. In this era of ecommerce, how to determine 
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the physical location of intangible products bought electronically? Similar to all other factor 
standing alone, the sales factor is limited and would not contribute to a fair system is applied 
alone. 
From the above analysis, it is clear that no one factor, standing alone, could provide a 
satisfactory formula for global implementation. Each factor, notwithstanding its merits, is 
malleable and lacking if implemented on a stand-alone basis. The task therefore is to design and 
agree on a combination of some or all of the factors in building the formula. The task is 
inherently for economists to wrestle with. Nevertheless, based on available literature on the 
issue, our tax reform proposal below suggests a formula implicating all three factors, but 
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Any proposal to adopt a UT has to contend with the various criticisms that have been levelled 
against UT principles notwithstanding the fact that there is yet to be major research as to its 
viability. UT is regularly dismissed both in the academic circles as well as in practice circles. 
Most arguments raised against UT however, are shallow to say the least and not worthy of much 
attention in reality. We will address three of those common arguments below. To contrast with 
the criticisms against UT for global application, UT principles have been in place in US States 
taxation for decades and continue to thrive. The experience os US States with UT can provide 
significant insight on the merits of the UT. Finally, Europe has flirted and continues to flirt with 
general implementation and application of the UT. The European Common Consolidated Tax 
Base draws straight from the UT principle and will be presented below as a form of UT, which is 
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A. Rebuttal of the Regular Arguments Levelled Against the UT 
The first argument levelled against the UT is that it is incompatible with the international tax 
treaty network.455 A more extensive debunking of this argument will be provided below in 
Chapter 8. The treaty network compatibility is a pseudo argument. Transfer pricing is currently 
governed by Article 9 of the treaties, which assumes the SA method because it addresses the 
commercial or financial relations between associated enterprises.456 If UT were adopted, Article 
9 would become irrelevant in those situations to which UT applies (i.e., where a unitary business 
is found to exist) because UT ignores the transactions between related parties, and treats them 
instead as part of a single enterprise. Traditionally, the term PE was meant to include separate 
entities (subsidiaries). However, in 1933, the League of Nations introduced Article 5457 (ancestor 
to the current Article 9 of the Model) where separate enterprises were no longer considered PE. 
UT would revive the disregard for separate entities and would apply globally each time a unitary 
business is found to exist. UT would be governed by Article 7 of the double tax treaties. Under 
Article 5(7), “[t]he fact that a company that is a resident of a Contracting State controls or is 
controlled by a company that is a resident of the other Contracting State … shall not of itself 
constitute either company a permanent establishment of the other.” However, it is well 
established that a dependent agent can be a PE (see Art. 5(5)), and whether an agent is dependent 
is based on whether the principal exercises legal and economic control over the agent.458 “An 
                                                          
455 See Avi-Yonah Reuven, Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for 
Reconciliation, (2010). 
456 The quoted articles are identical in all the tax treaty models except when discussed in the text. 
457 League of Nations, Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises- Methods of Allocating Taxable Income, 
Volume IV, Art 5 (Geneva: League of Nations Document No. C.425 (b). M.217 (b).1933.II.A., 1933). 
458 See, e.g., Roche Vitamins Europe Ltd v. Administracion General del Estado, Case No. STS/202/2012 (Spanish 
Supreme Court Jan. 12, 2012)  (Swiss principal had PE in Spain through an affiliated Spanish company; activity of 
the subsidiary was directed organized and managed in a detailed manner by the principal); Salad Dressing, Fiscal 
Court Baden-Wurttemberg, 3 K 54/93, Internationales Steuerrecht 1997 (Swiss principal had a PE at the premises 
of an unrelated German contract manufacturer based on detailed instruction by principal); Milcal Media Limited, 
Court of Appeal, Stockholm, Case nos. 7453-54-02 (2005) (Cyprus principal had a PE through Swedish subsidiary 
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agent that is subject to detailed instructions regarding the conduct of its operations or 
comprehensive control by the enterprise is not legally independent.”459  
In the case of a modern, integrated MNE that operates as a unitary business, a strong argument 
can be made in most cases that the parent of the MNE exercises both legal and economic control 
over the operations of the subsidiaries, especially where the subsidiaries bear no real risk of loss 
and acquire goods and services exclusively or near exclusively from the parent or other related 
corporations. The existence of Intranets in most MNEs has resulted in most important 
operational decisions being centralized. In that case, the subsidiaries should be regarded as 
dependent agents of the parent. Such a finding is in fact made with increasing frequency in both 
developed and developing countries.460 If the subsidiary is an agent of the parent, Art. 7(2) of the 
treaties requires the attribution of the same profits to the subsidiary “that it might be expected to 
make if it were a distinct and independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities 
under the same or similar conditions.”  Arguably, the application of UT satisfies this arm’s 
length condition because in the absence of precise comparables, which almost never exist, it is 
not possible to determine exactly what profits would have been attributable to the subsidiary 
under separate accounting.  
                                                          
because it was subject to detailed instructions and control); eFunds Corp. v. ADIT, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, 
Delhi, 2010; Lucent Technologies v. DCIT, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, 2008 (US parent company had a service 
PE in India); and the cases cited by LeGall (cited Infra).  
459 U.S. Treasury. Technical Explanation of United States Model Income Tax Convention. Washington: Government 
Printing Office, Art. 5(6) (2006).  
460 Le Gall and David Tillinghast, Can a Subsidiary Be a Permanent Establishment of its Foreign Parent? 
Commentary on Article 5, par. 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, 60 Tax Law Review 179 (2007).  
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Another pseudo argument levelled against UT is that it is contrary to the ALS which has risen to 
the level of a customary international law norm. The argument of customary international law 
does not, either, impede the application of a UT approach. The argument is based on the 
contention that because separate accounting and the ALS are embodied in all of the treaties they 
should be considered binding. But embodiment in the treaties is not enough to create a customary 
international law ban on UT, since article 7(4) is embodied as well. Most double tax treaties 
currently applicable contain Article 7(4) which provides:  
“Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to determine the profits to be attributed to 
a permanent establishment on the basis of an apportionment of the total profits of the enterprise to 
its various parts, nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining 
the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be necessary; the method of 
apportionment adopted shall, however, be such that the result shall be in accordance with the 
principles contained in this Article.” 
The Article allows for application of a formula, and the Article is well embodied in morst double 
tax treaties as we will see in Chapter VIII below. If the ALS is an international customary law 
norm due to its overwhelming presence in the current tax treaties, at least formulary 
apportionment should also rise to the level of customary international law norm because it is just 
as present in the current double tax treaties.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that Model Tax Treaties do not, in any way or form, create a 
‘right to tax’.461 The key issue is the actual practice of states, i.e. what countries actually do as 
                                                          
461 Vogel, K., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions- A Commentary to the OECD, UN and US Model 
Conventions for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Capital. With Particular Reference to German 
Tax Treaty Practice, 3rd ed. (London: Kluwer Law International): p26 and further; See also Fiscal Committee, 
Report to the OEEC, The elimination of double taxation, (Paris: OECD, September 1958), p. 12. 
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domestic laws reign supreme in the area of taxation, and many of them follow UT approaches in 
practice. In addition, countries should be free to follow the UN Model which does not adopt the 
changes made by the OECD, and which is also widely followed. 
Finally, it can be argued that even the OECD may be revising its approach. The authorized 
OECD approach may have marked the high point of OECD commitment to SA. With the 
beginning of the BEPS project, which is influenced by large developing countries like China and 
India, it is likely that the OECD may be stepping back from its total commitment to SA.  
Specifically, the potential adoption under BEPS of country by country reporting (which is 
already required for extractive industries in the US) can be the basis for implementation of UT. 
This development is very important for developing counties as many rely heavily on extractive 
industries. The requirements of the country by country reporting, if implemented, will likely start 
with the extractive industries as to draw from the US experiences with the system and thereby 
allow a profound change in taxation of the major industry in the developing world: the extractive 
industry. 
Sovereignty is also an argument used to oppose any application of the UT. It is argued that 
taxation is a very central topic of a country’s identity and that the determination of a tax policy 
suitable to a specific country’s needs is the very basic of their sovereignty. We absolutely agree 
with this premise. Taxation is a matter of a country’s sovereignty and every country should have 
the right to tax income within its borders. The current system has betrayed the basic premise of 
each country being able to tax income generated within its borders. The BEPS project analyzed 
above as well as the many various other schemes that have led to many countries not being able 
to exercise their power to tax income properly generated within their borders. For those who 
repudiate UT on the basis of countries’ sovereignty, the answer is that the current system 
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diminishes countries’ ability to exercise their tax sovereignty more than the UT would ever be 
able to achieve. In fact, the UT reestablishes countries sovereignty by ensuring that they are able 
to excessive their taxing power appropriately and thoroughly. The debate though is what it 
means for a country to exercise its fiscal sovereignty. Does fiscal sovereignty mean that each 
country should have isolated and uncoordinated tax policies with other nations? Does fiscal 
sovereignty mean that each country addresses global problems posed by MNEs taxation from a 
local perspective exclusively? Does fiscal sovereignty mean that countries should not agree on a 
common general policy manner to go about crafting their tax policies? The answer to these 
questions, even from the avid critics of the UT, is no. Fiscal sovereignty does not mean fiscal 
unilateralism or isolation. If fiscal sovereignty meant fiscal isolation, then no one would be able 
to argue today that the current international tax system is anywhere close to affording countries 
such sovereignty. In fact, countries are highly connected and coordinated whether through 
double tax treaties or other bilateral or regional instruments of common application. Fiscal 
sovereignty is therefore not to be found in the need of a country to be isolated and coordinated 
with others.  
Instead, we argue that UT provides greater fiscal sovereignty in the real sense of the word. On 
the one hand, and as indicated above, UT would allow countries to tax all the income generated 
within their borders. The unique ability of the UT to reduce the potential for MNEs to shift 
income out of some jurisdiction where the income is economically earned and fiscally belongs is 
an immediate testimony of putting the power back in the hands of each country’s tax authorities. 
On the other hand, UT does not interfere with each country’s freedom to determine how much 
tax revenues they would like to raise. The duty of determining tax rates is and shall always 
remain a country specific duty and each country should be free to set its tax rates at a level it and 
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only it decides appropriate.462 The UT does not, or at least our proposal does not advocate for a 
global uniformity of tax rates. Far from that, our proposal underlines the need for each country to 
determine its rates and the amounts of tax revenue they are willing to raise based solely on the 
social consensus and agreement as to what the role of the government should be for that specific 
country. Each country is free and shall always remain free to have and solve that debate and 
adopt a tax policy that corroborates the specific country’s position through the levels of tax rates 
retained. Sovereignty is therefore a pseudo argument against UT because from the perspective of 
the current system, UT offers a far greater level of sovereignty to countries in dealing with their 
fiscal affairs, chief of which is their ability to adequately tax income within earned within their 
borders. 
The very many arguments raised against adoption of UT are fundamentally lacking and do not 
justify a legitimate rejection of the UT. As seen above, most the arguments are at best, pseudo 
arguments, that actually apply in a more devastating manner to the current international tax 
system. The debunking and repudiation of the arguments above is in no way an admission that 
the UT is flawless. Any implementation of the UT, on a global scale, would have to contend with 
major transitional issues, and the system incontestably would struggle to establish a unique 
formula for global adoption just as it might at some point not reflect the real time economic 
returns of various entities within the group. The effort is to minimize such potential negative 
impact by providing an extensive analysis of the UT. Many criticisms clearly stem from the lack 
of concrete knowledge of what the UT really. Many academic contributions have superficially 
brushed off the idea of a UT without, unfortunately, a preliminary in depth explanation and 
                                                          
462 See Christians Allison, Sovereignty, taxation, and social contract, Minnesota Journal of International Law 18 
(2008). 
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understanding of what it is. A thorough understanding of the UT compels the conclusion that it 
ought to be adopted in replacement of the current system under the ALS. The superiority of the 
UT to the ALS is evident, whether it is regarding its fair results, its ease of operation, its 
advantages to the developed and the developing world, or its advantages to the MNEs and the 
private sector. In fact, the long standing experience of UT by the US States and the current 
experiences of some form of UT in Europe under the European CCTB, and the final BEPS 
Reports are very informative as to the merits of the UT as compared to the current and failed 
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B. The US States Experience with UT 
Each of the US States with an income tax system applies some form of formula of the UT.463 
Application of the UT in the US, even though with specificities, can provide a picture and 
helpful insight on any project of global application of the UT.464 The UT and the use of 
formulary apportionment in the US States can be traced back to the state of New Hampshire in 
1842 when the State enacted a law assigning the administration and assessment of railroad 
property to a State board.465 In 1868, Pennsylvania enacted a statute applying the apportionment 
formula concept to the tax base of an entire corporation.466 The Pennsylvania method resulted in 
an inclusion of the company’s out of state income into the tax base of the apportionment. 
Following the Pennsylvania experience, the UT principles and apportionment methods primarily 
conceived for property taxation and instate income, became instruments applicable to interstate 
commerce and out of state income.467 Interstate apportionment quickly gained popularity as 
many States followed suit and adopted UT principles.468 Court challenges quickly ensued but 
mostly unsuccessful.469 The Supreme Court of Kansa explicitly endorsed UT and formulary 
apportionment in the Missouri River case when it indicated that “a railroad is an entire thing and 
                                                          
463 46 US States currently have an income tax regime in place. 
464 See Weiner, Using the Experience in the US States to Evaluate Issues in Implementing Formula Apportionment at 
the International Level, 13 Tax Notes International 2113 (1996). 
465 See Runke and Fender, 1977. 
466 See Pennsylvania Statute, May 1, 1868. 
467 See 136 Kansas Reports 210. Ohio, April 27, 1893 
468 For example, Kansas approved a measure on March 4, 1869 providing assessment of railroad property tax 
through the application of a formula with included out of state income of the railroad company as the basis for the 
apportionment formula. The assessment included all of the property owned by the railroad, including that which 
was located in other states. The assessment was apportioned between the states and then among the Kansas 
counties and cities through which the railroad ran based upon the proportion of the property’s value within each 
county.  
469 See Missouri River, F.S. & G.R. Co., 136 Kansas Reports 210 (1871); See also Delaware Railroad Tax Case, 85 US 
206 (1874); See also,  Erie Railway Company Case, 88 US 492 (1875); See also State Railroad Tax Case, 92 US 575 
(1876); See also Adams Express Company, American Express Company, and The United States Express Company 
[165 US 194, 166 US 185. 
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should be assessed as a whole… a railroad is an entire thing, and cannot be valued or assessed 
except as a whole…”470 
Early in the twentieth century, many States expanded the reach of formulary taxation. What had 
mostly been applied to property taxation was being expanded to other forms of income. The 
State of Massachusetts adopted a three-factor formula based equally on assets, payroll and sales 
on the basis that such factors revealed the true source of the taxpayer’s income.471 By years 
1930s, the concept of UT was widely established and accepted. The formula retained; however, 
remained subject to contestations and sometimes even chastised by courts.472 The courts 
continuously posed the requirement that the formula retained neither be arbitrary, nor produce 
unreasonable results.473 Some States, including New York and California, went as far as adopting 
a UT that would apply to all income of the corporation, including that which is earned in other 
countries. The courts continued their support by upholding the UT applied by US States, even at 
a global level.474 
Under the application of the early UT principles, companies still had to possibility to manipulate 
their inter-company transactions so as to minimize the income. The State of California instituted, 
in 1936, the concept of combined reporting to avoid inter-company gamesmanship. The 
combined reporting, an informational return reduced the potential for tax avoidance through the 
setting up of separate companies in different States. Various challenges to the combined 
reporting instituted in California eventually survived and the system expanded to other States.475 
                                                          
470 See Missouri River, F.S. & G.R. Co., 136 Kansas Reports 210 (1871). 
471 See Massachusetts’ House Report No. 1480 on State Taxation (1964). 
472 See Underwood Typewriter Co., 254 US 112 (1920). 
473 Id. 
474 See Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton Limited, 266 US 271 (1924). 
475 See Edison California Stores, 183 P.2d 16 (1938). 
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Taxpayers were not happy with the continued court endorsement of the UT approach. Congress 
eventually passed measures limiting the scope of application of state UT principle.476 In addition, 
Congress aimed to make uniform across the States, the acceptable principles under UT.477 In 
1964 and 1965, Congress published reports recommending uniform standards, tax bases, and 
rules and procedures of apportionment to be applied by States tax administrations. Predictably, 
States resented the recommendations and were publicly opposed to any federal intervention in 
what was considered a State tax matter. In response, many States vowed to improve interstate 
taxation, and got together, formed what became known as the Multistate Tax Compact. The 
Compact wanted to preempt the federal government, and provide for a more coordinated 
application of UT principles amongst States.478 
Until the 1980s, UT and formulary apportionment flourished across US States and its reach 
seemed unlimited. Taxpayers used various forms or protest against the UT system usually to no 
avail. Taxpayers who opposed the ever-expansive use of UT principles used judicial means to 
curtail application of the UT. However, courts continued to upheld UT principles and their 
expansive application within US States. Taxpayers opposed to the UT also tried political 
pressures to eradicate UT, but again, to no decisive avail. Most State legislatures continued to 
expand the reach of their UT principles. The most convincing tool used to curtail expansion of 
the UT and the ever-increasing reach of its principles was the economic challenge.479 Many 
States refrained from applying their UT principles to income earned overseas and to require 
                                                          
476 In 1959, Congress passed Public Law 86-272 preventing the inclusion into the apportionable base of activities 
that barely amounted to solicitation of business or delivery of orders. 
477 See Public Law 86-272 directing the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Finance Committee to propose 
a federal legislation to provide uniformity in the application of UT within States. 
478 The Compact was formed in 1967 with 7 States getting together to solved the challenges of States UT. 
479 See Nancy Foram and Dahly Gray, The Evolution of the Unitary Tax Apportionment Method, 15 Accounting 
Historians journal 1, available at http://www.accountingin.com/accounting-historians-journal/volume-15-number-
1/the-evolution-of-the-unitary-tax-apportionment-method/ (last retrieved 4/1/2015). 
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global combined reporting for the fear of losing economic activity within their respective States 
and ultimately loosing revenues. The expansion of the UT was therefore halted.  
The UT in US States was however not abolished and today, all the States with income tax apply 
a form of UT. Some States still tax their MNEs on their worldwide income, and require a global 
combined reporting for state tax purposes.480 The common way in which US States currently 
apply UT is either through a single factor based formula, or a differently weighted multiple 
factors formula. 
First, many US States apply the single factor sales formula for their income apportionment. 
Business representatives are relentlessly lobbying for various changes to formulary 
apportionment applied by States, and the major trend and change noted is the move for many 
states to a single factor formula.481 In Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Oregon, or Nebraska, only sales are 
included in the apportionment formula. Other States use the notion of receipts, close to sales, to 
determine the apportionment formula. 482 The general move to a sales only factor formula is 
presented as an economic necessity and economic booster. A sales only factor encourages 
exports whereby goods are produced in one location with no tax concerns, and those goods are 
sold everywhere, with the only incidence of taxation being the place of the sale of goods. 
Additionally, the sales factor encourages investments in production facilities and plants because 
the location of the facilities, plants and other assets would carry no tax consequences. It is 
unsettled at the very least as to whether businesses actually prefer a single factor sales formula as 
a general proposition. Several empirical research show that a single factor sales formula leads to 
                                                          
480 See for example, the State of California and the State of Alaska. 
481 See Michael Mazerov, The “Single Sales Factor” Formula for State Corporate Taxes, center for budget and policy 
priorities (Sept 2005). 
482 See New York and Texas. 
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lower taxes paid by business in the various states they operate in. In fact, a single factor sales 
formula seem appealing to the brick and mortar industry, allowing them to install large amounts 
of assets at a location of their choosing and only be subject to taxation at locations of their sales. 
The situation sometimes leads to incongruences as to whether to support or not a single sales 
factor formula at a specific location. It is not uncommon for a major US company to support the 
adoption of a single factor formula in one State and oppose adoption of same in another State, all 
at the very same time. For example, Ford Motor Company was widely in favor and advocated for 
adoption of single factor sales formula in Michigan for the Michigan Single Business Tax.483 
However, the same Ford Motor Company, a few years later, vigorously opposed adoption of the 
same measure in Illinois, calling it unfair to out-of-state companies.484 The same attitude was 
noticed with Kraft Foods which opposed single factor sales formula in Maryland and supported 
adoption of same in Illinois,485 as well as AT&T which supported adoption of single factor sales 
formula in New Jersey while opposing the same in Oregon within a matter of one month.486 The 
ideal situation for most businesses seems therefore to have a single factor sales based formula in 
the State in which they manufacture or the State in which they are headquartered, while other 
States adopt a different formula that is not solely based on sales. The tendency though, is for 
more and more States to adopt a single factor sales formula or at least double weight sales, 
making it difficult for companies to manipulate the differences between the States’ adopted 
formulas. 
                                                          
483 See Michigan Single Sales Factor Bill Creates Controversy, State Tax Notes, September 21, 1995. 
484 See Single Sales Factor Triumphs, but without Throwback Repeal, State Tax Notes (June 1, 1998). 
485 See Corporation In Line for Big State Tax Break, Chicago Tribune (May 25, 1998); See also Taylor Backing Tax 
Change, Baltimore Sun (January 6, 2001). 
486 See Statement of Deborah Bierbaum in Support of Assembly Bill 3420 (June 4, 2001); See also Statement of 
John McNamara in Opposition of House Bill 2281-A (May 10, 2001). 
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Second, some States still use the basic Massachusetts formula. Under the Massachusetts’s basic 
formula, all three factors: assets, payroll, and sales are given equal importance and weighted 
equally. States such as Hawaii, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, or North Dakoda continue to give 
equal weight to all three factors and apply a three-factor formula for apportionment of income of 
their corporate residents.487 The equally weighted three factor test has the advantage of not 
favoring one factor over another; it is advantageous because it grasps all aspects that contribute 
to income and wealth creation and aims to tax it accordingly. The main criticism of the equally 
weighted three factor test is that it is not adapted to the modern economy. The assets factor 
included in such formula is inherently flawed when it comes to intangible assets and the 
difficulty of valuing them nowadays. 
Finally, various States still apply more than one factor in their formulas but grant them differing 
weights. The most common use of this system is the double weighted sales factor. In Alabama, 
Idaho, New Hampshire, Vermont, or Kentucky, the sales factor is given double weight in the 
apportionment formula.488 The States that adopt this formula argue that all three factors are 
important, but that the assets and payroll factors are highly subject to manipulation and have a 
more negative impact on investments and job creation. The emphasis on sales, is not only liked 
by businesses that are headquartered in those States, but also allows for an expanded tax reach of 
the local consumption. The debate of the move from the equally weighted three factor test to the 
double weighted sales factor and to the single factor test is reigniting the debate over a uniform 
formula, ideally amongst the States.489 The original idea and initial efforts of having a uniformed 
                                                          
487 See Federation of Tax Administrators (Feb 2015), available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/apport.pdf 
(last retrieved 4/6/2015). 
488 Id. 
489 See Income Taxes: Principles of Formulary Apportionment (Portfolio 1150), available at 
http://www.bna.com/Income-Taxes-Principles-p7802/ (last retrieved 4/6/2015). 
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and coordinated formula amongst the States490 has still not come to fruition half a century later, 
but has gained more acclaim in recent debates over US States taxation, a debate that is highly 
important and instructive in the international arena. The experience of the US States with UT has 














                                                          
490 See Supra, at 483.  
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C. The European CCTB 
Europe has long struggled with tax competition and various countries assigning different goals to 
their tax policies and tax rules.491 Unilateralism ruled the continent in the past on matters of 
taxation. Tax policy was determined on a country by country basis and each country reserved the 
sovereign right to determine its tax rules, with no coordination with other countries whatsoever. 
With the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957,492 and the efforts to draw 
Europe closer primarily for the sake of promoting economic progress and avoiding wars, issues 
of taxation remain deeply territorial and country specific. Europe continued to grow closer and 
continued to coordinate its economic, social and political policies in order to form a more perfect 
union and draw countries closer in their economic, social and political ties. Still, taxation 
remained out of the debate and tax policies remained largely uncoordinated and country specific. 
In the last few decades however, Europe grew from the era of unilateralism to a belief in 
bilateralism in tax policy. Many European countries negotiated and signed various bilateral tax 
treaties with other European countries and non-European countries. Europe has the most 
expansive bilateral tax treaty network as many European countries have concluded bilateral tax 
treaties with other countries in Europe and globally.493 Nevertheless, and thus far, the unilateral 
approach and the bilateral approach have been ineffective in preventing tax abuse and illicit tax 
competition in Europe.494  To mitigate the tax abuses and respond to general outcry, Europe 
endeavored to coordinate its tax laws and policy and provide for a common definition of tax base 
                                                          
491 See Toader and Teodorescu, European Fiscal Coordination, Romanian Eco and Bus. Rev. Vol 2 N*4 (2007). 
492 See the Treaty of Rome signed on March 25, 1957 establishing the European Economic Community. 
493 For example, there are currently approximately 1,300 bilateral tax treaties and the United Kingdom accounts for 
over 100 of those treaties. 
494 Communication from the Commission, Towards an Internal Market without tax obstacles – A strategy for 
providing companies with a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities, COM(2001) 582 
final, 23 October 2001, p. 10. 
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and coordinated tax enforcement through exchange of information. The Common Consolidated 
Tax Base (“CCTB”) is currently the manifestation of the commitment for a multilateral 
approach, at least across the European Union (“EU”), to tax policy and tax administration. The 
CCTB amounts to a proposal to develop a tax code for the EU, while leaving to the discretion of 
the individual member States, the ability to set tax rates. The goal of the CCTB project is to 
replace the separate accounting and ALS by consolidation and formulary apportionment. Under 
the CCCTB, a European company would only have to deal with one set of rules in order to 
calculate its profit for tax purposes – instead of having to comply with up to 27 different sets of 
rules as at current.495 
The long-awaited proposal for a CCCTB was published by the European Commission in 2011.496   
The proposal is presented as ‘a complete set of rules for company taxation. It details who can opt 
[in], how to calculate the taxable base and what is the perimeter and functioning of the 
consolidation. It also provides for anti-abuse rules, defines how the consolidated base is shared 
and how the CCCTB should be administered by member States under a 'one-stop shop' 
approach.’497  The discussion below only focuses on that part of the report that is relevant to the 
proposed formula and how it advances UT at a regional level. 
The CCTB requires a great degree of consolidation in determining the tax base. European 
companies would be provided with an instrument for the cross-border consolidation of profits 
                                                          
495 The EU currently has 27 member States and each member adopts a set of rules to determine the tax base. 
496 Official Press Release Announcing Proposal from the Commission for a Common Consolidated Tax Base 
(“CCTB”), March 16, 2011, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/319&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&
guiLanguage=en (last retrieved 4/13/2015); See also, Official ‘CCTB Draft’ (2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/com_
2011_121_en.pdf (last retrieved 4/13/2015). 
497 Id. 
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and losses. All intra-group transactions would be neutralized.498 A wide array of companies and 
legal entities are eligible for consolidation. Permanent Establishments are ipso facto included in 
the CCTB consolidation. Lower tiers subsidiaries; however, are included in the consolidation 
only if and to the extent that a two prong test is satisfied. The conditions relate to control and 
ownership. The parent company must hold more than 50% of the voting rights and must own 
more than 75% of the subsidiary’s capital or – alternatively – must be entitled to more than 75% 
of its profits.499 With regard to lower-tier subsidiaries, a holding of more than 50% of the voting 
rights is deemed to be a holding of 100%.500 By attributing a 100% for all lower tiers subsidiaries 
owned more than 50%, the calculation reflects the fact that a majority of the voting rights at each 
tier confers to the parent company control over all subsidiaries in the chain of participation. With 
regard to the ownership threshold, the interests held at each tier have to be multiplied.501 
The CCTB also provides for a territorial scope of consolidation. Consolidation under the CCTB 
is limited to companies operating in the EU. Only EU companies and Permanent Establishments 
may be part of a CCCTB group. However, companies which are tax resident in third countries 
may form a CCCTB group with regard to their qualifying subsidiaries and Permanent 
Establishments located in the EU.502 The right to opt for the CCCTB lies with the ultimate parent 
company of the group if it is tax resident in the EU, otherwise with one of its EU resident 
subsidiaries or Permanent Establishments.503 If the group opts for the CCCTB, all qualifying 
subsidiaries and Permanent Establishments are automatically included in the group;504 and the 
                                                          
498 See Art. 59 of the CCTB Draft. 
499 See Art. 54(1) of the CCCTB Draft. 
500 See Art. 54(2)(a) of the CCCTB Draft. 
501 See Art. 54(2)(b) of the CCCTB Draft. 
502 See Art. 55(2) of the CCCTB Draft. 
503 See Art. 104(1 and 4(6)) of the CCCTB Draft. 
504 The principle is known as the “all-in-or-all-out-principle”, See Art. 55 of the CCCTB Draft. 
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consolidation extends to the entire tax base of all group members irrespective of minority 
shareholdings.505 
Formulary apportionment is at the heart of the EU CCTB proposal. The CCCTB proposal adopts 
a three-factor equally weighted formula comprising assets, payroll, and sales.506  The CCTB has 
the specificity of providing guidance on the payroll factor. In fact, under the CCTB, the payroll 
factor comprises both salaries and the number of employees, considered equally.507 The CCCTB 
proposal also includes special apportionment rules for four industries: financial institutions; 
insurance; oil and gas and shipping; inland waterway transport and air transport. The asset factor 
is defined to consist of all fixed tangible assets.508 Intangibles and financial assets are excluded 
from the formula due to their mobile nature and the risks of circumventing the system. However, 
where the entity is a financial institution this is varied to include 10% of the value of financial 
assets, except for participating interests and own shares. Financial assets are included in the asset 
factor of the group member in the books of which they were recorded when it became a member 
of the group.509  Such a modification is arguable seen as necessary because of the significance of 
these assets to MNEs in the financial industry.  The sales factor, normally defined to mean the 
proceeds of all sales of goods and supplies of services after discounts and returns, excluding 
value added tax, other taxes and duties and excluding exempt revenues, interest, dividends, 
royalties and proceeds from the disposal of fixed assets is also varied for financial institutions.510  
The sales factor is varied from the general definition to include 10% of its revenues in the form 
                                                          
505 The principle is known as the “full consolidation”, See Art. 57(1) of the CCCTB Draft. 
506 See Art. 86(1) of the CCCTB Draft. 
507 Id. 
508 See Art. 92 and 94 of the CCCTB Draft. 
509 See Art. 98 of the CCCTB Draft. 
510 See Art. 95 and 96 of the CCCTB Draft. 
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of interest, fees, commissions and revenues from securities.  Financial services are deemed to be 
carried out, in the case of a secured loan, in the member State in which the security is situated or, 
if this member State cannot be identified, the member State in which the security is registered. 
Other financial services are deemed to be carried out in the member State of the borrower or of 
the person who pays fees, commissions or other revenue. If the borrower or the person who pays 
fees, commissions or other revenue cannot be identified or if the member State in which the 
security is situated or registered cannot be identified, the sales shall be attributed to all group 
members in proportion to their labour and asset factors.511  
In the Commissioner speech presenting the CCTB in 2011, the European commission 
endeavoured to present the CCTB and a coordinated approach as a panacea to Europe’s tax 
problems and obstacles. The Commissioner indicated in his speech that a common approach and 
a uniform policy to taxation was necessary to strengthen the single market and was necessary for 
Europe’s prosperity as a whole.512 Adoption of common and uniform principles for determining 
the corporate tax base across the EU is seen as a beneficial policy for both the companies in the 
EU, and the EU member States tax administrations. The European Commission has repeatedly 
affirmed its conviction that the only way to address tax obstacles that currently exist for 
companies in the EU operating in more than on EU member States is to provide for a 
consolidated tax base for EU-wide activities. It is in fact of great value for a company to apply 
the same set of rules across the EU instead of contending with 27 sets of differing and sometimes 
antagonistic tax rules. The CCTB proposal does not negate each Member-State’s sovereignty. As 
                                                          
511 Id. 
512 See Speech by Algirdas Semeta, Commissioner responsible for taxation, European Corporate Tax Base: making 
Easier and Cheaper to do Business in the EU, March 16, 2011, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-11-185_en.htm?locale=en (last retrieved 4/13/2015). 
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proof that a UT is not necessarily an impediment to countries’ sovereignty, the CCTB stands on 
the principle that there is a need to provide for a uniform way to determine the tax base, as well 
as a consistent formula to apportion taxable profits amongst intervening jurisdictions. At the 
same time, the CCTB leaves to the member States, the sovereign right in the way, the degree if at 
all, to which it taxes the then apportioned income.513 Sovereignty is exercised, deservedly so, 
through the setting and determination of the countries’ tax rates, if at all, that it ought to apply to 
the income that is earned within its borders.514 The application of an equally weighted three 
factors test for apportionment under the CCTB is an important factor that reiterates the 
usefulness of UT principles in eliminating or at least mitigating illicit tax schemes. As seen 
above and through the experience of US States, each of the three factors plays an important role 
in establishing to true economic reality of business operations and income earnings aspects of 
corporate organizations. Nevertheless, the EU’s preference for an equally weighted three factor 
test comes as a surprise in the face of established empirical evidence of the shortcomings of such 
formula. 515 The three factors equally weighted test affords an ease of application and 
straightforwardness to each component of the apportionment formula. The question is whether 
the EU decided that the advantages of the three factors equally weighted test outweighs the more 
complicated and arguably more effective formulas that have been developed in the US since the 
Massachusetts framework. The EU seems to have adopted a preference for rules that are 
relatively subject to manipulation but easily applicable from a taxpayer and tax authorities’ 
perspective. Further, most US States started their formulary apportionment regimes with a three 
                                                          
513 Id. 
514 See Christoph Spengel, Common Corporate Tax Base (CC(C)TB) and Determination of Taxable Income, ISBN 978-
3-642-28432-8 (2012). 
515 See Part 2 Chapter V above for an analysis of each factors limit as a standalone factor in the apportionment 
formula. 
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factor equally weighted test.516 It was only in light of reported abuses, or for the sake of 
encouraging certain business policies that States started, in an isolated manner, to move beyond 
the equally weighted three factors, and to implement formulas that were more adapted and 
arguably were more aligned with the State’s policy it aims to advance.517 States started giving 
more importance to the sales factor as to encourage assets investments as well as payroll and jobs 
within their borders. The literature and empirical research on the matter is inconclusive as to the 
effects of the importance of the sales factor in the States assets and payroll growth and 
performance.518 As a regional conglomerate, the EU seems to start with the equally weighted 
well understood and relatively easy to apply apportionment formula. Europe would undoubtedly 
learn from the application of the equally weighted three factor test, and make changes if any, as 
the experience with the system would require.  
Still, application of the CCTB across Europe would offer a credible and fortunate departure from 
the ALS, a net advantage to international taxation, and a model that can inspire global 
international tax reform. An analysis of the benefits of such reform and departure from ALS to 
the UT, from the perspective of all stakeholders, is necessary to provide more perspective in the 
urgency and necessity of the reform. 
 
 
                                                          
516 See Part 2 Chapter VI above for an analysis of the US States experience with UT and the initial quasi consensus 
on the three factors equally weighted test in the apportionment formula. 
517 Id. 
518 See Cara Griffith, Single Sales Factor Apportionment May Be Inevitable, But Is It Fair?, Forbes Magazine, Sept 
18, 2014, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/09/18/single-sales-factor-apportionment-
may-be-inevitable-but-is-it-fair/ (last retrieved 4/13/2015); See also, Klassen and Shackelford, State and provincial 
corporate tax planning: income shifting and sales apportionment factor management, 25.3 Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 385 (1998); See also Haig, Murray, and Shoup, The Sales Tax in the American States, 8.04 Business 
History Review 74 (1934). 
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The UT is a system based on the idea that any MNE is a global unique entity and all its 
subsidiaries, wherever located, constitute mere parts of the same unitary and unique body, 
provided that the conditions of the Unitary Business explored above are met.519 The current 
system, as seen above, relies on a fiction that suggests that the different subsidiaries of a 
common parent are in fact separate and independent entities and shall be seen and taxed as such. 
The resulting separate accounting and ALS has led to various abuses for countries globally and a 
largely unwelcomed level of complexity for MNEs operating globally. The needs of countries 
around the world and of tax authorities specifically are not being met and governments in the 
south or the west continue to denounce the fail system. Governments in the developed world are 
dissatisfied with the current system of international taxation; governments in the developing 
world are outraged by the current system of taxation of MNEs; and the private sector continues 
to voice its call for a simpler system and adoption of more easily understandable and comply 
with rules for the taxation of international income. 520 On the one hand, one can argue that the 
time is ripe for reform due to the global dissatisfaction with the current system and a realization 
that the status quo is not sustainable. As indicated by Professor James Hathaway in a different 
context, there is no better moment for reform than when all parties involved are dissatisfied and 
happy to express their dissatisfaction and understanding that the status quo is not sustainable.521 
The dissatisfaction with the current international tax system is widely shared and for that reason, 
reform is warranted. Further, reform is even more appropriate as there is a viable solution to 
replace the current and failed system, a solution that would prove advantageous to developed 
countries (A), MNEs (B), and developing countries (C) alike. This chapter demonstrates that 
                                                          
519 See above, Part 2, Chapter V, Section A. 
520 See Part 1, Chapter IV above for an analysis of the current ills of the international tax system. 
521 See James Hathaway, Michigan Law Professor, oral speech on refugee law at Michigan Law School in Ann Arbor 
Michigan, Jan 2015. 
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reform is not only of the essence because of a global dissatisfaction, but reform is further 
warranted because there is a viable, more credible and more advantageous alternative, able to 































A. Unitary Taxation: The Better Alternative for Developed Countries 
The current system of international taxation has failed developed countries in many ways already 
and continues to pose a threat to the very continued existence and ability of the governments to 
tax its people as the public perceptions of the fairness and effectiveness of taxation continues to 
dwindle. The UT presents a viable alternative chiefly because it provides a greater access to 
information thereby signing the death certificate of the tax heavens phenomenon, but also 
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1. Information Access   
Once a determination is made that an entity, along with its sub entities constitutes a unitary 
business as seen above, it become necessary that the taxation of such unitary business relies on 
the performance of the unit as a whole. The implementation of the UT requires that information 
be shared as to the performance of the unit as a whole. By providing the information on the 
global operations, UT allows for developed countries to access information they need to 
adequately apply their tax rules. Lack information and the non-sharing of information regarding 
multinational global performance by tax authorities has let to inadequate taxation. In recent 
years, many developed countries have made the sharing of information, the cornerstone of their 
international tax policy and the condition at times for their collaboration with other countries. 
The US, for example, has required a revision of most its outstanding tax treaties, and now 
incorporate in all new tax treaties, mandatory sharing of information between the government 
specifically as it relates to corporate performance of multinational companies within their 
border.522  
We have seen many experiences where lack of information, specifically in the developed world 
can lead to inadequate taxation, and to a feeling of tax unfairness. The debate regarding the so 
called ‘Panama Papers’ provided a case study of lack of information decimating tax policy and 
providing an appearance of tax unfairness not only amongst big companies, but also for 
individuals. The Panama Papers are a leaked of over 11 million documents that reveal how key 
financial information is kept private thereby restricting taxation. Though the Panama Papers do 
not necessary outline any illegality, they do reveal the art of hiding information for the purposes 
of diminishing potential taxation. A tax authority may only tax the income it is aware of, income 
                                                          
522 See recent US tax treaties, and other US treaty revisions for the specific purpose of including an information 
exchange provisions. Examples include US France, US Luxembourg, US UK.  
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that is hidden duly escapes taxation and the revelation to the general public of such hidden 
income, whether legally or not, highlights the distrust in the expected fairness of any tax system 
and undermines the trust of the many in the system thereby reducing voluntary compliance on 
which many western tax authorities rely upon to raise revenues. According to the EU estimates, 
the revenue lost from Panama Papers exceeded a trillion Euros; and the EU vowed to end such 
mechanisms of hiding financial assets and financial information.523 
The UT presents a viable alternative and a beneficial solution for developed countries. Combined 
reporting would prove to be very effective in developed countries being able to adequately apply 
their arguably well intended tax provisions to all income. As seen above, combined reporting 
would require for the multinational company to provide information as to its whole operations 
and performance globally. The developed countries would have the information handy and 
would more adequately apply their tax rules. UT prevents any possible Panama papers 
phenomenon. An obligation to entities to report their global financial data would leave no place 
to hide as the tax policy would follow economic activities and a unitary business would reveal its 
financial data globally, from a unitary perspective, for all to see, specifically tax administrations, 
in order to adequately tax all incomes, and eventually restore the credibility of the system as a 






                                                          
523 See declarations of the European Commissioner for Taxation, Pierre Moscovici, as reported in Politico (last 
retrieved April 7, 2016). 
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2. Restoring Credibility on the Tax System: Disclosure and Fairness 
One of the main existential threats to the survival of the taxation as we know it is the appearance 
of unfairness that has the ability to diminish people’s trust into the system and may lead to a 
general revolt and refusal to comply with tax law. If most people feel that the system is unfair, 
that no one pays their fair share of taxes, that in fact taxes are only paid by the naïve and 
uninitiated, all might recourse to ultimate goal of not paying taxes and as such governments 
would lose tremendous revenues. In the developed world, the outrage as to the current 
international tax system has been one of the major social and popular debates. The press, civil 
society and politicians aspiring to power have well documented the failures of the system. 
However, nothing is close to an agreement as to how to move forward, and as a consequence, the 
broken status quo remains in place and many feel the unfairness is at its highest and the system is 
designed to benefits some and not all. By not implementing a system that promotes disclosure, 
that at least appears to put all in the same footing, policy makers continue to fail the basic test of 
tax fairness and the people continue to express their anger and a prediction of major revolt 
potentially leading to the end of the tax system as we know are not totally out of the realms of 
possibilities.    
Many feel the current system has developed losers and harbored winners. Most income that 
multinational companies earn end up in places of their choice having a common characteristic of 
low to no taxation. In 2012 alone, for example, multinational companies reported more than $80 
billion of profits in Bermuda, a country with no corporate income tax, and an amount that 
exceeded the combined benefits reported in Japan, France, and China. Similarly, the gross profits 
reported in Bermuda was about 4% of the other profits around the world though sales in 
Bermuda accounted for less than 0.3% of the overall sales, and share of employees was less than 
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0.2% of the overall employees.524 The losers in this system seem to be the places where 
economic activities really happen and the taxpayer not sophisticated enough as to manipulate the 
system.  
There is therefore a tension between the winners and losers in fact of the current failed system. 
Unable to position themselves on the winners’ side, many taxpayers are arguing for a revolt and 
disobedience in paying taxes. For developed countries, this can be a major issue because 
developed tax systems are heavily reliant on voluntary compliance and self-declaration. The 
burden to enforce tax rules outside of the self-compliance system could be overly burdensome 
for developed countries tax authorities and the lost revenues would be colossal. For example, in a 
country like the US with more than 300 million individual inhabitants and many ore corporate 
entities, the IRS is not able to get the man power to enforce tax rules at the level of every 
individual taxpayer. Voluntary compliance has been the bedrock of developed countries tax 
systems and any departure from that would lead to major catastrophes. However, many taxpayers 
continue to wonder, in the face of current failures of the tax systems, why they should continue 
to comply, let alone voluntarily comply with a tax system that fails them over and over again, 
and that allows other to not pay taxes. The thread of public disobedience is real and developed 
countries face an urgent challenge to make their systems fairer. 
The UT presents a way forward. Under the UT, all actors in the tax arena would have the 
information they need and would appreciate the government efforts to apply fair rules to all. 
Under the UT little to no income would avoid taxation and the application of the tax rules to real 
economic realities and real incomes would reinstitute the integrity and fairness of the system and 
would boost the belief in the system and solidify the tenets of voluntary compliance. 
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B. Unitary Taxation: The Better Alternative for MNEs 
It has become somewhat of a generally shared and agreed upon statement that MNEs do not like 
to pay taxes. Most commentators seem to agree that MNEs manage to stay away from zones with 
high taxation and are more lured into jurisdictions with low or no taxation.525 The current 
experience with this empirical fact is that the congregation of MNEs in low to no tax 
jurisdictions come with a reputational cost. Most MNEs who incorporate or locate their revenues 
in low to no tax jurisdiction have to deal with the public perception and the reputational 
inconvenient of existing and being motivated solely by the need to avoid taxes. Needless to say, 
most MNEs would prefer to avoid such reputational repercussions, even if that meant paying a 
little bit more in taxes if other advantages were provided. 
Further, with the current debate around dealing with low to no tax jurisdictions and aiming to 
combat what is now known as the ‘race to the bottom’526 phenomenon, the international tax 
arena has created extremely complex rules that do not afford predictability to MNEs. The rules 
are often so different in various jurisdictions and so complex that the costs for complying to said 
rules are forever increasing.  
This research believes therefore that the UT would be a better system and would prove more 
beneficial to MNEs because it would afford them simplicity and predictability as well as reduce 




                                                          
525 See Hines James and Eric Rice, Fiscal paradise: Foreign tax havens and American business, 3477 National Bureau 
of Economic Research (1990). 
526 See for example, Mendoza Enrique and Linda Tesar, Why hasn’t tax competition triggered a race to the bottom? 
Some quantitative lessons from the EU, 52.1 Journal of monetary economics 163 (2005). 
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1. Predictability and Simplicity 
As much as MNEs would prefer to pay as little a tax as possible, MNEs are even more resentful 
of fiscal unpredictability and their inability to understand the tax environment in which they 
operate. When a tax environment is unpredictable and cannot be read, and planned around in the 
design of a business plan, many business enterprises are discouraged from engaging in business 
in those areas. Tax uncertainty, and tax unpredictability are aspects that weight heavy on the 
private sector and MNEs. 
Current international tax systems are characterized with their uncertainty and unpredictability. 
Tax systems in general and international tax systems for each country particularly are currently 
so dissimilar that an understanding of one, does not necessarily show helpful to the 
understanding of the other. Countries seem to have different interests and aim and promoting 
different sectors whether in society or in the economy. As a consequence, tax law and tax policy 
has been the tool readily available to incentivize those social, cultural, or economic priorities. 
The result has been the creation, in each tax jurisdiction, of a conglomerate of tax rules, quasi 
impossible to understand and generally unique to the specific jurisdiction. Tax law and tax policy 
is local, aim at solving jurisdictional specific issues, and continues to grow in complexity. For 
MNEs, the situation is difficult to understand and comply with. MNEs continue to plead for a 
simple tax system, which would allow them to predict they fiscal environment and the fiscal 
component in the planning of their business endeavors. 
The institution of transfer pricing in almost all tax systems and the reliance on ALS have 
introduced a new level of complexity in taxation. The conception and application of transfer 
pricing principles has ushered an unprecedented level of unpredictability in the tax arena.527 
                                                          
527 See Grabski Severin, Transfer pricing in complex organizations: A review and integration of recent empirical and 
analytical research, Readings in Accounting for Management Control, Springer US, 453 (1985). 
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Several methods initially proposed to apply transfer pricing quickly showed lacking policy 
makers around the globe have continued to designed new transfer pricing methods without ever 
eliminating the previous ones, thereby consecrating a convoluted system, extremely complex and 
at times internally contradictory. Time after time and survey after survey, investors and business 
managers have pointed to transfer pricing as their main tax worry.528 The area has become so 
complex that only a select few law firms and generally ‘big four’ accounting firms are able o 
assist on transfer pricing matters. However, transfer pricing is just an example of an international 
tax system that has grown unfit, and un-adapted to the new economies and the new needs of tax 
policy. 
UT, as seen above, provides a set of rules that include coherent definition of Unitary Business, 
universal requirement of a global reporting, and an agreed upon formula on which to apply the 
financial data in order to determine the tax liability. The UT therefore outlines a set of rules, and 
its global adoption would allow for a predictable fiscal environment in each and every one of the 
jurisdictions MNEs may operate in.  If a country adopts the UT, any MNE venturing in business 
in that country would know, in advance, that the basic tenets of UT would apply in the 
determination of the tax liability and as such could adequately include the fiscal considerations in 
the planning of its business venture. For example, if country X adopts a UT system outlining a 
clear definition of a Unitary Business, a requirement of combined reporting, and a formula based 
on equally weighted three factor average test, any MNE or any investor planning to engage into 
business in country X would know how such country would determine tax liability from the 
operations of the business and the company could plan accordingly. The MNE or investor would 
not be left to guessing how the investment in the assets would impact its fiscal posture, or how 
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much the workforce to carry its mission would help or hurt its fiscal outlook, or the occurrence 
of the sales and their geographical location would impact the investment.  
UT aligns fiscal policy with economic reality. If an investor is satisfied with the outlook of its 
potential investment, taxation should not constitute a drawback to an otherwise promising 
business endeavor.529 Taxation and the fiscal environment should be predictable, and tax policy 
should align itself with economic reality so that each business actor understands that there would 
be no unknown factors affecting the life, return, or sustainability of their business. Any factors 
that would not be linked to their business reality and the economics of their operations. 
UT offers fiscal simplicity and tax predictability to business investors and presents a better 
alternative compared to the current system of taxing multinational where most business operators 
barely understand if they will be tax, on what items, let alone how they would be taxed in each 
and every single jurisdiction they intend to operate in. By providing simplicity, the UT will also 
help MNEs cut down compliance cost that are related to navigating the current complex and very 
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2. Reducing the Cost for Tax Planning and Tax Compliance 
MNEs would be the first ones to point to how much they spend, year after year, to make sure 
they understand the various tax systems in the jurisdictions they operate in and to comply the 
countless reporting and other requirement of the ever-growing complex tax systems. MNEs 
nowadays can’t seem to exist without an army of lawyers and accountant just to help them 
understand the tax systems, and later to help them comply with such systems.530 Yet, the high 
cost does not come with a guarantee of accurateness and ease of a step taken care of. More often 
than not, tax authorities come back to question the understanding of the laws that the experts 
have provided to MNEs and what they had deemed proper compliance with the law.531 Tax 
audits and tax controversy continue to expand the spectrum of ever growing costs MNEs have to 
incur related to taxation. 
The example of the transfer pricing area mentioned above shows how costly the process of 
paying tax, not just the actual taxes paid, has become for MNEs. As mentioned above, transfer 
pricing has become very complex and transfer pricing engagements require application of very 
especially complex rules. The domain is now reserved to a select few lawyers and the ‘big four’ 
accounting firms mainly because of the man power necessary to conduct a transfer pricing 
engagement but also because of the technical resources needed, resources that are generally not 
accessible for ordinary tax compliance. 
Ordinary investors, without the capacity to retain a select few number of law firms of the ‘big 
four’ accounting firms to accompany them and guide them in the process of understanding, 
planning and complying with international tax, are discourage from engaging in international 
                                                          
530 See Mills Erickson and Edward Maydew, Investments in tax planning, 20.1 The Journal of the American Taxation 
Association 1 (1998). 
531 See Scotchmer Suzanne, Audit classes and tax enforcement policy, 77.2 The American Economic Review 229 
(1987). 
   272 
  
 
business activities. Because of taxation today, many investors are priced out of international 
markets and are obligated to conduct business locally where taxation may not pause a major 
influence.532 
UT reduces the planning and compliance costs and alleviates the process of paying one’s taxes. 
By providing for clear rules of transnational application, the UT cuts through complexity and 
provides business investors with easier ways to determine their tax liability without necessarily 
using an overly burdensome army of human and technical resources. The UT proposed in this 
research is marked by simplicity based on agreed upon tenets of taxation regardless of fiscal 
jurisdictions. 
The argument for simplicity of UT would be even stronger if all countries adopt the same or a 
quasi-identical formula for apportionment of income for purposes of assessing taxing rights. For 
example, if all taxing jurisdiction could adopt an equally weighted three factors test as their 
apportionment formula, UT would provide total simplicity as the same formula would be known 
as adopted in each jurisdiction, and its application would be predictable. Under such 
circumstances, a change from one jurisdiction to another would not compel a study of a new 
formula for assessing tax liability and investors would easily factor in the tax implication of their 
investment before they carry the same. The presence of uniformity would significantly reduce 
the cost of complying with tax law. 
Nevertheless, and even in the event the same formula is not adopted globally, UT still presents a 
simpler tax system and less costly to comply with for MNEs than the current international tax 
system. By adopting UT, even under differing formulas, tax jurisdictions agree on a baseline for 
approaching tax policy and designing tax rules, tax authorities agree on a number of common 
                                                          
532 See Cavusgil Tamer, et al., International business, Pearson Australia (2014). 
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tenets in the conception and application of their tax rules. As a consequence, the planning and 
compliance cost otherwise related to understanding the fiscal tenets for each taxing jurisdiction 
and interpretation of their way of assessing tax liability and levying taxes, those costs are 
immediately inexistent.  
The argument generally leveled against UT to the effect that UT would lead to increased tax 
liability for MNEs falls apart, we believe, when factored in, the amounts of saving MNEs would 
realize in reducing the costs associated with their fiscal planning and compliance. One of the 
major expenses for MNEs today is the cost of experts to help them navigate the various fiscal 
environments where they operate.533 The various separate efforts in different jurisdictions to tax 
as much of the income within their borders as possible within the realms of ALS of transfer 
pricing has led to an increase of tax laws. Due to the growing divergence and the ever increasing 
complexity, many large law firms and accounting firms are projecting an exponential growth in 
their tax revenues in the near future. The argument is that whatever MNEs may save by 
employing an army of experts to help them manage their tax exposure, is far more than whatever 
that is MNEs may end up paying as additional taxes under the UT. When the dust settles then, 
MNEs would find the UT more beneficial to them with regards to costs than the current system 
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C. Unitary Tax is Best for Developing Countries 
Developing countries may stand to benefit the most under a UT system. As analyzed above, no 
one else seems to have been more harmed and stands to lose the most in the future if the current 
international tax system stays in place. The current system is based on complex tax rules, 
incoherent in their nature, and majoritarily designed by developed countries.534 The current rules 
of international taxation require massive human resources and acute expertise for their 
application and enforcement. In an effort to set broad policies, developed countries have acted 
through the OECD to establish major guidelines for international tax rule making.535 The various 
rules and general guidelines are designed with developed countries capacities and capabilities in 
mind. Transfer pricing rules for example, with its OECD authorized methods require acute 
expertise and ability to access a wide array of information that generally seem out of reach for 
developing countries. Needless to say, therefore, the current international tax system and its 
encouragement for a tax treaty network has mostly left the developing world in a bad situation. 
Because developing countries endeavor to adopt tax system that align to some extent with the 
fiscal environment in the developed world, developing countries tax system are widely not 
understood by the tax professionals who are supposed to enforce them, and international taxation 
in the developing world continues to be a disastrous scene. 
UT, however, by aligning fiscal policy with economic reality, by aiming at convergence of tax 
system by and for both the developed and the developing world, is a better system specifically 
for developing countries because it would provide them the information they desperately need on 
                                                          
534 See Cockfield Arthur, The Rise of the OECD as Informal World Tax Organization through National Responses to 
E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 Yale JL & Tech. 136 (2005). 
535 See for example, Davies Ronald, The Oecd Model Tax Treaty: Tax Competition And Two‐Way Capital Flows, 44.2 
International Economic Review 725 (2003). 
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the MNEs economic operations globally, and the administration of the UT would show more 
feasible for developing countries as compares to the current system. 
 
1. Availability of Information 
Any adequate taxation of MNEs requires, as a pre-condition, a proper location of the income to 
be taxed. In order to properly locate the income to be taxed, each tax authority should understand 
how the income is made, the processes within each industry and the relationship of the income 
with the assets of the business as necessary. Under the current system, MNEs possess the 
information regarding their global operations and the revenues location within their network in 
accordance with their economic realities. However, MNEs are not required, generally, to provide 
that data to taxing authorities and many developing countries continue to struggle to figure out 
that information. 
Many developing countries’ tax authorities claim that access to information regarding their 
transnational taxpayer is the number one impediment for the adequate taxation of those 
taxpayers.536  MNEs sophisticated transactions planning have made it quasi- impossible for tax 
authorities, specifically tax authorities of the developing world, to understand the scope of the 
income earned within their borders and therefore adequately tax the same. For example, many 
MNEs chose to operate in the developing world through traditional subsidiaries, while others, 
use the legal construct of a PE to operate in the same jurisdictions. For a developing country’s 
tax authority looking into taxing the presence of the MNEs within its borders, it quite difficult to 
determine the income earned by the branch present in the country without an understanding, 
however basic, of the operations of the MNE out of the country. The traditional setting of a 
                                                          
536 See for Example, The Global Tax Agenda and its Implications for Africa, African Tax Administration Forum 
(“ATAF”) Discussion Paper (2014). 
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subsidiary as well as the more fiscally innovative set of a PE cause concerns to a developing 
country’s tax administration when trying to determine the income adequately earned within its 
borders for taxation purposes. 
Generally, local tax authorities do not have the information regarding the structure and 
functioning of the MNEs outside of the country. Even, the taxation authorities in the developing 
world seldom fully understand the operations of MNEs within the country. Tax authorities in the 
developed world have designed ways to access the information or manners to compel MNEs to 
provide them with such information. However, developing countries do not have what is 
necessary to access the information and in any event, do not have the powers to compel MNEs to 
provide to information to them. For example, the US realized an immense tax leakage from the 
US tax net based on transactions being carried abroad. In order to solve the problem, the US 
implemented the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”).537 FATCA is a way for the 
US taxing authorities to obtain information they need to assure adequate taxation in this area.538 
This was a way the US designed in order to access the information it needed from taxpayers. 
However, and upon adoption of FATCA, many MNEs claimed the US government’s overreach 
and planned to not comply.539 The US therefore had to design a way to compel compliance with 
the Act. The US adopted sanctions especially applicable to taxpayers with a presence in the 
US.540 The US in this instance, because of its power and level of development, found a way to 
access the information and otherwise find a way to compel MNEs to comply with its provisions. 
This situation squarely contrasts with a developing country’s circumstances. On the one hand, a 
                                                          
537 See The Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act of 2010 (Pub.L. 111–147, 124 Stat. 71, enacted 
March 18, 2010, H.R. 2847). 
538 See Supra, at 375. 
539 See Kossachev, Worldwide Taxation and FATCA: A Constitutional Conundrum or the Final Piece of the Tax 
Evasion Puzzle,  25 Geo. Mason UCRLJ 217 (2014). 
540 See Supra, at 375. 
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developing country’s tax administration does not have the reach the US government may have 
and on the other hand, a developing country’s tax authority would not be able to design an 
enforcement method similar to the US because the presence of MNEs in the development is not 
consequential. 
The UT solves most the developing countries tax authorities access to information problems. 
Under the UT, MNEs are required to report, in all jurisdictions where the operate, information 
regarding their global operations. The combined reporting is done at the level of both developed 
and developing countries alike. The information the MNEs will possess internally regarding their 
global operations and economic results will be the same information used by taxing authorities in 
the developed world as well as, most importantly, the developing world, to assess taxation. The 
MNEs information needed for adequate taxation in all localities they operate in will be available 
to all taxing authorities and would be accessible especially to the taxing authorities in the 
developing world. As a consequence, the UT is a better system for developing countries, as 
compared to the current system.  
With accessible and readily available information, developing countries’ tax authorities as well 
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2. Easier to Administer 
The ease of administration of a tax system is arguably the utmost priority of any developing 
country tax administration contemplating changes to its tax system. Improving tax administration 
in the developing world has been and continues to be a high priority.541 Many commentators and 
experts endeavoring to offer a better tax system to developing countries have sometimes 
understated the importance of tax administration in the design of any tax policy by or for 
developing countries.542 Good tax administration distinguishes successful tax authorities from 
unsuccessful ones in terms of the amount of revenues they are able to raise for the well-
functioning of their governments.543 Whatever the policy or tax system adopted, the results in the 
developing world are usually summarized in terms of how effective the tax authorities are at 
administering such tax policy or tax system. 
An effective tax administration is generally evaluated by looking at the ease with which the 
taxing authorities are able to access the information they need; the ease with which taxpayers are 
able to apply the rules in complying with the tax system, and tax administrations are able to 
apply the rules adopted to collect the revenues; and the volume of revenues collected as a result 
of adequate taxation of all economic activity within the taxing authority’s fiscal borders. By all 
these measures, developing countries continue to struggle and their tax administration, to say the 
least, are not optimum.544 The current system of international taxation has let to difficult to 
administer systems in the developing world and various attempts to adapt have not received 
major political will. Any changes to a tax system, even a change to tax administration in order to 
                                                          
541 See Richard Bird et. al., Improving Tax Administration in Developing Countries, 1 JOTA 1 (2015). 
542 Id. 
543 See Levi (1988), Lieberman (1988), or Steinmo (1993). 
544  See Vito Tanzi and Anthony Pellechio, The Reform of Tax Administration, IMF Working Paper 95/22 (1995). 
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optimize the revenues must be driven first and foremost by political will.545 However, the foreign 
systems empirically ask too much of developing countries governments. Basically, developing 
countries are asked to, as indicated earlier, deploy the resources they do not have to apply the 
rules they seldom understand and the outcome of which is at the very least, very uncertain. 
Complicated tax rules on transfer pricing, analyzed above, are a very current and telling example 
of what developing countries tax administration deal with. 
Adoption of a UT system would usher in an era of more easily administrable tax rules and tax 
systems for the benefit of developing countries. Basically, a UT systems allows for a more 
effective tax administration on each of the three measuring factors. 
First, the UT would allow for an easy access to information. As indicated above, MNEs, under 
the UT, are required to make available to all governments tax authorities, including developing 
countries tax authorities, the information on their global operations and global economic 
performance. Under the UT reporting obligation therefore, it is no longer the task of a taxing 
authority, let alone a task of a developing country’s tax authority to look for and find the 
information it needs to apply its tax rules. In fact, the burden is on the taxpayer to provide such 
information and for the tax authorities, specifically the developing country’s tax authority, the 
information is available and easily accessible under the UT. Therefore, based on the first prong 
regarding the ease with which the tax authorities are able to access the information, the UT 
establishes a more efficient tax administration system. 
Second, the UT allows for clear rules of easier application. Under an ideal UT adopted globally, 
as we will endeavor to design and propose below, all three tenets would be globally agreed upon. 
There would be a common understanding of a Unitary Business, an agreement on a combined 
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reporting of net income, and a single agreed upon formula. It such UT is adopted; it would lead 
to easy tax administration based on the second prong in the measurement related to the ease with 
which rules are compliable by both the tax payers and tax administrations. Under the UT, both 
the taxpayers, including MNEs and the tax authorities would have a set of rules, agreed upon and 
ready to be applied uniformly. For the taxpayer, there would be total predictability of what 
would constitute a Unitary Business, how they would combine report globally, and what formula 
would be applicable to them. Therefore, taxpayers would have rules they understand making it 
easy for them to comply with the rules. For tax administrations, they would similarly know what 
constitute a Unitary Business, would expect taxpayer to combine report globally, and would 
know what formula to apply. Therefore, tax administrations, including developing countries tax 
administrations, would have clear rules to they understand and can easily apply in their 
collection of revenues mission. As a consequence, the UT would lead to more effective and 
easier tax administration because it would provide easy to understand and apply rules for both 
taxpayers and tax authorities. 
Finally, the UT would lead to increased tax revenues and in any event, adequate taxation of all 
economic activities in each taxing jurisdictions’ fiscal borders. The UT relies on actual economic 
activity and taxation follows economic performance globally. Under the UT, gamesmanships of 
relocating profits or choosing jurisdictions within which to be taxed would be reduced if not 
eliminated. MNEs would not, with the relation to their actual economic mode of operation and 
reality, book profits in a jurisdiction of their choosing while booking losses where they believe 
would make the most tax sense. By requiring a global reporting, a disclosure of global economic 
performance as well as of global economic footprint, and by requiring the application of an 
apportionment formula, the UT endeavors to give tax power where taxing power is economically 
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due. In practice, developing countries may end up with an increase in tax revenues, and most 
likely, the countries currently known as tax heavens may see a sharp decrease to however much 
income they currently are entitled to exercise taxing power over.546 If the UT is implemented, the 
result would be a more equitable application of various countries taxing sovereignty and a better 
empowerment of developing countries in their ability to raise revenues. As a consequence, 
therefore, the UT would allow for an easier administrable tax system based on the prong of 
overall revenues raised and equitable global distribution of revenues raising as relates to 
economic activity and performance from taxpayers. 
Notwithstanding the various advantages outlined above, notwithstanding the fact that a UT 
would be beneficial for developed countries, MNEs, as well as developing countries, none of the 
advantages could take place unless and until an actual UT is adopted. We offer a proposal below 
to replace the current system of taxation of MNEs and to take put into practice, the many positive 
provisions of the UT.  The below proposal may not immediately receive unanimous approval 
from the various stakeholders, but at least it can provide a creditable starting point where 
fundamentals are agreed upon, a result that has been the objective of this entire dissertation: 







                                                          
546 See Hampton Mark and John Christensen, Offshore pariahs? Small island economies, tax havens, and the re-
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The design of a tax system and the proposal of a UT alterative requires an adoption of the basic 
tenets with overall explanation of their meanings. The hope is to assure that the fundamentals of 
the UT system are outlined in a manner that is agreeable to most, even though the edges and 
many details may still require some fine tuning in order for the system to be readily 
implementable. This chapter will therefore outline the tenets of UT seen above, proposing a 
definition to be adopted with regards to each key term, explore a proposed formula to be adopted 
for purposes of apportionment of the MNE’s global income. 
After proposing a system, we would analyze why we believe it is not incompatible with the 
current tax treaty network. In fact, we will argue, the current tax treaty network could facilitate 
the transition from the current system of taxing MNEs incomes internationally, to the UT system 
proposed in this research. Unlike many concerns that the tax treaty network is so engrained in the 
international tax system that UT would be contrary, we will argue that the tax treaty network 
would in fact serve as a springboard in the transition and for the implementation of the UT 
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A. A UT Proposal 
This UT is based on and applicable to a common business, required to file combine reporting of 
net income from all its activities globally, and be applied a formula for the apportionment of 
such global income to all connected territories for purposes of determining taxing rights. 
 
 
1. Unitary Business 
A MNE would qualify as a Unitary Business if any one of the conditions below are satisfied. 
However, for any of the conditions to be tested and applied, there must be a shares or interest 
ownership relationship between the tested entities. The percentage of ownership, unless 
otherwise indicated below, is irrelevant. Further, the character of such ownership, whether direct, 
indirect, or constructive is also irrelevant. Nevertheless, such ownership relationship, however 
insignificant, must always exist before any of the below tests may apply. 
 
a. Common Ownership 
A MNE chain will be considered a Unitary Business based on common ownership if either: 
 
 The entity is legally owned, directly or indirectly, by another entity at a percentage of 
more than 50%. Under this condition, an entity will constitute a unitary business if one 
entity owns more than 50% of the stock of the other entity. This condition strictly looks 
at legal ownership of the stock, and if the entity is not incorporated, this condition looks 
at the interests (whatever its form) being held. Or, 
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 The entity is economically controlled by another entity which does not meet the required 
legal ownership threshold. This condition strictly looks at the economic relationship 
between the two entities. One entity may not hold the legal threshold required but it could 
entirely control another entity so that that other entity would not be able to exist but for 
the economic relationship with the first entity, under these circumstances, both entities 
should be considered as forming a unitary business. 
 
Common ownership is therefore established with legal ownership or with economic control. The 
legal ownership remains the principle and the economic control may intervene under exceptional 
circumstances. 
 
b. Unity of Operations and Centralized Functions 
 
A MNE chain will be considered a unitary business based on unity of operations or centralized 
functions in the below described circumstances: 
 
 Two or more entities constitute a unitary business if their operations are united. The 
concept if unity of operation requires that the operations of one of the entities are 
inseparable from those of the other company. As a factual matter, the entities are 
inherently tied to one another in their operation and as such are eligible for a unitary 
business treatment. Generally, the frequency of interaction between the entities 
constitutes a helpful indicator of the community of operations. Further, the unity of 
operations implies unity of use. The entities may use identical assets, sometimes 
comingle assets in their operations. The results of their operations are intertwined and the 
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outcomes are in a continuum of interdependency for their ultimate use or 
commercialization. For example, a unity of operation will exist if two entities, related in 
ownership, are the only ones that produce: one car tires, and the other the body of the car, 
products that would not be useful but for the actions of the other. If, in our example, the 
entity that produces the cars operates in a similar fashion as the entity that produces the 
tires and in some regards, uses identical machinery indistinctively owned by one or the 
other entity, and assuming that these are the only two entities in the business of producing 
car tires and body of cars, then those entities would satisfy the unity of operations and 
would meet the unitary business definition under that prong. The bottom line is the not 
separate, legally or otherwise, two entities that are intricately connected and intertwined 
and would not exist by themselves on a standalone basis. And when operations are 
united, when the level of interdependency is established, the unitary business is satisfied 
and UT should come into play 
 
 Two or more entities constitute a unitary business if their functions are centralized. When 
there is a stock ownership link and there is coordination of activities generally through 
centralization of functions, the entities would constitute a unitary business. Centralization 
of functions can be evidenced by, for example, central purchasing, common advertising, 
central administrative functions such as accounting or legal, and centralized management 
through group management divisions. Many MNEs now adopt a system aimed at 
centralizing the most of their common functions within the group. For example, many 
global businesses domicile all their accounting functions in one jurisdiction, all their legal 
functions in one jurisdiction or all their advertising functions in one jurisdiction. Under 
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this system, regardless of where the several entities of the group reside, all their functions 
as relate to accounting legal or advertising are centralized in the same jurisdiction. These 
business structures, when underlined by a stock ownership, would qualify as a unitary 
business subject to UT rules. Again, the aim here to make sure that all that is 
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2. Combined Reporting 
All MNE that qualify as a unitary business will be required report in a combined manner on their 
global operations, their net income from all activities and entities around the globe that form part 
of the unitary business. The net income to be reported on the combined basis globally should be 
computed locally, using of tax base that have been adopted locally. The mechanics of the global 
combined reporting of net income are outlined below, followed by a policy justification for the 
adoption of the combined reporting of global net income. 
 
a. Computation of all gross income should be done locally 
Under a UT system, all gross income is computed locally. Local gross income should mean, for 
all jurisdictions, all incomes. The computation of the entity’s income would take into account, all 
the incomes the entity receives or otherwise is entitled to as per the rules and tax base definitions 
adoption in the jurisdiction in which such entity operates. 
As an illustration, for an entity incorporated in country X, gross income for year Y would be the 
sum of all incomes received by company X. Such incomes would include for example, all 
revenues from sales, all dividends, all interests, all royalties, all gifts, all cancelation of 
indebtedness or any other items of income as specifically received by the entity. 
This definition of gross income would be closer to the definition that the United States tax laws 
give to income. An over encompassing notion that takes into account, all items of income from 
whatever source derived. The source or nature of the income would matter less, and items 
income of whatever nature and from whatever sources would be included in the local 
computation of the entity’s gross income. 
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b. Factoring of Local Deductions and Incentives 
Under the combined reporting of net income, deductions and incentives would be taken into 
account from a local perspective. The UT would encourage and allow for an alignment of 
standard business deductions but all deductions would be taken locally within the jurisdiction of 
the entity’s incorporation. 
Similarly, various incentives adopted by different jurisdictions for different reasons should be 
taken into account at the local level. Many government endeavor, in a legitimate and reasonable 
manner to provide incentives in order to boost certain sectors of their economies and the UT, by 
adopting a system of combined reporting of net income, endorses such practices. 
For example, the UT would encourage general adoption of standard deductions related to 
interests or other common business expenses, and such deductions would be taken into account 
at the local level in arriving at the entity’s net income for that jurisdiction and that specific 
segment of activities. Further, should the local jurisdiction adopt incentives that are legitimate 
and reasonable and that do not promote tax evasion, such incentives would be taken into account 
at the local level in arriving at the entity’s net income for the geographical area and for specific 
segment of activity. 
As a consequence, therefore, deductions should be taken into account locally and local incentives 
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c. Combined reporting of all local country net incomes at the global level 
After all the incomes are taken into account and gross income is determined at the local level for 
the local entities, the deductions and incentives should be taken into account in arriving at the 
local country and local entities net income. 
After the net incomes are computed in local countries and for local entities, the MNE should 
centralize all that information for all entities that form a unitary business and at the level of the 
global MNE, should report to each taxing authority in each of the countries where any of the 
entities that form part of the unitary business conducts activities, the global combined reporting 
of the group. Each taxing jurisdiction connected to the operation of the unitary business shall be 
entitled to receive a combined reporting of all net income of the group globally. 
For example, if company X operates in countries A, B, C, and D, and local computations 
established that each of companies A, B, C, and D have $25 of net income for the year, and 
company X is a unitary business made of operations in countries A, B, C, and D, then each of 
countries A, B, C, and D shall be entitled to and shall receive a combined reporting of net 
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d. Justification of the Reporting of Net Income 
The adoption of the combined reporting of net income is motivated and justified by is many 
advantages including the following: 
On the one hand, the UT does not intend to impede with local countries plans and willingness to 
use their taxing powers to legitimately encourage sectors of activities or boost their economies in 
some shapes or form. Under the UT, countries sovereignty in the area of taxation is not 
eliminated. Countries remain free to adopt legitimate and reasonable incentives from a fiscal 
perspective without running afoul of the UT rules. The adoption of the combined reporting of net 
income achieves that goal. Under the UT, MNEs would be required to account for their revenues 
at the local level, and take into account all the legitimate incentives provided in that local 
jurisdiction in the ultimate computations of the net income for the local jurisdictions. The taxing 
power, and the sovereign right to determine a country’s tax policy remain therefore largely at the 
local country level and the local country’s area of decision. For example, and as indicated above, 
if a country X decides to adopt incentive A and B, subsidiaries or branches of the MNE operating 
in country X would be entitled and in fact would be able to benefit from those local incentives 
should they qualify, and the UT would not stand in the way of such local entities benefiting from 
the local tax incentives. It is worth noting that none of the incentives under the UT would be 
purely for purposes of encouraging non-economic based tax advantages. The acknowledgement 
of local countries right to determine their specific tax policy and eventual adopt tax incentive 
will not constitute a license for the promotion of measure aiming at unfair tax competition or the 
so-called race to the bottom. The UT is primarily a response to current abusive tax situation, 
current schemes of tax evasion and tax avoidance; therefore, any attempt to use the local power 
reserved in forms of incentives to provision tax evasion or undue avoidance would not be 
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sanctioned. Incentives deemed illegitimate and unreasonable, and that are not based on economic 
reality would not be taken into account in the net income calculations. 
On the other hand, one of the main advantages for the UT is its relative simplicity for all the 
parties involved. As seen above, UT is a simpler system for tax authorities and a simpler system 
for businesses. The adoption of the combined reporting of net income underscore the simplicity 
concerns and goals of the UT. By allowing for the net income to be arrived at from a local level 
perspective avoids overly complicated and complex computations at the global level for the 
MNE. The simplicity results from the fact that deductions, is any, are taken into account at the 
local level, making it unnecessary to compile deductions globally and in some instances to 
endeavor to understand and reconcile deductions adopted by one jurisdiction to those of another. 
Furthermore, many MNEs today already operate this way. It is not unusual for a MNE today to 
know and keep record of net income from its operations in each and every jurisdiction. The 
simplicity here would come from the fact that MNEs would only use the information that are 
already used to compiling, recording and utilizing internally. The net income historically 
computed by MNEs would be used, eliminating any unnecessary new step under the UT system. 
In addition, adoption of a different approach, specifically the combined reporting of gross 
income would engender many complexities and inconsistencies. For example, if the gross 
income was reported on a combined basis and globally, all incomes received by each of the local 
entity of a unitary business would be reported at the global level, and it would be incumbent on 
the global organization to conduct to taxable income and net income computations. Under these 
circumstances, one would wonder what definition of tax base would be adopted, what accounting 
principles would be applied and what results would be achieved when the net income 
computations are done globally and detached from the local provisions and local fiscal systems 
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already in place. By avoiding such complexities, the requirement of a combined reporting of net 
income consecrates and underscore the simplicity characteristics of the UT. 
It is worth noting that one could argue that the requirement of combined reporting of net income, 
notwithstanding is merits, would be an invitation to promote tax evasion and tax avoidance. In 
fact, one could argue that by giving countries the liberty to adopt their tax incentives for 
example, the UT basically endorses the fragmentation of the MNEs to all the jurisdiction it 
operates in, one of the cardinal sins of the current international tax system. However, these 
arguments would be true but for the requirement of formulary apportionment as discussed below. 
In fact, deductions and incentives may lead to lower taxable income, but there are no guarantees 
under the UT system that the jurisdiction in which the taxable income may have seemed reduce 
would get to tax any of it. Deductions and incentives reduces taxable income, but the countries 
would not be inclined to adopt more or less deductions and incentives because the number of 
deductions and incentives or lack thereof, does not impact the share, if at all, of their tax 
revenues from the MNE operations. The repartition of the tax revenue amongst the jurisdictions 
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3. Formulary Apportionment 
One of the most debated issues regarding the adoption or not of a UT is the controversy around 
formulary apportionment. While some do not seem to agree with idea of a formula at all, other 
seem to take issue with a kind of formula that could be considered ideal, or the lack thereof. As 
seen above, any idea of adopting a UT would require not only that there be an agreement on a 
well-defined and generally agreed upon notion of unitary business, as well as agreement on the 
combined reporting of net income, but also, there would need to be agreement on the 
apportionment formula to be adopted. Ideally, all countries would agree on an identical 
apportionment formula to be applied. Nevertheless, even without an agreement on an identical 
formula, there are formulas that can be adopted that would satisfy the goals of UT while not 
providing avenues for double taxation. 
The risk, if an identical formula is not adopted is that the same income may be subjected to 
double taxation of to no taxation at all, coming back to the original problem that the UT aims at 
solving. For example, if a MNE operates in jurisdictions A & B, and jurisdictions A & B have 
adopted a UT system but with different apportionment formulas, there will be a real risk of the 
same income being taxed twice by virtue different apportionment factors being used. Or 
similarly, there will be a real risk for some of the income not to be taxed at all because an 
apportionment factor may not include them. In order, therefore to avoid falling in the trap of the 
current system and avoid encouraging similar techniques of tax avoidance or over taxation, a 
formula should be universally adopted or at least be of a kind that can be coordinated with a 
different formula so as not to allow risks of double taxation or for that matter, double non-
taxation. 
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The formula under this research and this model UT tax proposal is the equally weighted three 
factors test based on assets, wages, and sales. Though imperfect as detailed above, this formula 
proposal has the merit of being able to be agreed upon by the various jurisdictions and its 
advantages in taxing economic realities far outweighs its disadvantages. 
Under the equally weighted three factors test, assets, wages, and sales each constitute a factor 
and each has the same weight in determining the countries taxable portion of the overall net 
income of the MNE. In practice, each jurisdiction would compute the number of assets the MNE 
holds in their territory, the amount of wages paid to employees in their country, and the amounts 
of sales concluded from their country, in order to determine the amount of the net income to 
which they are entitled to impose their taxing rights. 
Under this equally weighted test, each of the factors would need a clear and agreeable definition. 
Under the current proposal, assets would mean all assets whether tangible or intangible. The 
location of tangible assets is rather easy to determine and in this proposal would constitute the 
place where the assets can be found. The physical location of the assets will determine in which 
country they are to be used as a factor for determining the net income attributable to that 
jurisdiction. However, the physical location of the assets is only applicable to tangible assets. For 
intangible assets, their location has sparked much debate in the current system of taxing MNE 
and similarly pose a concern under a UT. Nevertheless, under the UT location of use of the IP 
would determine its location as an asset. Under this conception, the place of registration of the 
intellectual property for example, is not the determining factor for location of the intangible. As 
an illustration, if a MNE has an intellectual property address registered in the state of Israel, 
however, the use of that intellectual property is solely related to sales of the products the MNE 
makes into the Cameroonian market. Under these circumstances, the intellectual property would 
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be considered located in Cameroon as an asset, therefore, the factor would be taken into account 
in Cameroon. If the intangible property is used in several jurisdictions, the degree of use in each 
jurisdiction will determine the asset value that would attributable to that jurisdiction and the 
ultimate value from that intangible that would be included in the country’s assets factor in the 
formula. 
Under this proposal, wages would have the common meaning of salaries on the one hand, but 
also include the various new forms of compensation in the market. Therefore, the wages factor 
would include regular salaries, bonuses, incentive based compensation such as stock options, as 
well as contingent forms of compensation. The issue with the wages factor at an international 
context is the exchange rate and the cost of labor. Labor cost in the US are empirically more 
onerous that they would in any developing country and blindly recognizing wages without 
appropriate considerations would lead to undue attribution of excessive taxable income to 
developed countries such as the US. Under this proposal, the wage factor is subject to 
adjustments. To determine how much wages are attributable to a certain jurisdiction and in order 
to compare said wages with those of another jurisdiction, the computation would not be and the 
comparison would not limit itself simply to the amounts at stake, but consideration would be 
taken to how much of the amount represent in overall income in the jurisdiction. For example, 
country A could pay 100 units of currency X (representing $100) in year 1, and in the same year, 
the operations in the US have $500 in wages. Under this approach, we would not limit ourselves 
to comparing and attributing 100 to country A and 500 to the US. Instead, we would look at how 
much the 100 represent in the overall income in Country A and how much the 500 represent in 
the overall income in the US. Thereby, adjusting the wages factor so as to account for the real 
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weight of the wages in each of the jurisdictions, measured as a relative to the overall income of 
the jurisdiction.  
The sales factor adopted in this proposal refers to the gross amount of sales. Under this proposal, 
sales would be deemed located in the jurisdiction in which the buyer is located. Under this 
approach the physical location of the buyer is paramount. Under this proposal, the notion of 
physical address of the buyer is adopted to determine the location of the sale. For in person sales, 
one would rely on the address provided by the buyer at the point of payment. For online sales, 
the shipment address as well as address used at the point of payment are indicators of the 
physical location of the buyer. 
This method of determining the location of sale based on the physical location of the buyer is 
important because it is generally unbiased. While the MNE may want a sale to be located in one 
jurisdiction instead of another in order to benefit from some tax advantages, for buyers, the 
location of the sale is irrelevant for their tax perspective, and they would not use gamesmanship 
or even be aware of any tax gamesmanship related to the report of their physical location. 
The above outlined international tax proposal based on principles of UT would be beneficial, as 
discussed above, to developing, and developed countries while not alienating the private sector. 
The proposal is based on a common understanding of the notion of a unitary business, an 
agreement on the application of combined reporting of net income, and allocation of taxing 
rights based on an apportionment formula composed of an equally weighted three factors test. 
The proposal is intended as a basic outline of generally agreeable pronouncements that would be 
subject to negotiation and adaptations as needed during the country specific adaption of the UT 
system. 
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Further, the proposal, and the UT system in general are not incompatible to most current 
international tax rules, in fact, the current international tax set up can serve as a spring board and 
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B. Compatibility of UT with Current International Tax Treaty Network 
Transfer pricing is currently governed by Article 9 of the treaties, which assumes the Separate 
Accounting (“SA”) method because it addresses the commercial or financial relations between 
associated enterprises.  Traditionally, the term Permanent Establishment (“PE”) was meant to 
include separate entities (subsidiaries). However, in 1933, the League of Nations introduced 
Article 5 (ancestor to the current Article 9 of the Model) where separate enterprises were no 
longer considered PE. If UT were adopted, Article 9 would become irrelevant in those situations 
to which UT applies (i.e., where a unitary business is found to exist) because UT ignores the 
transactions between related parties, and treats them instead as part of a single enterprise. 
Instead, UT would be governed by Article 7. Under Article 5(7), “[t]he fact that a company that 
is a resident of a Contracting State controls or is controlled by a company that is a resident of the 
other Contracting State … shall not of itself constitute either company a permanent 
establishment of the other.” However, it is well established that a dependent agent can be a PE 
(see Art. 5(5)), and whether an agent is dependent is based on whether the principal exercises 
legal and economic control over the agent.  “An agent that is subject to detailed instructions 
regarding the conduct of its operations or comprehensive control by the enterprise is not legally 
independent.”  
In the case of a modern, integrated MNE that operates as a unitary business, a strong argument 
can be made in most cases that the parent of the MNE exercises both legal and economic control 
over the operations of the subsidiaries, especially where the subsidiaries bear no real risk of loss 
and acquire goods and services exclusively or near exclusively from the parent or other related 
corporations. The existence of Intranets in most MNEs has resulted in most important 
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operational decisions being centralized. In that case, the subsidiaries should be regarded as 
dependent agents of the parent. Such a finding is in fact made with increasing frequency in both 
developed and developing countries.  
If the subsidiary is an agent of the parent, Art. 7(2) of the treaties requires the attribution of the 
same profits to the subsidiary “that it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and 
independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar 
conditions.”  Arguably, the application of UT satisfies this arm’s length condition because in the 
absence of precise comparables, which almost never exist, it is not possible to determine exactly 
what profits would have been attributable to the subsidiary under SA.  
When the US adopted the `comparable profit method’ (CPM) and profit split in the 1994 transfer 
pricing regulations, some countries objected that it was violating the treaties because these 
methods did not rely on exact comparables to find the arm’s length price. However, these 
objections eventually subsided, and the OECD endorsed similar methods in its transfer pricing 
guidelines and more recently granted them equivalent status to the traditional methods. The US 
has always maintained that both CPM and profit split satisfy the arm’s length standard despite 
the lack of precise comparables (and in the case of profit split, using no comparables at all to 
allocate any residual profits). Similarly, the US has maintained that the “super-royalty rule” of 
IRC sec. 482 (which requires royalties to be “commensurate with the income” from an 
intangible, and therefore subject to periodic adjustment) is consistent with the arm’s length 
standard, even though no comparables can be found to show that such adjustments are ever made 
by unrelated parties. 
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Before the recent changes to the OECD MC, it was therefore quite plausible to argue that UT 
was compatible with the treaties if the subsidiary were as a factual matter legally or 
economically dependent on the parent so as to constitute a PE. In addition, a country that wished 
to adopt UT could rely on the language of the OECD MC Art. 7(4): 
“Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to determine the profits to be attributed 
to a permanent establishment on the basis of an apportionment of the total profits of the 
enterprise to its various parts, nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from 
determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be necessary; the method of 
apportionment adopted shall, however, be such that the result shall be in accordance with the 
principles contained in this Article.” 
Since it can be argued that in the absence of comparables the result reached under UT is 
equivalent to what could be reached under SA, this language seems to permit the use of UT for 
dependent agent PEs.  
However, the OECD in 2010 adopted changes to article 7 of the MC that would make this 
argument more difficult to sustain. Specifically, the OECD adopted the “authorized OECD 
approach” to the attribution of profits to a PE that treats a PE as the equivalent to a subsidiary, 
and has suggested that the transfer pricing guidelines that explicitly reject UT should be applied 
to PEs. In addition, the OECD has followed the US lead and deleted article 7(4) from its MC. 
However, not all OECD countries accepted these changes, which were also rejected by 
developing countries, and the UN model which still contains article 7(4). 
 
   302 
  
 
In fact, the vast majority of existing actual treaties have not been revised to incorporate those 
changes. In particular, Appendix A (below) shows that many developing country treaties contain 
article 7(4), even when the treaties are with OECD members. The Appendix lists 174 such 
treaties by developing countries that contain this language, including recent treaties such as 
India-Lithuania (2011) India-Nepal (2011) Korea-Panama (2010) and treaties with OECD 
members such as India-Sweden, India-UK, Mexico-UK, and Sri Lanka-US.  In all of those cases, 
or in the absence of a treaty, countries should be free to implement UT in accordance with the 
analysis set out above.  
 
The Customary International Law Argument 
The argument of customary international law does not, either, impede the application of a UT 
approach. The argument is based on the contention that because SA and the ALS are embodied 
in all of the treaties they should be considered binding. But embodiment in the treaties is not 
enough to create a customary international law ban on UT, since article 7(4) is embodied as well. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that Model Tax Treaties do not, in any way or form, create a 
‘right to tax’.  The key issue is the actual practice of states, i.e. what countries actually do as 
domestic laws reign supreme in the area of taxation, and many of them follow UT approaches in 
practice. In addition, countries should be free to follow the UN Model which does not adopt the 
changes made by the OECD, and which is also widely followed. 
Finally, it can be argued that even the OECD may be revising its approach. The authorized 
OECD approach may have marked the high point of OECD commitment to SA. With the 
unfolding of the BEPS project, which is influenced by large developing countries like China and 
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India, it is likely that the OECD may be stepping back from its total commitment to SA.  
Specifically, the adoption under BEPS of country by country reporting  (which was already 
required for extractive industries in the US) can be the basis for implementation of UT. This 
development is very important for developing counties as many rely heavily on extractive 
industries. The requirements of the country by country reporting, will allow a profound change in 
taxation of the major industry in the developing world: the extractive industry. 
 
Does Article 7 Preclude Application of UT to Entire MNEs? 
One important question raised by Durst is whether the requirement that profits be “attributable” 
to a PE under Article 7 of the model treaties means that if UT is applied, it must be done on an 
activity by activity basis. Otherwise, profits would be “attributed” to the PE that have nothing to 
do with it, because the PE is not engaged in the activity that generates these profits. However, 
one would rather not make this assumption, because allowing a MNE to split its activities among 
different subsidiaries is notoriously hard to combat, and facilitates precisely the kind of profit 
shifting that developing countries in particular have a hard time policing. 
In our opinion, the phrase “attributable to a permanent establishment” does not preclude 
attribution of global profits of a MNE to a PE under whatever formula is adopted for UT 
purposes. The reason is that once a functional analysis is performed and whatever can be 
attributed to the various functions by using either comparables or a proxy (such as a fixed 
percentage of costs as suggested by Durst), the remaining residual can be allocated in any way 
we wish, since it is attributable to the entire MNE. 
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Profit splits frequently result in a residual that cannot be allocated under the traditional functional 
analysis because it results from cost savings that inhere in the relationship of the group members 
to each other. The classic example is the US case involving Bausch and Lomb (B and L).  B and 
L developed an unpatented technology that enabled it to manufacture contact lenses at a cost of 
$2.50 per lens, when its competitors had costs of $7.50 per lens. B and L contributed the 
knowhow to its Irish subsidiary. The question facing the US court was whether to accept B and 
L’s view that the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method should apply to determine the price 
charged by the Irish subsidiary to its parent based on a comparison with prices charged by 
independent lens manufacturers despite the difference in production costs. The IRS argued that 
the residual profit from the know-how belonged to the US parent that developed it, but the court 
rejected that view because the residual profit inhered in the relationship between the parties. Had 
B and L Ireland been unrelated to its parent, the know-how would have been disclosed, the 
competitors would have used it, and the residual profit would have disappeared. 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not say what should be done with residuals under the 
profit split method. The US regulations follow the White Paper in assuming that any residual 
results from intangibles and allocating the residual to where the intangibles were developed. This 
is a view that favors US revenue interests because more intangibles are developed in the US than 
elsewhere, but not surprisingly it has not been accepted by other OECD members. Nor is it 
congruent with the facts, since residuals can result from other reasons such as cost savings from 
synergies or advantages of scale, and they usually inhere in the relationship among the group 
members and cannot be allocated to any one of them. 
The OECD’s preferred method of applying the profit split method is to analyze the functions, 
assets and risk of each member of the affiliated group. However, in the context of residuals this 
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method also proves to be illusory. A functional analysis can only be applied to those functions 
that can be assigned to the group members, such as production or distribution, but it does not 
help with residuals that result from the relationship among the group members. Assets can 
include intangibles, which are usually the most valuable assets of a modern MNE, but intangibles 
also get their value from the relationship among the group members, as illustrated by the B and L 
case. This makes it very difficult for them to be allocated to either where they were developed or 
where they are exploited. The Glaxo case in which the IRS and HMRC disagreed about whether 
the profit from selling Zantac, a drug developed in the UK, into the US market resulted from the 
intangibles embodied in the drug itself or those used in Glaxo’s marketing resulted in massive 
double taxation. 
Risk is the trickiest concept of all. Recent case studies by the US Joint Committee on Taxation 
reveal a model in which the entrepreneurial risk for a product is assigned to an affiliate in a low 
tax jurisdiction and the manufacturing and distribution of the product in high tax jurisdictions are 
done on a contract manufacturing and commissionaire basis. But it is not clear what the 
allocation of entrepreneurial risk means among related parties. If a product fails because of 
technological change or defects in manufacturing or environmental hazards, the risk is 
effectively borne by the entire MNE, or more accurately by its management who risk being fired 
and by its shareholders who see the stock price plummet. 
Under UT, these issues can be solved by using the formula to allocate the residual by the profit 
split method. The specific formula used can be negotiated, and is the topic Michael Durst has 
written about. But in our opinion it is clear that whatever formula is decided upon should be 
applied under UT to the entire profit of the integrated MNE, and not divided into separate 
activities, and that this would be perfectly congruent with Article 7. 
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Appendix 1: Current tax Treaties with Article 7-4 Language15 
15 Data compiled from the IBFD, June 2015. 
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Although this paragraph is not included in 
the U.S. Model, this is not a substantive 
difference because the result provided by 
paragraph 4 is consistent with the rest of 
Article 7.  
The U.S. view is that paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
Article 7 authorize the use of total profits 
methods independently of paragraph 4 of 
Article 7 of the OECD Model because total 
profits methods are acceptable methods for 
determining the arm’s length profits of 
affiliated enterprises under Article 9. 
Accordingly, it is understood that, under 
paragraph 2 of the Convention, it is 
permissible to use methods other than 
separate accounting to estimate the arm’s 
length profits of a permanent establishment 
where it is necessary to do so for practical 
reasons, such as when the affairs of the 
permanent establishment are so closely 
bound up with those of the head office that it 
would be impossible to disentangle them on 
any strict basis of accounts.  
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Trinidad and Tobago Feb. 1984 
Art. 28 
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United Arab Emirates 
Feb. 21, 
2001 
 “… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 





“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 





“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 





“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 





“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 





“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 







“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 





“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 





“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 





“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 





“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 





“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 




“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 




 “… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
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apportionment as may be customary…” 
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apportionment method would be 
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KENYA & 
 
                 Thailand 
Dec. 26, 
2006 
 “… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude 
that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…” 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
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